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This thesis is made up of three Chapters. In the first chapter, “Happy, healthy, 
wealthy and rational: Are biases harmful?” I conduct a quasi-experimental survey to 
investigate whether or not five biases and fallacies (present bias, sunk cost fallacy, 
loss aversion, gambler’s fallacy and impact bias) affect the likelihood of depression, 
of an individual participating in socially (un)desirable behaviors and whether or not 
they are associated with lower incomes. Out of the five biases investigated three are 
linked to lower incomes, but only one to a higher likelihood of depression.  
In the second chapter, “The Marginal Benefit of Manipulation: Investigating 
paternalistic interventions in the context of intertemporal choice”, I conduct an 
experiment to determine to what degree a traditional libertarian paternalist (LP) 
intervention, popularly known as a nudge, can outperform an autonomy-enhancing 
paternalist intervention (AEP). I introduce the term Marginal Benefit of 
Manipulation, MBoM, defined as the difference in treatment effect between an LP 
and AEP intervention. I find that the AEP intervention completely failed to alter 
behavior, but while the LP intervention fares better at first, it tapers off towards the 
end of the survey and the treatment effect becomes insignificant. 
In the third chapter, “The Marginal Cost of Transparency: Do honest nudges work?”, 
I conduct another experiment, this time to determine the effect that transparency has 
on the efficacy of a nudge. I introduce the term Marginal Cost of Transparency, 
MCoT, defined as the difference in treatment effect between a libertarian paternalist 
intervention (LP) and what I call a transparent libertarian paternalist (TLP) 
intervention, a type of LP intervention where consumers are made aware of the 





not statistically different from zero and that the answer to the question “Do honest 
nudges work?” is Yes. Furthermore, the results indicate that autonomy-enhancing 
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Behavioral economics has moved from being outré to being accepted and 
mainstream.  However, there are features of behavioral economics that have perhaps 
been accepted all too readily and need to be critically examined.  Among these are 
the use of behavioral nudges to alter consumer behavior to match what the choice 
architect views as more consistent with individual maximization and the 
identification of behavioral biases that, purportedly, reduce individual welfare.  In 
this thesis, using survey analysis, the impact of behavioral biases on individual 
wellbeing is explored in the first chapter and the ethics and efficacy of nudging are 
explored in subsequent chapters.   
A central assumption of economics is that agents are rational and that the 
neoclassical model of individual utility maximization is the gold standard for 
evaluating individual behavior.  Any behavior deviating from this standard is deemed 
a bias and is thus irrational.  Such biased behaviors should lead to a reduction in 
individual wellbeing, and, as such, should be corrected. However, as discussed by 
Berg and Gigerenzer (2010), very little evidence exists that irrationality, as defined 
by neoclassical economics, does in fact reduce utility. This is a critical shortcoming, 
as behavioral economists frequently justify their models by promising, or at least 
aspiring to, improved empirical realism (Camerer 1999, 2003; Rabin, 1998, 2002 and 
Thaler, 1991). Truly realistic models of consumer behavior should be expected to 
identify not just how consumers differ from the neoclassical assumptions, but 
whether and to what extent these differences make them worse off. Parker and 





(DMC) and anti-social, high-risk behavior, and as those with high DMC scores on 
average were less biased, this may seem to vindicate the neoclassical model. 
However, the study suffered from several shortcomings. First, the sample size was 
very small with only 110 participants. Second, the sample was made up only of 18- 
and 19-year old men, putting the external validity of the study into doubt, as there is 
no way to know whether results can be extrapolated to other age groups or to 
women. Finally, as economics was not the focus of the study, no proxy for utility 
was used and the study did not investigate the link between biases and income. As 
debiasing techniques become more sophisticated and able to permanently change 
behavior (Morewedge et al., 2015), it is critical to understand which biases actually 
reduce utility. Otherwise, behavioral economists run the risk of “correcting” biases 
which may be harmless or even beneficial, something that would undoubtedly 
undermine trust in the field among policy-makers as well as the general public. In 
Chapter 1, “Happy, healthy, wealthy and rational: Are biases harmful?”, a quasi-
experimental online survey is developed and implemented specifically to determine 
the link, should it exist, between biases and depression, income and unemployment, 
as well as socially destructive behaviors such as alcohol overconsumption, drug use, 
smoking, obesity/Type II diabetes and socially desirable behaviors such as budgeting 
and saving. 
Behavioral biases also provide the rational for nudging. Nudging, also referred 
to as libertarian paternalism (LP), is an application of behavioral economics 
developed by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein that has become more and more 
common in recent years. Local and national governments as well as private 
businesses have used nudges to reach their policy, regulatory or profit goals. Thaler 





alters people's behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or 
significantly changing their economic incentives.” 
Despite promising results, many have raised ethical concerns with nudging. 
Critics allege that nudging is a short-term solution that may make the problem of 
poor decision-making worse in the long run as consumers come to rely on nudges to 
make good decisions thus spend less time and energy on obtaining information 
(Klick and Mitchell, 2006). Nudging has been criticized for the lack of transparency 
surrounding its use (Binder and Lades, 2015) and the inability for consumers to hold 
choice architects to account. As nudging has become more widespread, these ethical 
concerns are no longer just hypothetical, but have become real world issues. 
More prosaically, nudging can be criticized for not raising revenue, unlike sin 
taxes. Even if a nudge is relatively effective at preventing an undesirable consumer 
behavior, it will not raise revenue, as do sin taxes, that can be used to treat the 
negative effects stemming from those consumers who still do engage in that 
behavior.  
Nudges do little to deal with the underlying causes of faulty consumer behavior 
(O’Brien, 2011). Whereas proponents of libertarian paternalism tend to view bad 
decisions as resulting from psychological biases and heuristics, many of these 
decisions may stem from poor socioeconomic backgrounds, discrimination and 
environments that reinforce racial stereotypes. For example, high school students 
belonging to an ethnic minority may choose not to apply for college, not because 
they are suffering from a present bias that prevents them from valuing the long-term 
benefits that they will gain from higher education, but rather due to lack of educated 





not being evaluated fairly by the university admission offices. Nudging students in 
this situation would “camouflage” rather than deal with the underlying issues that 
they face. 
Autonomy-enhancing paternalism (AEP) is an attempt to rectify several of the 
issues associated with nudging: The goal of these interventions is to make consumers 
more informed and/or provide them with more time to make a decision, or to reverse 
a decision they have made, which will improve their ability to make right decision. 
The effects of these interventions may have a greater potential of permanently 
altering consumer behavior by augmenting the information set (Rogers and Frey, 
2014). Since AEP interventions happen in the open, there is little issue with 
transparency and the ability of consumers to hold policymakers to account for these 
interventions. 
AEP, however, is not itself immune to criticism: AEP can be opposed on the 
basis that it still is a form of government intervention that assumes that policymakers 
know what information consumers need to make decisions or how much time they 
need to consider their decisions before they make them. AEP interventions have also 
been criticized for promoting stigmas. In particular, calorie labels on restaurant 
menus may promote the shaming of overweight and obese individuals and may 
possibly worsen the condition of those struggling with eating disorders, such as 
anorexia (Maughan, 2018). 
Transparent nudges (TLP: Transparent libertarian paternalism) are an 
alternative to both traditional, hidden nudges and AEP interventions. TLP utilizes 
normal nudges but includes disclaimers to consumers letting them know that they are 





ethical issues with nudging, in particular the lack of transparency and accountability 
of responsible policymakers. This makes it a valid option, in particular in cases 
where AEP interventions are unfeasible or proven to be ineffective. It should be 
noted, however, that TLP interventions do not mitigate the issue of nudges having 
only a temporary effect, and by extension the issue of nudges causing learned 
helplessness (Klick and Mitchell, 2006). 
In “The Marginal Benefit of Manipulation: Investigating paternalistic 
interventions in the context of intertemporal choice”, intertemporal choice and 
nudging to alter it is examined.  Understanding intertemporal choice and how to alter 
intertemporal choices is vital in situations where consumers must focus on the long-
term effects of their decisions rather than just considering the short-term benefits.  
This is true with respect to global warming, but it also the case with respect to diet 
choices leading to obesity (Komlos, Smith and Bogin, 2004), smoking (Fersterer and 
Winter-Ebmer, 2003), alcoholism (Petry, 2001), drug use (Kirby and Petry, 2004) 
and cognitive ability (Shamosh and Gray, 2008). While it is far from certain that a 
causal link exists between high discount rates and each of these conditions and 
behaviors, enough evidence exists implicating high discount rates that it is 
worthwhile to consider how they can be lowered.  To do this and to investigate if 
there is a more ethical way to nudge, an experimental online survey is developed and 
implemented to determine the “marginal benefit of manipulation”, defined as the 
difference in treatment effect between a libertarian paternalist (LP) intervention 
(popularly known as a nudge) and an autonomy-enhancing paternalist (AEP) 
intervention. This is the first study to directly compare these two types of 
interventions in an experimental setting and is one of relatively few studies to use a 





In “The Marginal Cost of Transparency: Do honest nudges work?”, an 
experimental online survey is developed and implemented to determine the effect 
that transparency has on the efficacy of a nudge. This is the “marginal cost of 
transparency”, defined as the difference in treatment between a hidden nudge and a 
transparent nudge.  
Whereas Chapter 2 focuses on the difference between a nudge and another type 
of behavioral intervention, Chapter 3 focuses on the effect that transparency has on 
the efficacy of a nudge. Few previous studies had investigated this, and none had 
done so in the context of intertemporal choice. This study also employed a much 
stricter definition of transparency than previous studies, in which the nudged 
participant must be aware of not just that they are being nudged, but how, for what 
end and by whom. 
By varying the size and form of the payoff, vouchers or money, the 
experiments captured the magnitude effect documented by Thaler (1981) and 
investigated how the form of the payoff interacts with the interventions. This 
difference would prove important as the third Chapter found that the efficacy of a 
treatment is partially dependent on the size of a reward (AEP interventions work 
better when rewards are large). 
The interventions tested in the second and third chapters, while similar, are 
distinct. In the second chapter, the AEP intervention was “neutral”, consisting of a 
list of arguments in favor of the larger-later and a list of arguments in favor of the 
smaller-sooner options. In the third chapter the list was made up only of arguments in 
favor of the larger-later option. This change had a great impact on the efficacy of the 





but not in the second. Taken together, this suggests that AEP can work, but also that 
there are limits to how “neutral” a policymaker can be and still expect results from an 
intervention. 
In the third chapter, with its large sample size, it was possible to differentiate 
who paid full attention and those who paid only some attention to the experiment. 
This was determined by their answers to the attention-measuring questions. 
Substantial differences in the treatment effects were found between these two 
samples, with the AEP intervention being drastically more effective among those 
who paid full attention. Differences in treatment effect were also found between 
those participants with only a high school diploma or less, and those with higher 







To elicit preferences and determine the effect of various interventions on consumer 
behavior, as well as investigate the link between biases and financial well-being and 
mental health, this thesis uses online experiments. This raises three overarching 
methodological issues: First, the use and abuse of student-only subjects in 
experiments. Second, the design and reliability of online surveys. Thirdly, the use of 
incentives in experimental economics and in particular the impact of real incentives 
in intertemporal choice experiments. 
2.1 The use of student subjects in social scientific research 
The experiments that are the basis of this thesis included both student and non-
student participants. This differs from most economic experiments which rely 
entirely on student subjects. This is a rather controversial topic in behavioral 
economics, with Bardsley et al. (2009) arguing in their book that, since economic 
theories make no exception for students, it is acceptable to test economic theories 
using students. Thus, if students display discount rates of a different structure than 
predicted by the discounted utility model (Samuelson, 1936), then the discounted 
utility model can be considered not to have behavioral validity. 
Gächter (2010) argues on a similar basis that using students is sufficient to test 
economic theories, further arguing that students are the perfect subject pool as they 
are on average intelligent and used to learning. While this characterization of 
students may be correct, it is debatable whether this makes students a better subject 
pool, as these things distinguish them from the overall adult population. Gächter does 
concede that the optimal subject pool depends on the specific research question but 





For the purposes of testing the assumptions of neoclassical economic theory, 
student samples are technically sufficient, but this is far from the only type of 
experimental economic research where student samples are used. As behavioral 
economics moves on from testing neoclassical assumptions to testing the feasibility 
of policy, the methodology needs to adapt and move from students to the general 
adult population. 
Gächter further argues that replicability is improved when student-only 
samples are used, as students are easily available and other researchers can run the 
same experiment with their own universities’ students to verify the results. In the 
pre-Internet world, this argument certainly held merit, but today adults can be 
reached and allowed to participate in experiments over the internet. Even 
experiments that cannot be conducted online can none the less utilize the internet for 
recruitment, making it easier to reach non-student adults.  
In Chapter 1, while a student-only sample would have been possible, it would 
not have allowed the investigation of a link between income and biases. While 
students do have income, their income is less likely to depend on their cognitive 
abilities or lack thereof, and more likely to depend on the wealth of their parents, 
their ability to get stipends and the student loan and grant system in the country 
where they live. 
Hooghe et al. (2010) noted further that in addition to student-only samples not 
including older individuals, such samples also do not include young people who are 
not attending college. As they show through three different experiments, 
interventions that are effective with undergraduate students may not be effective at 





Experiments in economics which have included students alongside other adults 
have had mixed results. Fehr and List (2004) found that CEOs, when playing two 
versions of a trust game, exhibited greater degree of trust, and a greater degree of 
trustworthiness, than students playing the same games. Cadsby and Maynes (1998), 
in a public goods game, found that nurses acted with a greater degree of co-operation 
than students.  
On the other hand, DeJong, Forsythe and Uecker (1988), in a principal-agent 
experiment, found no difference in prices, quality of service or average profits 
between students and professionals. Dyer, Kagel and Levin (1989) found that 
professionals exhibit similar levels of winner’s curse as students in an auction game. 
Fréchette (2015), in reviewing 13 experimental economic studies that used mixed 
samples (students and professionals) found that the difference between students and 
professionals was statistically insignificant in nine of these studies.  
Unfortunately, none of the experiments comparing students and professionals 
have dealt with either nudges or intertemporal choice. It is known, however, that 
discount rates are negatively correlated with age and continue to decline into 
adulthood (Green, Fry and Myerson, 1994). It therefore seems intuitively reasonable 
that college students may be less patient than older adults. Whether or not this means 
that paternalistic interventions aimed at reducing the discount rate may affect 
students differently cannot be inferred, but as an act of caution, all adults, rather than 








2.2 On the use and reliability of online surveys 
Since the advent of the internet, social scientists have debated how to best conduct 
online surveys, and the advantages and disadvantages of conducting surveys and 
experiments online. 
Couper, Traugott and Lamias (2001) conducted three experiments on the 
effects of survey design on the responses and the response rate of a survey. They 
found that having multiple questions on the same screen significantly reduced the 
time it took to complete the survey and reduced cases of missing data, but that this 
did not significantly affect the responses to the questions themselves. Because of 
this, the surveys that form the foundations of this thesis generally grouped several 
questions together on the same page. Furthermore, they found that allowing 
participants to answer a web survey by only using their computer mouses, instead of 
having to type in their responses, significantly reduced the number of participants 
answering “Don’t know” to the questions. In the context of this thesis, this supports 
the choice of choice tasks in which the participant simply clicks on a button to 
choose an option (larger-later or smaller-sooner), as opposed to matching tasks 
which would have required participants to type the larger-later reward that would be 
the least they would be willing to accept in exchange for forgoing the smaller-sooner 
reward. While a drop-down menu with options could be used to allow participants to 
solve matching tasks without typing, these options could have had an anchoring 
effect which would have biased the responses. 
Galesic and Bosnjak (2009) conducted an experiment investigating the impact 
that the length of an online survey has on participation and completion rates as well 





and the participation and completion rates. They also found that questions asked later 
in a survey receive shorter and more uniform answers. For this reason, the surveys in 
this thesis were kept relatively short, with a comparatively low number of tasks 
compared to most other economic experiments. Furthermore, the intertemporal 
choice tasks in the second and third chapter were placed at the beginning of the 
survey, to improve chances that participants would pay attention and not be tired or 
lack concentration due to having already answered other questions. In the first 
chapter, the tasks intended to discern biases were intermingled with demographic and 
attention-measuring questions, but all tasks were none the less in the first part of the 
survey. The relationship between the length of a survey and the response rate has 
also been documented in studies on mailed surveys (Burchell and Marsh, 1992; 
Jepson et al., 2005). 
All three surveys were designed to allow as much anonymity as possible. This 
was particularly the case for the survey that formed the basis for the first chapter as it 
asked highly sensitive questions about depression, drug and alcohol consumption and 
several other taboo topics. Anonymity has been shown to affect the responses given 
to surveys on alcohol, tobacco and drugs at least among teenagers (Bjarnason and 
Adalbjarnardottir, 2000), and it is intuitively likely that adults too may answer such 
questions differently unless anonymity could be guaranteed. For this reason, this 
survey did not offer any real incentives, as real incentives would have required 
participants to disclose their contact information in order to be able to receive the 
incentive. While there are advantages associated with using real incentives (see 
below for a longer discussion on the topic), the disadvantage of not being able to 





Baatard (2012) and Kaczmirek (2005) recommend that longer surveys allow 
participants to save and continue where they left off. In the context of this thesis, this 
would apply mainly to the survey detailed in the first Chapter, which was 
significantly longer than the surveys in Chapters 2 and 3. There were two reasons 
why this option was not pursued. First, just like real incentives, offering participants 
a chance to save and come back to complete the survey later would almost certainly 
involve violating the anonymity of the participants in question, as they would have to 
disclose their email address to which a link to the part of the survey where they left 
off could be sent. Secondly and most importantly, the external validity of the survey 
would have suffered if participants had had the opportunity to close down the survey 
and look for information about the questions (to ensure that they gave the “right” 
answers) before proceeding. 
Online surveys are generally accepted to reduce the experimenter effect. The 
term, coined by Kintz et al. (1965), refers to the influence that the presence of and 
interactions with an experimenter has on the effect of participants in a study. The 
experimenter effect can bias participants into acting unnaturally, reducing the 
external validity of the experiment, and has been observed in economic experiments 
(Weiss, O’Mahony and Wichchukit, 2010). The anonymity of online surveys and 
experiments is believed to reduce this effect (Denissen, Neumann and Van Zalk, 
2010). No economic experiments have investigated whether the experimenter effect 
is reduced when experiments are conducted online. However, studies from other 
behavioral fields have shown that individuals are more prone to reveal sensitive 
information to computers (“virtual humans”) than to human beings (Pickard, Roster 
and Chen, 2016; Lucas et al., 2014). Another study (Pickard et al., 2019) found that 





by a virtual interviewer as opposed to a human, even when the human in question has 
significant interviewing experience.  
Online surveys also allow for significantly greater (in theory unlimited) sample 
sizes. Whereas sample sizes in lab experiments are limited by the size of the room 
where the experiment takes place, online experiments face no such limitation. This is 
a particularly great advantage when conducting research where the dependent 
variable is binary, as binary variables generally require greater sample sizes to 
analyze than continuous variables. Field experiments also allow for big sample sizes, 
but often require the experimenter to be physically present at the place where the 
experiment takes place in order to collect data, and as discussed by List (2011) many 
field experiments fail due to insufficient sample sizes. Larger sample sizes allow for 
comparison of subgroups which can yield greater insights into economic behavior in 
particular groups (such as people between a certain age). As noted by Zhang and 
Ortmann (2013), economic experiments typically utilize small sample sizes that only 
allow for non-parametric testing of the data. Small sample sizes are also a likely 
reason behind the low replication rates in experimental economics. A review of 85 
replications found that only 42.3 % successfully replicated the results of another 
experiment (Maniadis, Tufano and List, 2017). 
These advantages, however, mean little unless the data collected through online 
surveys is valid. While there are no experimental economic studies comparing the 
behavior of participants in online surveys to those in a traditional lab experiment, 
several such studies do exist in psychology and other behavioral sciences. Meyerson 
and Tryon (2003), using an online survey with a demographically identical sample as 
a previous, in-person study on the Sexual Boredom Scale and five validation scales, 





review, Gosling et al. (2004) found that results from surveys and experiments 
conducted on the internet were consistent with results from lab experiments and in-
person surveys. 
Other researchers, rather than attempting to replicate the results of past lab 
experiments using online experiments, have conducted experiments in which one 
part of the sample took part online, and the other in a lab. Doing this allows for the 
researcher to compare to what extent the behavior of participants in the online group 
differ from the “baseline” group of participants who are taking part in the experiment 
in person. A study on syllogistic reasoning (Musch and Klauer, 2002) found very 
similar results between the online and lab experiment participants, as did a study on 
self-trust (Pasveer and Ellard, 1998). 
In conclusion, it is very likely that internet surveys and experiments induce 
behavior at least as natural as that induced by lab experiments, while simultaneously 
allowing for greater sample sizes. 
2.3 On the use of real incentives  
In experimental economics over the past several decades, the use of real incentives 
has become the norm. The use of real incentives is generally agreed to cause 
participants in experiments to act as they would have in real life, rather than to make 
choices according to what they believe the experimenter wants them to do or what 
they believe will make them look good. In addition, real incentives make 
participating in experiments more attractive, making it easier for experimenters to 
find participants. 
One issue with real incentives is that participants’ decision-making may shift 





third task of an experiment who has already earned $20 on the first two tasks may act 
differently than a participant who has not earned anything on the first two tasks. 
Random lottery incentives are an attempt to solve this problem. Instead of 
participants being paid based on every task in the experiment, they are paid based on 
one, randomly selected task. Since participants do not know which task their pay will 
be based on, they have no way of estimating how much they have earned mid-way 
through an experiment, meaning this cannot influence their behavior.  
Random lottery incentive experiments are, however, not without critics. Smith 
(1982) argues that valid economic experiments must have incentives high enough to 
dominate any subjective costs and benefits to the subject that stem from participating 
in the experiment. Harrison (1994) further argues that since the average payment per 
task is typically very low in such experiments, that participants are likely to commit 
errors when solving tasks, and that results from random lottery incentive experiments 
thus will be biased towards the option that is most likely to result from errors. 
Wilcox (1993), in a similar vein, hypothesized that the greater the dilution of 
rewards, the less accurate would the heuristics used by participants in an experiment 
be. Cubitt, Starmer and Sugden (1998) defended random lottery incentives. In a 
series of three experiments, they found no evidence of bias in random lottery 
incentive experiments compared to single choice incentives in which a participant 
faces only one task and knows that the reward for this single task is real. Violations 
of expected utility theory were not found to be more common in random lottery 
incentive experiments than under single choice conditions.  
In the specific context of intertemporal choice, which is the focus of two of the 
three Chapters of this thesis, there is little-to-no evidence suggesting that incentives 





literature on intertemporal choice experiments found no clear evidence that results 
from experiments which utilized real incentives differed from those that did not. 
Coller and Williams (1999) conducted an intertemporal choice experiment in which 
real incentives were used for one group, and hypothetical incentives for the other. 
The results were the same. Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and l’Haridon (2013) conducted a 
similar experiment, and likewise found that results were overall similar between 
hypothetical and real participant groups. Chapter 2 of this thesis also compared the 
choices of participants who had provided their email address with those who had not. 
Participants needed to provide their email address in order to have a chance to be 
paid. If real incentives had an impact on intertemporal choices, one would expect 
there to be a difference between the choices of participants who provided their email 
addresses and thus had a chance to be paid, and those who did not. No such 
difference was found for any task. 
In what is perhaps the most important study on this topic, Bickel et al. (2009) 
used neuroimaging to test the response of participants solving intertemporal choice 
tasks involving real and hypothetical gains, as well as hypothetical losses. They 
found no within-subject difference between these conditions, again reinforcing the 
idea that real incentives are not strictly necessary when conducting experiments on 
intertemporal choice. 
Finally, exiting an online experiment is rather easy and does not involve any 
type of confrontation, or even interaction, with the experimenter. Thus, if subjects 
feel that the experiment is not worth their time in light of the lack of incentives, or 
that the lack of incentives makes it impossible for them to take the tasks seriously 
and know how they would act, they are likely to simply quit the experiment rather 





3. Key findings 
This thesis uses experimental and quasi-experimental online surveys to examine key 
issues in behavioral economics:  whether biases are indeed harmful and whether 
nudges can be both ethical and effective.  The findings are important and improve 
our knowledge and understanding of behavioral economics and the role it plays in 
practical policy making. 
In Chapter 1, “Happy, healthy, wealthy and rational: Are biases harmful?”, a 
quasi-experimental online survey is implemented to investigate which, if any, of the 
five biases tested are harmful to consumers financial well-being or mental health. 
Only one of the biases is associated with a higher risk of depression, while three are 
associated with a lower income. 
In Chapter 2, “The Marginal Benefit of Manipulation: Investigating 
paternalistic interventions in the context of intertemporal choice”, an experimental 
online survey is carried out to investigate whether a libertarian paternalist 
intervention (nudge) is superior to an autonomy-enhancing paternalist intervention. 
A follow-up survey investigates whether either intervention has any permanent effect 
on behavior. The LP intervention is initially effective, but the treatment effect tapers 
off later in the survey. The AEP intervention turns out to be ineffective. Neither 
intervention has any permanent effect. 
In Chapter 3, “The Marginal Cost of Transparency: Do honest nudges work?”, 
an experimental online survey is carried out to investigate the effect that 
transparency has on the efficacy of nudges. Parallel to this, the experiment 
investigates the effect of a stronger AEP intervention than the one investigated in the 





transparent, and may, in fact, be more effective than hidden nudges provided that 
consumers exposed to them are paying full attention. The AEP intervention also 
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Behavioral economists have over the years discovered a great number of cognitive 
biases and fallacies in human decision-making that violate the neoclassical model of 
consumer behavior (popularly known as Homo Economicus). However, behavioral 
economists have, largely, failed to provide evidence that these violations actually 
reduce utility in any significant way. This paper presents the results of a quasi-
experimental survey designed to determine whether non-neoclassical (“irrational”) 
consumer behavior can be linked to a reduction in income, a higher risk of 
depression, or, possibly, to unhealthy risky behaviors such as smoking or drug use. 
Out of the five biases investigated, only one is associated with a higher risk of 
depression, while three biases are associated with lower earnings. Biases are not, in 
general, linked to unhealthy or risky behaviors. Overall, biases, even when 








Since its introduction as a sub-field of economics, behavioral economics has 
identified a great number of biases, heuristics and other deviations from the 
neoclassical model of consumer behavior. Experimental and empirical data have 
challenged everything from the neoclassical model of time discounting (Frederick, 
O’Donoghue and Loewenstein, 2002) to more basic ideas such as transitive 
preferences (Loomes and Taylor, 1992). 
These discoveries have been followed by various proposals for policy 
interventions and “debiasing” measures. Historically most debiasing measures that 
have been attempted have focused on one bias in one setting and have failed to 
permanently alter behavior. Recently, this has begun to change: Morewedge et al. 
(2015) used a set of computer games and instructional videos to reduce six biases 
with an immediate reduction in erroneous decision-making of 30 percent and a 
reduction of 20 percent three months after the intervention took place.  
Nudging, another well-known form of debiasing, whereby a ‘choice architect’ 
(typically a government official) changes the framing and/or presentation of a choice 
in a manner intended to induce the consumer to make choices that the architect 
deems to be better for the consumer (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). For example, a 
choice architect may attempt to combat obesity by redesigning cafeterias to make the 
unhealthy foods less visible and/or accessible. Proponents of nudging defend this 
type of “manipulation” by arguing that they are merely undoing the harms caused by 
biases. The present bias for instance may cause an individual to overconsume 
unhealthy foods, and the nudge simply undoes the evil influence of the present bias. 
Thus, the nudge is justified as it, in effect, leads to consumers behaving in a manner 





However, as Berg and Gigerenzer (2010) point out, by prescribing policy 
interventions to ‘cure’ irrational behavior, behavioral economists implicitly admit 
that while the neoclassical model of human behavior may be deeply flawed, it is 
none the less a model worth striving for. The neoclassical model, then, becomes 
something of a perhaps unachievable yet still admirable ideal. However, very little 
data supports the idea that consumers whose behavior is closer to the neoclassical 
model are happier, wealthier or less prone to socially undesirable behaviors such as 
drug or alcohol abuse. In fact, some studies even indicate the opposite may be true. 
In an experiment, Berg, Eckel and Johnson (2009) found time-inconsistent 
consumers and consumers who violated the Expected Utility model to have higher 
expected earnings. 
Since debiasing was developed as a concept, researchers have looked for ways 
to permanently reduce biases broadly as opposed to only temporarily in specific 
settings (Nisbett et al., 1987). However, as debiasing measures become more 
effective at broadly reducing biases permanently, it becomes more important to 
understand whether such reductions do in fact benefit individuals, and if not whether 
they at least benefit society as a whole. If in the future we were to develop a button 
that if pushed would eliminate every bias and other deviation from the neoclassical 
model, should we choose to push it?  
Parker and Fischhoff (2005) conducted a longitudinal study which tested the 
relationship between decision-making capacity (DMC) and a range of social factors. 
Participants were asked questions that tested for among other things sensitivity to 
framing, the sunk cost fallacy and present bias, from which a decision-making 
capacity score was then calculated with a higher score indicating a better ability to 





anti-social, high-risk behaviors (such as drug and alcohol abuse), although notably 
the ability to resist falling victim to the sunk cost fallacy was found to be irrelevant. 
As those with high DMC scores were, at least on average, less biased, this may be 
seen as a vindication of the neoclassical model. However, this study suffered from 
several shortfalls. First, the sample size was only 110. Second, all participants were 
males, aged between 18 and 19, which makes the external validity highly 
questionable. Behavior, including high-risk behavior, may still change after the age 
of 18, and ‘flawed’ decision-making processes that cause harm at the age of 18 may 
still be beneficial further down the line. Third, as the study did not mainly focus on 
economics, the authors did not include any proxy for utility (no depression/happiness 
score) nor did they look at income.  
In this paper I conduct an experiment with the goal of establishing whether or 
not deviating from the behavior predicted by the neoclassical model hurts consumers 
individually and/or society as a whole. An important distinction needs to be made 
between these: It is virtually impossible to know whether a behavior is in fact 
irrational for each individual consumer who engages in it. As suggested Becker and 
Murphy (1988), addiction can in fact be modeled as a rational behavior, where 
consuming more and more of an addictive good may maximize a consumer’s 
discounted utility. None the less, there exists no literature suggesting that addiction, 
alcohol or drug consumption is a net benefit to society as a large. Even if an 
individual rationally engages in behavior that will cause (or risk) addiction, this does 
not mean that society as a whole will not suffer from the effects of that rational 
choice (in the form of increased health care costs, costs associated with adopting or 





As it would not be practically feasible to test for every possible bias and 
fallacy, I focus on five well-established deviations from the neoclassical model, loss 
aversion, the sunk cost fallacy, impact bias, present bias and the gambler’s fallacy. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I discuss the five biases, both putting 
forward the economic argument that the biases reduce utility and counterarguments 
that they may be utility enhancing.  In Section 3 I develop my methodology and 
discuss its limitations. In Section 4 I present my results and discuss their meaning, 
and finally In Section 5 I draw my conclusions. 
2. Biases 
Loss aversion 
Loss aversion, first identified by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), refers to 
consumers’ and investors’ tendency to be willing to go to greater lengths and take 
greater risks to avoid losses than to make gains. A loss averse consumer has two 
utility functions: A concave utility function for gains, and a convex utility function 
for losses. This allows the consumers to act simultaneously risk averse and risk 
loving depending on whether losses or gains are involved.  
It has been observed (Haigh and List, 2005) that traders who are ‘in the red’ are 
more prone to take risks than those who are ‘in the black’. In many cases this 
desperation to get ‘back in black’ only ends up causing bigger losses.  
However, a strong aversion towards losses may also spur an individual to take 
action and make changes – even drastic, uncomfortable changes – when losses 
(financial or otherwise) do happen. It is important to keep in mind that in addition to 





loss aversion in some way acts as a ‘counter-weight’ to the status quo bias, spurring 
individuals to abandon the convenience of what is known to avoid losses. 
Sunk cost fallacy 
A neoclassical consumer, when deciding whether to spend money to pursue a certain 
end, would only consider the marginal benefit vs the marginal cost, ignoring any 
irretrievable costs in the past. The sunk cost fallacy (Staw, 1976) however results in 
consumers taking these irretrievable (sunk) costs into account when making 
decisions. This commonly results in ‘throwing good money after bad’, when an 
investor who has lost half the value of his portfolio continues to hold simply because 
he’s already lost so much and does not want the agony he has gone through to have 
been for nothing instead of objectively estimating the likelihood of the portfolio 
having a positive return in the future and based on that deciding whether or not to 
sell. Succumbing to this flawed reasoning can lead to lower future income. Outside 
of economics, many people stay in relationships because they feel that since they 
have already invested so many years, they do not want to throw those years away.  
Thus, this fallacy may also hurt mental health, as in the aforementioned 
example of people who stay in loveless, unhealthy relationships simply because they 
have already been in the relationship for a long time.  
There is, however, a case to be made in favor of the sunk cost fallacy: Consider 
an obese person who, on January 1, buys a 1-year gym membership. Over the course 
of the year, the obese person may be able to ‘fool’ himself into going to the gym 
even though he does not feel like it, by telling himself that “I spent so much money 
on it, if I do not use my gym membership it will all have been a waste”. The sunk 





Likewise, for a severely depressed person, the sunk cost fallacy may be able to 
prevent suicide attempts – “I have fought this depression for so many years, I am not 
going to just throw it all away now”. This is an irrational motivation for living, as 
any past efforts you have sunk into keeping yourself alive are irretrievable and 
should not matter for your decision on whether or not to carry on. A ‘rational’ 
consumer would decide on whether or not to commit suicide by objectively 
estimating whether the net utility of the rest of his/her life was positive or negative. 
In reality this “lifetime utility estimate” is almost impossible to calculate, and 
especially so for someone whose mind is clouded by depression.  
One may counter that individuals should not need to rely on fallacies like the 
sunk cost fallacy in order to partake in healthy behaviors like exercising, or more 
basic things like merely staying alive. However, the fact that there may be a thousand 
rational, fact-based arguments in favor of exercising does not mean that consumers 
do not need or do not in practice benefit from the additional ‘motivation’ that the 
‘flawed’ thinking provides.  
Doody (2013) argues that the sunk cost fallacy is mislabeled and that, from a 
social perspective, caring about sunk costs may make sense. An individual who often 
quits endeavors half-way through may lose reputation and be considered less 
trustworthy, even if quitting was the right choice. An individual who realizes that a 
certain investment, financial or otherwise, was a mistake and quits is essentially 
admitting that he or she committed an error of judgement when he or she started, 
which will impact negatively on how other people view him/her. Depending on how 
great this loss of reputation is, it may make sense to hold and hope that the 






Impact bias (Kahneman and Snell, 1992; Gilbert et al., 1998) refers to a tendency by 
consumers to overestimate the impact of a given event. In economics, the event in 
question is usually a change in income, or the purchase or loss of a good or service. 
Several studies have shown that consumers tend to overestimate in particular how 
long, for example, a salary raise will make them happier, or how long a salary 
reduction will make them less happy. The impact bias can cause sub-optimal 
decision-making as consumers may decide to spend more on something than what it 
is really worth or work harder to receive a raise than what the raise is really worth in 
terms of utility (Hsee and Zhang, 2004). Simply put, the belief that eternal happiness 
or at least eternally increased happiness is only one purchase or salary increase away 
can cause consumers and workers to make poor choices.  
This fallacy is also likely to be exacerbated by cultural factors, at least in the 
developed world. Plenty of advertising is aimed at convincing consumers that the 
product being advertised will be revolutionary and that life will never be the same 
again after purchasing it. Companies also benefit from employees believing that a 
raise or promotion would make them permanently happier, so that they work harder 
than they would if they realized that any increase in utility would be quite small and 
temporary. 
However, similar to how the sunk cost fallacy may keep someone from suicide, 
the impact bias may prevent a person from falling into despair. If one sincerely 
believes that eternal happiness is merely one purchase or promotion away it may be 





people avoid despair, then the economic impact may very well be positive as the 
negative economic consequences of despair are severe (Pecchenino, 2014). 
Present bias 
For consumers with present bias, the per-period discount rate is not constant as 
assumed under the neoclassical Discounted Utility model, but rather falls over time. 
This means that a consumer, who rejects €110 in one year in favor of €100 today, 
may still choose €110 in two years in favor of €100 in one year. There are several 
behavioral economic models that incorporate present bias, most notably the 
hyperbolic discounting model (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992) and quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting model (Laibson, 1997) 
High discount rates have been associated with smoking (Fersterer and Winter-
Ebmer, 2003), obesity (Zhang and Rashad, 2008) and drug use (Kirby, Petry and 
Bickel, 1999). It should be noted, however, that these studies have failed to show a 
causal link. Furthermore, the mindset of a ‘present biased’ individual may be one that 
reduces the risk of depression and despair by focusing on today and not worrying 
about any possible dark clouds that a neoclassical consumer may see on the horizon. 
Hence, while there is a strong case to be made that present bias is socially 
undesirable, we cannot tell from existing literature whether it reduces individual 
utility. 
Gambler’s fallacy 
The gambler’s fallacy, first described by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), and its 
counterpart, the hot hand fallacy (throughout this paper these terms are used 
interchangeably), refers to a tendency among consumers, which is especially 





chance has a memory. A person suffering from the gambler’s fallacy would believe 
that a coin is more likely to come up heads if it came up tails the last time, since 
he/she knows that there is a 50/50 chance of either outcome, while someone 
suffering from the hot hand fallacy would think the likelihood is greater that it comes 
up heads again. In both cases the person is unable to comprehend the difference 
between cumulative probability and individual probability. Though it is unlikely to 
get heads when tossing a coin three times in a row (the cumulative probability is 
1/8), if it were to happen it is not any less likely for the coin to come up heads on the 
fourth toss.  
Chen, Moskowitz and Shue (2016) found evidence for negative autocorrelation 
in decision-making, i.e. gamblers fallacy, among everyone from judges in asylum 
courts to baseball umpires and loan application officers.   
It is easy to see how the gambler’s fallacy could hurt a consumer at a casino – 
such a consumer may convince him/herself to continue gambling because “every 
time I lose, I get closer to a win”, or convince him/herself to bet everything on Red at 
the roulette table just because Black has come up on the last five spins.  
Outside of the casino, the gambler’s fallacy has the potential to cause problems 
by fooling consumers into thinking that their luck must “even out” – if they have 
suffered one unfortunate random event, such as having had their car stolen, they do 
not need to worry about it happening again because the likelihood of one person 
suffering car theft twice in their life is very small. This creates a false sense of 
security that can lead to poor decision-making. Likewise, the hot-hand fallacy may 
cause a person to think that a certain random negative event will not ever happen to 





At the same time, this false sense of security can allow consumers to ignore 
risks that, if they were ‘hanging over their heads’, would reduce their utility. This is 
particularly the case for risks that are difficult or impossible to mitigate. In those 
cases, if consumers did not believe themselves to be immune to whatever the 
negative event was, the anxiety would merely reduce their utility without the 
knowledge of the risk giving them a chance to reduce the risk. 
If it is in fact the case that biases do not harm consumers individually or 
society as a whole, this puts into question the usefulness of debiasing. It would also 
weaken the case for paternalism, i.e. nudging, that is based on the idea that 
consumers, when left to their own devices, end up making choices that reduce both 
their own utility and that of society.  
Given the above analysis I test three hypotheses: First, that no biases other than 
the present bias will be associated with harmful behaviors. Secondly, that only the 
sunk cost fallacy will be associated with reduced earnings. Finally, that both these 







I conducted a quasi-experimental survey online using the platform QuestionPro from 
11 December, 2017 to 11 January, 2018. In total, 1154 participants took part.  
Conducting this experiment online rather than in-person provided a number of 
benefits. First and most importantly, it allowed the experiment to include people of 
all age groups, from dozens of countries, of all employment statuses. This is in 
contrast to traditional lab experiments which tend to have a heavy overrepresentation 
of college students and the demographic groups that they typically belong to, that is 
overwhelmingly young and middle class. Greater diversity improves the external 
validity of the survey. 
Second, there is significantly less effort and time commitment involved in 
participating in an online experiment. Lab experiments, in contrast, take more time as 
participants need to get to and from the location of the lab, material needs to be 
handed out to all participants, and all participants would typically be given time to 
ask questions. This may create a selection bias as the participants who are willing to 
go through this time-consuming ordeal may not be representative of the overall 
population, and possibly not even of their own demographic groups. This 
experiment, on the other hand, took just 20 minutes on average to complete.  
Third, it is likely that the relative anonymity of the internet reduces the 
observer effect, where participants act differently because they feel, rightly or 
wrongly, that they are being watched.  
Finally, the internet allows for a sample size that is practically impossible to 





size of whatever room acts as the “lab”. Very few rooms hold more than few hundred 
people and most labs used for experimental studies are much smaller. 
There are of course also a number of drawbacks associated with online 
experiments. As discussed by Grimelikhuijsen and Meijer (2014), since participants 
cannot be observed while completing the experiment, the experimenter has less 
control and the internal validity suffers. Since I was unable to observe the 
participants, I cannot know for certain whether some of them may have looked up the 
“correct” answers to the questions on the internet. Online experiments are also 
vulnerable to multiple submission, though this appears to be rare (Reips, 2000), a 
risk that was reduced in this survey since participants could not take the survey twice 
using the same IP address. 
Finally, as has been discussed by among others Duda and Nobile (2010), online 
surveys and experiments cannot be considered unbiased, since the condition for 
unbiasedness is that every member in the population under study must have a known 
chance of participating. Since there are no representative samples of email addresses 
for the general population, and since not all in the general population are online, this 
is difficult or impossible to achieve. However, I maintain that online experiments 
still compare favorably to lab experiments on this point since these mainly rely on 
students. 
Usually in economic experiments participants are divided into treatment and 
control groups and the results compared. Here, because the purpose of the study was 
to find out if individuals who acted in a manner consistent with neoclassical 
predictions had better outcomes in life, from both individual and social viewpoints, 





participants are “irrational”. An experiment on loss aversion may reveal that the 
treatment group which was solving tasks involving losses was less risk-averse than 
the control group which solved tasks involving gains, but such an experiment cannot 
tell us which participants suffer from loss aversion, only that loss aversion to some 
extent exists.  
To identify which individuals suffer from loss aversion and other 
biases/fallacies, this experiment asked the same set of questions to all participants. 
This allowed for patterns to be found in the responses that give identification of 
which participants suffer from which biases.  
The survey was divided into two parts. The first part of the survey consisted of 
economic decision-making tasks and tested participants’ tendency to exhibit present 
bias, loss aversion, impact bias, gambler’s fallacy and sunk cost fallacy. To make it 
harder for participants to figure out the purpose of the study, no two questions in a 
row dealt with the same bias/fallacy, and demographic questions were interspersed 
between the tasks. To help participants consider each question separately, there was 
only one question per page. While this study did not rely on any outright deception, it 
was necessary to keep the purpose and hypotheses hidden from participants as this 
might otherwise have affected their choices.  
The second part of the survey asked questions on mental health and whether 
participants partook in a series of socially desirable/undesirable behaviors.  
Interspersed throughout the survey were three ‘trick’ questions, the purpose of 
which was to determine whether or not participants were paying attention and taking 
the survey seriously. These questions were necessary as unserious or inattentive 





This experiment did not utilize real incentives as doing so would have been 
unfeasible for many of the scenarios. Whereas real incentives may trigger more 
realistic responses, in the context of an online survey it would also have limited the 
type of questions and scenarios one could pose to participants. 
Instead, the survey relied on the above-mentioned trick questions to weed out 
unserious participants. It also, to a great extent, relied on questions with realistic 
scenarios that many participants would have found themselves in (or could see 
themselves being in), allowing participants to draw on their experiences when 
answering the questions. Questions were designed to elicit specific biases.  
Loss aversion 
Participants’ loss aversion was examined through three pairs of questions. In the first 
pair, participants were asked to choose between two options: With the first option 
they had a 100 percent chance of winning (losing) €5, with the second option they 
had a 50 percent chance of winning (losing) €10 but a 50 percent chance of not 
winning (losing) anything. The second and third pairs were identical except the 
gains/losses were increased to 20/40 and €100/€200 respectively. A loss averse 
participant would tend to choose the safe option when gains were involved but 
reverse their preference and choose the riskier option in the “loss” tasks.  
While I am unaware of any experiment that has utilized these exact tasks, I 
chose them because they are unequivocally related to loss aversion and they are easy 
to understand. Other experiments (Thaler, Kahneman and Schwartz, 1997) have 
utilized tasks with scenarios from the stock market, but I felt that this would have 
been suboptimal since most people have little or no experience trading stocks and 





Sunk cost fallacy 
Four different tasks were meant to discern which participants were prone to “throw 
good money after bad” as the sunk cost fallacy is informally described. In the first 
task participants are posed with the scenario of having accidentally booked a ticket to 
another movie than the one they wanted to see, and to make it worse, the ticket was 
expensive, non-refundable, and the movie is not even one the participant would 
enjoy watching. Do you still go to the movie? Rationally the answer is No since no 
entertainment would come from watching a bad movie and it is reasonable to assume 
that the evening could be spent on a more enjoyable activity. Participants who suffer 
from the sunk cost fallacy however would choose to go to the movie as they have 
already paid for the ticket and want to get something out of the money rather than 
acknowledge it as an unrecoverable loss not worth dwelling on.  
This task was inspired by Thaler (1980), who cited as an example of a sunk 
cost fallacy a family who decided to attend a game in the middle of a blizzard 
because they had already paid for the (presumably non-refundable) tickets, even 
though they conceded that, had the tickets been free, they would not have gone. 
Similarly, in the task above, having already paid for a ticket induces (some) 
consumers into a non-pleasurable activity.  
In the second task, participants are asked to imagine that they are visiting an 
expensive restaurant that they have looked forward to going to for a long time. The 
meal is just as delicious as expected, but the portion is huge and they soon feel full, 
even though the plate is only half-empty. The restaurant does not offer any to-go 
bags so if they do not finish the meal, it goes to waste. Participants are asked whether 





leave the meal as the marginal utility of eating once full is negative. A consumer 
suffering from the sunk cost fallacy on the other hand will choose to finish the meal 
since it is expensive and they will be paying for the full portion regardless.  
While to the best of my knowledge no previous experiment has used this 
specific task, the tendency for some consumers to consume in order to “get their 
money’s worth”, including in the context of restaurants and buffets, is well-
established (Clark and Goldsmith, 2005; Just and Wansink, 2011) and was the 
inspiration for both this and the final sunk cost fallacy task. 
In the third task participants are asked to imagine they go to a club that has a 
€10 cover fee. They really like the club so they think it is worth it, but shortly after 
arriving they decide to go outside, and when they try to go back in they realize they 
have lost their ticket and the bouncer refuses to believe them when they say they 
have already paid. They are not in a bad spot economically so they could afford to 
pay the cover fee again, or they could go somewhere else. What should they do? 
From a neoclassical viewpoint, the answer is obvious: If the club was worth a €10 
cover fee the first time you entered, it is worth it the second time as well. The fact 
that you already spent €10 makes no difference as there is no way to recover that 
money. The sunk cost fallacy on the other can convince a consumer to refuse to pay 
the additional €10 because the club is not worth a €20 cover fee.  
This question was inspired by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), who asked in 
the context of going to the cinema (buying a second ticket after losing the first one). 
In the final task participants are asked whether they usually eat more to “get 
their money’s worth” at all-you-can-eat buffets. There is no rational reason to do so 





will simply eat until the next bite no longer generates positive marginal utility. The 
‘irrational’ guest sitting at the table next to his on the other hand may very well 
continue stuffing himself with food until he is sick just so he can get his money’s 
worth.  
Impact bias 
In this experiment, two multiple-choice tasks test for impact bias. In the first task, 
consumers are asked for how long they would be happier if they were to win 
€100,000; in the second task, how long they would be happier if they received a 25 
percent salary increase. The only answer option that counted as indicating impact 
bias was “I would be permanently happier”. While it is possible that some 
respondents would in fact be permanently happier, it is unlikely given the well 
documented human ability to adapt to new circumstances. Eventually, the new 
money would simply become part of a “new normal” and utility levels would fall 
back to pre-impact levels.1  
While these tasks have not been used in previous literature, the specific 
scenario of a lottery win has been used in the past to estimate impact bias, including 
by Buechel, Zhang and Morewedge (2017). 
Present bias 
To test for present bias, this experiment included four choice tasks meant to discern 
patterns of discount rates that fall over time. If a participant for example chose €100 
 
1 In the case of individuals with very low levels of income, it may be hypothetically possible that a 
rise in income would make them permanently happier. However, these cases are rare, and likely even 





today over €109 in one month, but then chose €281 in one year over €100 today, this 
would indicate present bias as the per-month interest rate is the same (1.0912=2.81).  
The use of choice tasks to determine intertemporal choice preferences is 
widespread and is in fact the most common way to elicit discount rates (Frederick, 
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2002). One important benefit of choice tasks is the 
ease through which participants can understand the tasks, and how similar the tasks 
are to real world situations (such as when participants are asked between spending 
their money or saving it in a bank account in exchange for a certain fixed interest rate 
for a given time period). 
Gambler’s fallacy 
This experiment includes three tasks that test for gambler’s fallacy. The first task 
asked participants to predict the likelihood of rolling a six, provided they had 
previously rolled two sixes in a row. The second task asked participants to predict the 
outcome of the next coin toss, provided the last six tosses all came up heads.  
While these two tasks were similar, the third task was a scenario task where 
participants were asked to imagine they had arrived at a roulette table, and the dealer 
offers to tell them the outcome of the last 10 spins in exchange for 1 percent of their 
winnings. Accepting this deal indicates that a participant suffers from the gambler’s 
fallacy, as roulette is a game of chance and, since chance does not have a memory, 
any information about past spins is absolutely worthless. Many past experiments 
(Ayton and Fischer, 2004; Barron and Leider, 2010) on gambler’s fallacy and hot 
hand’s fallacy have used roulette as a setting, though none as far as I know have used 





more applied setting so as to test not just participants’ understanding of probability 
theory but also whether they could apply this in a real-world setting. 
Measuring depression 
While happiness (utility) cannot be directly measured, several tests have been 
developed by psychiatrists to measure the presence and severity of depression. This 
experiment relied on the Patient Health Questionnaire, or PHQ-9, which is a well-
recognized screening tool for depression backed up by multiple large studies 
(Kronke, Spitzer and Williams, 2001; Arroll et al., 2010; Martin et al., 2006). PHQ-9 
relies on the patient answering nine multiple-choice questions regarding their 
behavior and state of mind over the past few weeks. There are 4 possible answers to 
each question ranging from “Not at all” to “Nearly every day”, with points allocated 
for each question from 0 (“Not at all”) to 3 (“Nearly every day”). A total score is 
then calculated, ranging from 0 to 27, where a higher score indicates a higher risk of 
depression. If biases are making consumers less happy, one would expect to find that 
biased consumers score higher on this test.  
Economic and lifestyle decision-making 
Even if it were to be the case that biases did not increase the risk of depression, there 
may still be a case for debiasing if biases could be found to be positively correlated 
with socially undesirable behaviors or negatively correlated with socially desirable 
behaviors. This experiment tested for the presence of a range of economic and non-
economic behaviors, as well as income and employment status.  
Finally, participants were given the opportunity to provide feedback. This 
served two purposes. First, the feedback opportunity gave participants an opportunity 





feedback may reveal that a participant did not know what he or she was doing or did 
not take the experiment seriously. In this way, the feedback question compliments 
the previously mentioned trick questions.  
Limitations 
As with any methodology there are certain limitations and potential weaknesses that 
need to be discussed. 
The first is the lack of real incentives. It is generally advised to use real 
incentives in economic experiments, in order to induce participants to act in the way 
they would in real life. This was not feasible in this case as many of the tasks did not 
have a monetary payout at all (such as the sunk cost fallacy tasks). Even those that 
did, such as the intertemporal choice tasks, would have required immediate payout to 
participants (if they chose the smaller-sooner option) which would not have been 
possible. Furthermore, in order to use real incentives, there would have been a need 
for me to have a way to contact participants, such as by having them give me their 
email address, which would have compromised their anonymity and may have 
affected how they responded to some of the more sensitive questions. 
Secondly, many questions touched upon sensitive topics, and as such there is a 
risk that some participants did not answer honestly. This risk contributed to the 
choice of using an anonymous online survey that did not ask participants for any 
identifying details. 
Thirdly, some participants may genuinely not know the answer to all the 
questions. This may explain why only around 11 per cent of participants state that 
they suffer from obesity and/or Type II diabetes. It is likely that not all obese people 





obese. In retrospect asking participants about their height and weight would have 
been wiser. 
Likewise, some people might not know exactly how much alcohol they 
consume in a typical week. Other surveys have employed other techniques to 
accurately measure alcohol consumption, such as having participants look at pictures 
and choose which picture their alcohol consumption most looks like. The platform 
used for this survey, however, did not support the use of graphics. While it is 
possible that some may have underestimated their alcohol consumption, this would 
not necessarily change which biases affect alcohol consumption, which after all is 
why this question was included in the first place.  
The question regarding annual income also suffered from this issue. In many 
countries, including all of Scandinavia where a majority of participants reside, 
salaries are typically stated in monthly terms. While it may seem easy to multiply 
one’s monthly income by twelve in order to get the annual income, it cannot be ruled 
out that some participants unintentionally put down the wrong answer. It also cannot 
be ruled out that some participants, particularly working-class participants who are 
paid on an hourly basis and who may not work the same hours every month, may not 
have known exactly how much money they make in a year. In some cases, it could 
be deduced that participants had written down their monthly, rather than their annual 
income. Participants were asked to provide their income in the currency they were 
paid in, but many who lived in Scandinavia did not and instead wrote down their 
income in euros. There is no way of knowing what exchange rate these participants 
used or how close this exchange rate was to the correct exchange rate. This issue was 
however mitigated by turning the responses to the income question into three 





individuals (intentionally or unintentionally) misstated their income. Overall it seems 
reasonable to assume that participants in the upper quartile have higher incomes than 
those in the bottom quartile. 
There were relatively few tasks associated with measuring each bias. This was 
done for several reasons: Had there been more tasks, the drop-out rate among 
participants would no doubt have increased as few people are willing to spend 
significant amount of time on internet surveys. This would have increased the risk of 
a self-selection bias, as well as reducing the total sample making regression estimates 
less reliable. Furthermore, it was essential for the external validity of the experiment 
that participants remained unaware of the purpose of the experiment, since if 
participants realized that a certain task is testing for the presence of a certain bias it 
could affect how they act. It appears intuitively likely that the likelihood of 
participants realizing the purpose behind the survey would increase with the number 
of questions as participants are more likely to spot patterns.  
It should be noted that the survey dropout rate is unknown since participants 
who did not complete the survey had their responses deleted immediately as 
promised in the survey instructions. This was done for ethical reasons, as a 
participant who did not complete the survey might not consent to having their data 
stored (i.e. they may have changed their mind since they started the survey). None 
the less, this lack of data is a shortcoming as it may have revealed how successful the 








These results were obtained by estimating logistic regressions using the socially 
desirable/undesirable behaviors, mental/physical health states and income as 
dependent variables and the biases and demographic variables as independent 
variables.  
For the biases, scores were calculated for each participant based on their 
answers to the survey. A sunk cost fallacy score of 3 means that the participant chose 
the answer indicating sunk cost fallacy on 3 out of a maximum of 4 tasks. Present 
bias is a binary variable, while the gambler’s fallacy and loss aversion have a 
maximum value of 3 and impact bias a maximum value of 2.  
For the purpose of regression, the biases were turned into binary variables, with 
cut-off scores: The cut-off score is set at 3 for sunk cost fallacy, 2 for impact bias, 
gambler’s fallacy and loss aversion and 1 for present bias. That is; any participant 
who answered in a sunk cost fallacy manner in 3 or more tasks is classified as 
suffering from the sunk cost fallacy, etc. 
Each task has been given the same weight for the purpose of calculating scores. 
While it may be argued that some tasks should be more heavily weighted than others, 
it is not clear which tasks these would be or that there is an objective standard by 
which one could determine how much more heavily some tasks ought to be weighted 
compared to others. 
An additional set of regressions was also estimated with the cut-off score being 
the maximum score for each bias; that is, with participants only being classified as 






Regressions were estimated with and without control variables. The regressions 
with the income-related dependent variables were estimated with a reduced sample 
that excluded retirees, students, unemployed/disabled and part-time workers as these 
would otherwise have muddled the results by having lower-than-average income for 
reasons unrelated to behavior. The “Unemployed” regression was estimated without 
retirees, students and also those over the age of 64 as none of them were 
unemployed. 
Two variables relate to depression. As discussed in the previous section, this 
experiment utilized the PHQ-9 questionnaire, which provides all participants with a 
score from 0 to 27. The cutoff score for the “Depression” variable is 10, which is a 
commonly used score among psychiatrists at which point further treatment would be 
necessary (Kroenke, Spitzer and Williams, 2001; US Preventive Services Task 
Force, 2005). The cutoff score for “NoDepression” is 4; that is, any participant 
scoring higher than a 4 receives a zero in this variable. This, too, is based on 
psychiatric guidelines.  
Furthermore, two variables relate to alcohol consumption – “AlcoholDanger” 
and “AlcoholOveruse” where the former refers to consuming more than 14 units of 
alcohol per week, which is the maximum consumption advised by the NHS (National 
Health Service, 2018). While there are other indicators of problematic alcohol 
consumption, the total consumption in a given week was chosen as other measures, 
such as the frequency with which a participant engages in binge drinking, may have 
increased the number of dishonest responses as participants may be ashamed to 
admit to engaging in binge drinking sessions. “AlcoholOveruse” refers to consuming 





anything beyond minimal alcohol consumption is negative from a health perspective 
and therefore increases health care costs.  
One of the final questions asked participants how much attention they had paid 
to the survey. Those who admitted to not paying any or very little attention were 
removed from the sample. Only those who stated they paid full attention to the 
survey were included in the regressions below as results may otherwise be muddled 
by participants who were not taking the questions and scenarios seriously. 
Participants who failed any of the “trick questions” were also removed, for the same 
reason. 
Model specification and assumptions 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL 1: No control variables 
log Prob(Y=1)/(1 - Prob(Y=1)) = B0 + BPresentBiasdPresentBias + Blossaversedlossaverse + 
Bimpactbiasdimpactbias + Bgamblersfallacydgamblersfallacy + Bsunkcostdsunkcost + Bpatiencescoredpatiencescore 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL 2: Control variables included 
log Prob(Y=1)/(1 - Prob(Y=1)) = B0 + BPresentBiasdPresentBias + Blossaversedlossaverse + 
Bimpactbiasdimpactbias + Bgamblersfallacydgamblersfallacy + Bsunkcostdsunkcost + Bundergraddundergrad + 
Bpostgraddpostgrad + Bage2435dage2435 + Bage3664dage3664 + Bover64dover64+ BAnglospheredAnglosphere 
+ Bdevelopingcountryddevelopingcountry + Botherlocationdotherlocation+ Bpatiencescoredpatiencescore 
where Y is a dependent variable (see Tables 6-10). 
As with any type of regression, there are certain assumptions that must hold true in 
order for a logistic regression – the type that was used for this research – to yield 





First, given that these are binary logistic regressions, the dependent variables 
must be binary variables. This is clearly the case.  
Second, as is the case with ordinary least squares regression, logistic regression 
too requires that observations be independent of one another. There is no reason to 
believe that the answers of one respondent would not be independent of the other 
respondents. The sample is diverse with participants of all ages spread out over most 
of the western world (with a few coming from other parts as well). The only way this 
assumption could reasonably be violated would be if one participant filled out the 
survey multiple times, but this is unlikely to be the case as IP address tracing allowed 
for duplicates to be deleted. While IP address tracing is not foolproof, a participant 
would have to go to great lengths to circumvent it, and it seems implausible that any 
participant would do so as there was no reward for finishing the survey.  
Third, there must be little or no multicollinearity among the independent 
variables in a logistic regressions. By calculating the variance inflation factor it was 
confirmed that this is indeed the case. 
Fourth, logistic regression requires that continuous independent variables be 
linearly related to the log odds. Using the Box-Tidwell test, this assumption was 
tested and the null hypothesis of linearity was never rejected at a 5 per cent 
significance level regardless of which dependent variable was used. 
Finally, logistic regression requires a relatively large sample size. Peduzzi et al. 
(1996) argued that as a guideline the sample size, N, should be at least equal to 
10k/p, where k is the number of independent variables and p the smallest number of 





control variables fulfill this condition, and it is on these that the conclusions of this 
study are mainly based.  
Credibility of results 
With this as with any experiment, there is a very legitimate question on whether or 
not the results are reliable. Were participants honest, even though they had no 
incentive, beyond their own goodwill, to be? Did they take the survey seriously or 
did they view the questions more as a ‘game’ than a serious decision-making 
exercise? One way to get an idea about this is to look at the correlations between the 
demographic, economic and lifestyle variables and compare them with what one 
would expect to find. From the data of this experiment, the following should be 
noted: 
• Private saving increases with age, until retirement when it drops again. This 
is consistent with the life-cycle theory of consumption.  
• Drug use is linked with higher depression scores, a link backed up by 
literature (Grant, 1995). 
• Young people in the survey are more likely to use drugs, which is also known 
to be the case in the general population (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 
2017).  
• Those who are unemployed have higher depression scores in this experiment. 
The link between unemployment and depression is well established in the 
literature (Paul and Moser, 2009). 





• Obese individuals in this survey have higher discount rates, which both 
intuitively makes sense and has been backed up by previous studies (Zhang 
and Rashad, 2008). 
• Obese individuals also score higher depression scores. Obesity has been 
linked to depression (Dong, Sanchez and Price, 2004). 
• Drug users in this experiment are more likely to smoke, which previous 
studies have also found (Degenhart, Hall and Lynskey, 2001). They are also 
more likely to have a dangerous level of alcohol consumption, which is also 
backed up by literature (Burns and Teesson, 2002). 
Based on this, it seems very likely that participants in this survey did in fact 
answer honestly, as it is otherwise hard to explain how all these significant 
correlations that correspond with what we know to be true from previous research 
occurred. 
TABLE 1: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
PresentBias  1 if participant exhibited present bias, 0 otherwise 
sunkcost 1 if participant exhibited sunk cost fallacy on at least 3/4 
tasks, 0 otherwise 
gamblersfallacy 1 if participant exhibited gambler's fallacy on at least 2/3 
tasks, 0 otherwise 
lossaverse 1 if participant exhibited loss aversion on at least 2/3 tasks, 0 
otherwise 
impactfallacy 1 if participant exhibited impact fallacy on 2/2 tasks, 0 
otherwise 
unbiased 1 if participant exhibits one or fewer biases as defined by the 
thresholds, 0 otherwise. 
patiencescore Takes values between 0 and 4 depending on how many times 
the participant chose the larger-later option over the smaller-
sooner option on the intertemporal choice tasks  
depression 1 if participant had a PHQ-9 score of 10 or higher, 0 
otherwise 
nodepression 1 if participant had a PHQ-9 score of 4 or lower, 0 otherwise 






alcoholdanger 1 if participant consumes more than 14 units of alcohol in a 
typical week, 0 otherwise 
alcoholoveruse 1 if participant consumes more than 4 units of alcohol in a 
typical week, 0 otherwise 
smoking 1 if participant smokes or uses other forms of tobacco, 0 
otherwise 
obesity 1 if participant suffers from obesity or type II diabetes, 0 
otherwise 
yesbudget 1 if participant budgets his or her spending, 0 otherwise 
saveprivate 1 if participant regularly saves privately (not just through a 
pension plan), 0 otherwise  
Scandinavia 1 if participant resides in Scandinavia, 0 otherwise 




1 if participant resides in a developing country, 0 otherwise 
otherlocation 1 if participant resides in a country not included above, 0 
otherwise 
highschool 1 if the highest level of education achieved by the participant 
is a high school diploma or less, 0 otherwise 
undergrad 1 if the highest level of education achieved by the participant 
is an undergraduate degree or equivalent, 0 otherwise 
postgrad 1 if the highest level of education achieved by the participant 
is a postgraduate degree or equivalent, 0 otherwise 
age1823 1 if participant is 18-23 years old, 0 otherwise 
age2435 1 if participant is 24-35 years old, 0 otherwise 
age3664 1 if participant is 36-64 years old, 0 otherwise 
over64 1 if participant is over 64 years old, 0 otherwise 
fulltime 1 if participant has held full-time employment, 0 otherwise 
parttime 1 if participant has been employed part-time but not full-
time, 0 otherwise 
neveremployed 1 if participant has never held employment, 0 otherwise 
student 1 if participant is a student, 0 otherwise 
retired 1 if participant is retired, 0 otherwise 
unemployed 1 if participant is unemployed, 0 otherwise  
highincome 1 if participant's annual income is in the upper quartile of the 
sample, 0 otherwise 
abovemedian-
income 
1 if participant's annual income is above the median of the 
sample, 0 otherwise 
lowincome 1 if participant's annual income is in the lower quartile of the 
sample, 0 otherwise 
















As the table shows, the share of individuals suffering from any given bias or fallacy 
ranges from around 18 % for the gambler’s fallacy to just below 56 % for the present 
bias. 












Just over 17 % of participants qualify as depressed according to the PHQ-9 scores. 
Only 11 % suffer from obesity of Type II diabetes, though, as discussed, this variable 






TABLE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF ANNUAL INCOME AMONG 
PARTICIPANTS 
Percentiles 
1% € 4 000 
5% € 14 400 
10% € 19 000 
25% € 31 500 
50% € 45 800 
75% € 65 450 
90% € 93 500 
95% € 130 000 
99% € 500 900 
 
At €45,800 the median income in the sample is higher than in most countries, 
something that may be due to the higher proportion of postgraduate degree holders 
(see Table 5). 




















Just over half the sample reside in Scandinavia, with around one third living in the 
Anglosphere. Very few participants live in the developing world, which makes sense 





users, and the survey was available exclusively in English. Those aged 18-23 are 
overrepresented relative to their share of the adult population in western countries, 
though it should be noted that they are a much smaller share of the sample than in 
traditional lab experiments which frequently rely on all-student samples. The 
unemployment rate in the sample is just below 5 %, which is in line with most 
western countries.  
Before moving on to the regressions, I would like to reiterate my hypotheses: 
First, that no biases other than the present bias will be associated with harmful 
behaviors. Secondly, that only the sunk cost fallacy will be associated with reduced 
earnings. Finally, that both these biases – and only these biases – will be associated 
with a higher rate of depression. 
TABLE 6: DEPRESSION2 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES depression nodepression 
   
PresentBias 0.824 1.332* 
 (0.320) (0.0649) 
lossaverse 1.239 0.944 
 (0.287) (0.716) 
impactbias 0.836 1.318 
 (0.415) (0.104) 
gamblersfallacy 1.416 0.950 
 (0.117) (0.784) 
sunkcost 2.961*** 0.295*** 
 (3.61e-08) (0) 
patiencescore 0.737*** 1.094 
 (5.80e-05) (0.135) 
Constant 0.302*** 1.367 
 (2.91e-06) (0.144) 
   
Observations 852 852 
Pseudo R2 0.0652 0.0513 
 
2 Notes on Tables 6-10: The tables show logistic regression coefficients as odds ratios for the variables 
listed in the left column. Numbers below the odds ratios are p-values.  Each column contains the result 
for a different dependent variable, the name of which can be found at the top of the column. 
Statistically significant results are marked with asterisks with * denoting significant at 90%, ** 






My third hypothesis stated that only the sunk cost fallacy and the present bias would 
be associated with higher likelihood of depression. The sunk cost fallacy is indeed 
associated with higher likelihood of scoring above the depression threshold of the 
PHQ-9 test, and lower likelihood of having a score of 4 or lower that would indicate 
no sign of depression, but the present bias is insignificant. Including the control 
variables made no difference as to which variables were or were not significant. 
TABLE 7: INCOME3 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES highincome abovemedianincome lowincome 
    
PresentBias 1.070 1.336 0.739 
 (0.773) (0.159) (0.194) 
lossaverse 0.695 0.796 1.695** 
 (0.132) (0.267) (0.0220) 
impactbias 0.956 0.776 0.897 
 (0.853) (0.233) (0.660) 
gamblersfallacy 0.725 0.689 1.786** 
 (0.321) (0.160) (0.0369) 
sunkcost 0.511** 0.343*** 2.637*** 
 (0.0250) (1.38e-05) (9.62e-05) 
patiencescore 1.207** 1.172** 0.845* 
 (0.0394) (0.0437) (0.0540) 
Constant 0.278*** 0.925 0.362*** 
 (0.000170) (0.786) (0.00126) 
    
Observations 477 477 477 
Pseudo R2 0.0259 0.0465 0.0519 
 
My second hypothesis stated that only the sunk cost fallacy would be linked to lower 
earnings. Instead, loss aversion and gambler’s fallacy also turned out to be associated 
with having a low income, although only the sunk cost fallacy can be linked to a 
reduced likelihood of having a high, or above median, income. 
 
3 The regressions for the income-related variables excluded 2 participants who had not disclosed their 






TABLE 8: DRUG USE AND ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES druguse alcoholdanger alcoholoveruse 
    
PresentBias 1.217 1.183 1.704*** 
 (0.322) (0.391) (0.000428) 
lossaverse 1.007 0.929 1.049 
 (0.973) (0.709) (0.755) 
impactbias 1.078 1.108 1.002 
 (0.724) (0.617) (0.990) 
gamblersfallacy 0.894 0.734 0.835 
 (0.642) (0.219) (0.323) 
sunkcost 2.255*** 0.639* 0.707** 
 (5.38e-05) (0.0592) (0.0420) 
patiencescore 0.760*** 1.132 1.103* 
 (0.000452) (0.110) (0.0963) 
Constant 0.256*** 0.171*** 0.512*** 
 (2.45e-07) (5.29e-10) (0.00176) 
    
Observations 852 852 852 
Pseudo R2 0.0425 0.0115 0.0160 
 
Only the sunk cost fallacy appears to increase the likelihood of drug use, and the 
inclusion of control variables renders this fallacy insignificant as well. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the present bias is not associated with use of illegal drugs; other studies 
have shown a link between high discount rates and drug use. However, it should be 
noted that the “patiencescore” variable captures high discount rates, meaning the 
present bias variable only represents the effect of having a higher discount rate for 
the present period than for future periods. 
No biases appear to significantly increase the risk of problem drinking. When control 
variables are included, one bias – the gambler’s fallacy – does in fact turn out to be 
significant, but participants suffering from this fallacy are on average less likely to 





It should also be noted that the sunk cost fallacy variable is significant at a 10 
% level and thus may be associated with a lower likelihood of overdrinking, but once 
control variables are included the variable is totally insignificant. 
Only the present bias appears to be correlated with a higher risk of consuming 
more alcohol than what is socially optimal, that is consuming more than very little. 
This makes intuitive sense as the present bias refers to overvaluing the present 
relative to the future, in this context overvaluing the pleasure of consuming alcohol 
today relative to the future health consequences of doing so. The sunk cost fallacy is 
in fact associated with a lower risk of socially suboptimal alcohol consumption, 
though once again this variable turns out to be insignificant once control variables 
are included. 
TABLE 9: SMOKING AND OBESITY/TYPE II DIABETES 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES smoking obesity 
   
PresentBias 0.820 0.879 
 (0.240) (0.569) 
lossaverse 0.967 1.113 
 (0.850) (0.651) 
impactbias 1.173 0.970 
 (0.376) (0.905) 
gamblersfallacy 1.631** 1.078 
 (0.0119) (0.781) 
sunkcost 0.616** 1.096 
 (0.0190) (0.721) 
patiencescore 0.981 0.818** 
 (0.767) (0.0220) 
Constant 0.378*** 0.197*** 
 (3.29e-05) (5.89e-08) 
   
Observations 852 852 







In a surprising twist, the gambler’s fallacy appears to increase the likelihood of 
smoking. The sunk cost fallacy is associated with a decreased likelihood of smoking, 
however the inclusion of control variables renders this variable insignificant. 
No bias appears to be linked to increased risk of obesity or Type II diabetes, 
including, somewhat surprisingly, the present bias. Previous studies have found a 
correlation between high discount rates and obesity (Komlos, Smith and Bogin, 
2004), but it appears that it is only the discount rate itself and not the structure of it 
(whether it is hyperbolic or not) that affects the likelihood of obesity. The inclusion 
of control variables did not substantially change anything; all biases remained 
insignificant. 
TABLE 10: BUDGETING, SAVING AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES yesbudget saveprivate unemployed 
    
PresentBias 0.957 1.575*** 0.769 
 (0.767) (0.00316) (0.442) 
lossaverse 1.162 1.034 0.746 
 (0.327) (0.836) (0.441) 
impactbias 1.217 1.106 0.622 
 (0.222) (0.546) (0.248) 
gamblersfallacy 1.547** 1.023 2.137** 
 (0.0173) (0.904) (0.0471) 
sunkcost 0.955 0.932 0.974 
 (0.782) (0.685) (0.948) 
patiencescore 1.058 1.320*** 0.936 
 (0.326) (3.41e-06) (0.614) 
Constant 0.952 0.703* 0.116*** 
 (0.813) (0.0966) (2.16e-06) 
    
Observations 852 852 538 
Pseudo R2 0.00820 0.0225 0.0226 
 
Budgeting is a good way for consumers to gain an oversight over their income and 
expenditure and avoid spending more than they can afford. The data from this 





consumers budget just as much as ‘rational’ consumers. In the case of consumers 
suffering from the gambler’s fallacy, they actually seem to budget to a greater extent 
than their ‘rational’ counterparts. This remains the case once control variables are 
included. 
Surprisingly, the present bias is positively correlated with regular private 
saving. No other biases are significant; adding control variables does not change this. 
Finally, only the gambler’s fallacy appears to be linked to a higher risk of 
unemployment. All the other biases are insignificant. This remains the case when 
control variables are taken into account. 
My first hypothesis stated that no biases other than the present bias would be 
correlated with harmful behaviors. This is clearly not the case; present bias can only 
be linked to socially sub-optimal alcohol consumption. However, caution is very 
much advised. As previously stated, these regressions included a “patience score” 
variable which measured how many times participants chose the larger-later over the 
smaller-sooner option in the survey. This variable captured any change due to high 
discount rates, and as such the present bias variable only captures any change caused 
by having a hyperbolic discount rate. It appears that what matters is not the shape of 
the discount function, but rather the rate itself. The gambler’s fallacy is associated 
with higher rates of smoking, but also lower alcohol consumption and a greater 
tendency to keep a budget. 
It is important to note that even when biases are significant, their explanatory 
power is consistently very low: The explanatory power, as measured by the pseudo-
R2, is never higher than 7 percent and often below 1 percent. It appears that even if 





Discussion of results 
Of all the biases, the sunk cost fallacy turns out to be the overall most significant, 
being associated with a higher risk of depression, a lower income and a higher 
likelihood of using drugs. It should be noted however that we cannot be certain 
whether there is a causal relationship and, if so, how that relationship works. It is 
possible that the sunk cost fallacy may make an employee stay at a workplace even 
though he/she would be better off elsewhere because the employee feels like he/she 
has invested a lot of time and effort into the current workplace which would be 
wasted if they quit. Likewise, as discussed in the introduction, the sunk cost fallacy 
may make an individual stay in a relationship that is not fulfilling his/her needs, 
simply because they have invested a lot in it. This combined may increase the 
likelihood of depression, which in turn increases the likelihood of drug use.  
However, it is also plausible that a low income may increase the likelihood of 
an individual falling victim to the sunk cost fallacy: People with lower incomes may 
be more likely to feel that they have to “get their money’s worth” and thus, as in the 
experiment, keep eating even when they are full or attend a movie that they have 
already bought a ticket for even though they do not like the movie. 
Likewise, a person suffering from depression may “use” the sunk cost fallacy 
as a way of coping: Telling oneself that suicide is not an option because it would 
mean throwing away all the efforts one has to put into staying alive is irrational from 
a strictly economic viewpoint; the Neoclassical economist’s calculus suggests that all 
that matters is whether total utility of staying alive is expected to be positive or 
negative. However, this “irrational” way of thinking, that is non-neoclassical, may 





Next, the gambler’s fallacy is associated with an increased risk of having a low 
income, of being unemployed and of smoking – but also of a higher tendency to 
budget. It should be noted that the gambler’s fallacy is strongly correlated with 
having a low (high school diploma or less) level of education, and that this may be 
causing the gambler’s fallacy: Since the gambler’s fallacy is essentially a 
misunderstanding of how probability theory works, it would seem intuitively 
reasonable to think that less educated individuals may be more prone to this error. It 
is well-known that having a low education is associated with having a low income 
and a higher likelihood of unemployment. This however cannot fully explain the link 
as the fallacy remains significant even when education is included as a control 
variable.  
Another possible explanation is that those suffering from the gambler’s fallacy 
may be more prone to believe that they could become rich by playing the lottery 
(believing that “I am bound to win soon, I have played it so many times”) or other 
forms of gambling. The inability to understand that they have no more chance of 
winning the lottery the 100th time they play than you have the 1st, and that the 
likelihood is always astronomically small (and that most if not all casino games are 
rigged against them) may make them put less effort into earning a high income 
through work. 
It is also possible that the gambler’s fallacy could act as a sort of coping 
mechanism, being caused by having a low income rather than causing it in the first 
place: In this scenario, a low-income earner may be more prone to think that since 
they have been unlucky in the past (or feels that bad luck has led to them having a 
low-paying job) they are bound to be lucky in the future. In other words, like with 





rather than being caused by, the bias or fallacy in question. One may think that, if 
this were the case, those suffering from gambler’s fallacy ought to also show a higher 
tendency to suffer from depression, but this is not necessarily the case as coping 
mechanisms like this one might in some cases prevent individuals from becoming 
depressed in the first place. 
In the case of smoking it seems plausible that those who suffer from gambler’s 
fallacy, or rather, the hot hand fallacy, may not understand that just because they 
have not developed cancer or other smoking-related diseases yet, that does not mean 
it will not happen to them eventually. 
Loss aversion is also associated with a higher likelihood of having a low 
income. One possible explanation for this would be that loss averse individuals are 
less likely to take chances, perhaps preferring jobs with lower-but-safe salaries and a 
low risk of being laid off, to more volatile industries (such as finance) where pay on 
average may be higher but where there is also a higher turnover and a higher risk of 
earning less in one year than one did in the year before if market conditions change 
(which would mean “losing” income relative to the status quo). Again however, it is 
plausible that having a low income is the cause rather than the effect. An individual 
with a low income may have a more visceral reaction towards the possibility of 
losing money, causing them to do almost anything to avoid it since even a small loss 
is disastrous. 
The present bias appears to increase an individual’s likelihood of regular 
private saving (that is, saving outside of a pension plan). This may seem 
counterintuitive, but it is important to remember that a lot of those who from the 





he/she is likely to overspend due to present bias may be more likely to instruct 
his/her bank to transfer part of his or her salary to a savings account from which it 
cannot be easily withdrawn so that he or she doesn’t get the chance to spend the 
money. It is also possible that those who are already saving may be more prone to 
feel that they “deserve” to choose the smaller-sooner reward since they are acting 
“patiently” in their everyday life. 
Furthermore, the present bias is associated with a higher tendency towards 
socially suboptimal alcohol consumption, which makes sense given that the present 
bias implies favoring short-term enjoyment (such as those that stem from consuming 
alcohol) over long-term benefits (such as better health).  
The least harmful bias appears to be the impact bias, which does not 
significantly affect any variable. 
Correlation coefficients confirm these results with few exceptions: The present 
bias is associated with socially suboptimal alcohol consumption and drug use, 
whereas gambler’s fallacy is associated with depression and higher likelihood of 
unemployment. Further, the sunk cost fallacy is negatively correlated with socially 
suboptimal and dangerous alcohol consumption, as well as drug use.  
In addition to the set of regressions detailed above I ran another set in which 
the bias variables were replaced with a variable named “unbiased” which took the 
value 1 if a participant exhibited one or fewer biases, and 0 otherwise (see Tables 11-
15 in Appendix B). The purpose of this was to get insight into whether biases as a 
whole appeared to be harmful, as it is hypothetically possible that two biases might 
be individually harmless but harmful when an individual suffers from both of them. 





median income and a lower likelihood of having a low income. For all other 
dependent variables, the unbiased variable turned out to be insignificant, suggesting 
that being unbiased does not affect an individual’s tendency to participate in socially 
undesirable, or desirable, activities. Neither does it appear to affect an individual’s 
likelihood of depression. The unbiased variable is balanced, with only slightly more 
participants unbiased than biased, making these predictions more reliable than those 
from the main set. 
Another set of regressions used only participants who stated that they reside in 
Scandinavia. Most notably among these participants, the present bias is associated 
with a lower risk of suffering from depression and increases the likelihood of not 
exhibiting any symptoms of depression as defined by the PHQ-9 scale. The sunk cost 
fallacy is once again associated with a higher risk of depression, but also with a 
higher likelihood to save. Caution is advised as the sample size is small (N=456)- 
Further research is necessary to confirm these results and, if confirmed, investigate 
what elements of the Scandinavian culture and/or economy may be responsible for 
these differences between Scandinavians and people from other countries. 
Finally, a set of regressions was estimated with the cut-off score for each bias 
variable changed to the maximum – for a participant to be classified as suffering 
from the sunk cost fallacy, he/she would have to have answered in a way that 
indicates sunk cost fallacy on all four out of four tasks, and likewise with the other 
biases. In this set, only the sunk cost fallacy is associated with a higher risk of 
depression, whereas the present bias is associated with not having any signs of 
depression (of scoring between 0-4 on the PHQ-9 test). Only the sunk cost fallacy is 
associated with a lower likelihood of having an above median income, and a higher 





with drug use, and weakly (at a 10 per cent significance level) associated with having 
a dangerous alcohol consumption. Present bias in turn is associated with a socially 
suboptimal alcohol consumption. Those in the sample who are suffering from 
gambler’s fallacy are more prone to smoke. Sunk cost fallacy is weakly associated 
with smoking and obesity/type II diabetes. No bias appears to have any effect on the 
tendency of a person to budget, or the risk of a person being unemployed. Finally, 
the present bias increases the tendency to save. It should be noted that these estimates 
are less reliable. This is because few participants are classified as biased, meaning 
the bias variables are heavily skewed while the sample size is unchanged. 
Sensitivity and specificity are generally poor (see Appendix B, Tables 35-36), 
with the area under the ROC curve never being higher than 0.68 for the regressions 
without control variables. This however is to be expected given that many additional 
variables not included in the model(s) affect the dependent variable, and the purpose 
of the study was not to fully explain and account for all variables that affect the 
dependent variables, but rather to determine the effect, or lack thereof, that biases 
have. 
My first hypothesis stated that only the present bias would be linked to harmful 
behaviors. This turned out not to be the case as sunk cost fallacy is associated with 
drug use, and gambler’s fallacy with smoking. 
My second hypothesis stated that only the sunk cost fallacy would be 
associated with reduced earnings. While the sunk cost fallacy is indeed associated 





My third and final hypothesis stated that only the sunk cost fallacy and the 
present bias would be associated with higher levels of depression. In reality, only the 
sunk cost fallacy is associated with a higher risk of depression 
5. Conclusions 
Are biases harmful? The results of this study suggest that the answer is “Not much, if 
at all”. Biases appear to be only at most a relatively minor factor in determining a 
person’s health, income, tendency towards socially destructive/constructive 
behaviors and likelihood of depression.  
As discussed in the previous section, there are areas and situations where being 
biased may be beneficial. Proponents of debiasing may concede this point, but still 
argue that debiasing in certain specific areas where biases are harmful will not stop 
individuals from being biased when they benefit from being biased. In other words, 
teaching someone not to be biased in one context will not carry over into another 
context. While this may be true, the burden is on those who support debiasing to 
prove that debiasing actually does increase utility and that it does not have any 
serious adverse effects. In pharmaceutical research it is standard practice to monitor 
the overall health of the test subjects and not just the area that the medicine is 
supposed to affect. This is to discover any possible side-effects that a new drug may 
have. Behavioral economists, when developing debiasing techniques, need to act 
more like pharmaceutical researchers and dare to look into side-effects and also track 
participants after an intervention has ended as side-effects may not be immediately 
apparent. This becomes all the more critical as debiasing techniques become more 
sophisticated and permanent. Medical drugs are often rejected even though they 





provides. As far as I am aware, no behavioral economist has ever rejected a 
debiasing technique on these grounds – or even tested for possible side effects. 
Future research will focus on exploring this. 
Proponents may further argue that even if biases do sometimes make people 
happy, that this happiness is “fake” and that having people embrace reality is better 
even if it reduces their utility. Whether it is better to be happy living in a lie or sad 
living with the truth is ultimately a philosophical question, however it should be 
noted that virtually all humans lie to themselves to make themselves happy. Ignoring 
our own mortality, signs of aging, or the fact that nearly all of us will be forgotten 
within 100 years of our deaths are all examples of these mood-enhancing “white 
lies”. Would debiasing proponents have the government expend resources on 
reminding citizens about their gray hairs or upcoming death? If not, they will have to 
explain and preferably back up with evidence how the “biased” lies that can keep us 
going through depression and hard times are any different from these.  
In any case, given the low explanatory power of biases, it may be wise for 
policymakers to focus their attention on other ways of reducing social ills and 
improving quality of life. Debiasing is not and will never be a magic bullet towards 
these ends, and behavioral economists who claim so may be suffering from an 
academic form of tunnel vision where they overvalue the significance of biases 
simply because their own field focuses so heavily on them: “When all you have is a 
hammer, everything looks like a nail” as the saying goes. 
Future research will focus on determining whether there is a causal link 
between the biases identified in this work, and if so which way it runs. This may best 





depression scores, incomes, etc. over several years, perhaps decades. Future research 
will also attempt to reach demographics that were not included in this experiment, 
mainly those who do not speak English. This will be accomplished by translating 
future surveys into several languages. 
To conclude, there appears to be little connection between being happy, 
healthy and wealthy on the one hand and “rational” on the other, and the recent 
policy focus on debiasing appears to be severely disproportionate when compared to 
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Appendix A: Survey design 
 
Welcome! 
My name is John Gustavsson and I’m an Economics PhD student at Maynooth 
University in the Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting.  
This survey is part of the experimental research on the topic of economic behavior 
and happiness that I am conducting for my PhD dissertation. In this survey you’ll be 
presented with a series of consumer scenarios and asked to choose between different 
options and courses of action. Please be advised that no question has just one right 
answer; what the correct answer is depends entirely on taste and preferences. Please 
consider each question separately!  
This survey also contains demographic questions and questions regarding personal 
finances as well as mental and physical health.  Please note that some of these 
questions are of a highly sensitive nature! All data will be stored in a password-
protected folder stored in the university system, and there will be no further use of 
the data beyond this study. The data will be saved for 10 years after which it will be 
deleted. 
This survey is entirely anonymous; you will not have to share your name, email or 
any other identifying information to submit your response. This survey is has been 
approved by and is bound by the rules of the Maynooth University Ethics 
Committee. 
You may quit the survey at any time for any reason; if you quit before finishing the 





If you have any questions or you wish to contact me for any reason, you can reach 
me at john.gustavsson.2010@mumail.ie.  
You must be 18 or older to participate in this survey. This survey will take 
approximately 10-15 minutes to complete, obviously depending on how much time 
you spend thinking about your decisions. 
It must be recognized that, in some circumstances, confidentiality of research data 
and records may be overridden by courts in the event of litigation or in the course of 
investigation by lawful authority. In such circumstances the University will take all 
reasonable steps within law to ensure that confidentiality is maintained to the greatest 
possible extent. Although as you don’t have to share any identifying information 
about yourself in this survey, it won’t be possible even with the full dataset to find 
out whom and where you are.  
By proceeding, you agree to take part in this survey, and have your data stored under 
the conditions outlined above. Thank you for your participation! 
Q1: I have read and understand the details of this project; 
I understand 
Q2: I understand that I can leave the survey at any time and my data will not be 
retained. 
I understand 
Q3: I am aware of the sensitive nature of the questions being asked regarding 






Q4: I confirm that I am over 18. 
Click here to confirm 
Q5: NOTE: The scenarios in this survey use euros. 1 euro equals roughly 9.5 
Swedish crowns, 1.2 US Dollars and 0.9 Pound Sterling. Again, please consider each 
scenario separately. 
This survey contains questions regarding mental and physical health as well as 
personal finances. If you're uncomfortable answering these kinds of questions, please 
exit the survey now. Remember that you are anonymous. 
I understand 
Q6: You win a lottery and as your prize, you get to choose between 100 euro today 
or 127 euro a year from now. What do you choose? 
100 euro today 
127 euro a year from now 
Q7: You are given a choice between two options: With Option A you have a 100 % 
chance of losing 20 euro, with Option B a 50 % chance of losing 40 euro but also 50 




Q8: You win a lottery and as your prize, you get to choose between 100 euro today 
or 281 euro a year from now. What do you choose? 





281 euro a year from now 
Q9: You roll a dice twice and get 6 both times. What is the likelihood of getting 6 the 
third time you roll it? 
[comment field] 
Q10: You are given a choice between two options: With Option A you have a 100 % 
chance of losing 5 euro, with option B a 50 % chance of losing 10 euro but also a 50 









Q12: You win a lottery and as your prize, you get to choose between 100 euro today 
or 109 euro a month from now. What do you choose?  
100 euro today 
109 euro a month from now 









Q14: You are given a choice between two options: With Option A you have a 100 % 
chance of winning 20 euro, with option B a 50 % chance of winning 40 euro but also 




Q15: You want to go see a movie in the cinema, but while booking your ticket online 
you absentmindedly book a ticket for another movie that you don’t even like, and to 
make matters worse, the ticket was both expensive and non-refundable. Do you still 
go to the movie?  
Yes 
No 









Q17: You are a given a choice between two options: With Option A you have a 100 
% chance of winning 100 euro, with option B a 50 % chance of winning 200 euro but 




Q18: You toss a coin six times, and it comes up heads all six times. What is the most 




Q19: You’re visiting a very expensive restaurant that you’ve been looking forward to 
go to for a very long time, and the meal is as great as you expected – however, your 
portion is gigantic and after finishing just over half, you already feel really full. The 
restaurant unfortunately does not have any bags that you could bring the food home 
in, so unless you eat the rest of this expensive meal, it goes to waste. What do you 
do? 
Finish the meal 
Leave it 
Q20: You are a given a choice between two options: With Option A you have a 100 
% chance of winning 10 euro, with option B a 50 % chance of winning 20 euro but 








Q21: Imagine that you won 100 000 in a lottery. How long do you think this would 
make you happier than you are now? 




I would be permanently happier 
Q22: Have you ever been employed? 
Yes, I’ve had full-time employment or both full- and part-time employment 
Yes, but only part-time employment. 
No 
Q23: You’ve just arrived at a roulette table and you’re getting ready to play when the 
dealer makes you an offer: He’ll tell you the results of the last 10 spins so you can 
determine which numbers are hot and cold, in exchange for you giving up 1 % of 
your winnings if you do win. There is no other way to find out this information, and 







Q24: What country do you live in? 
[Comment field] 
Q25: You’re going to a club that has a 10 euro cover fee. You like the club so you 
think the fee is worth it. But shortly after you get in you head out for just a few 
minutes, and when you try to get back in your ticket is gone and the bouncer refuses 
to believe you when you insist you already paid. You’re not in a bad spot 
economically so you could afford to simply pay the fee again, annoying as it is, or 
you could go somewhere else. What do you do? 
Pay the cover fee again 
Go somewhere else 
Q26: What is the highest level of education you have achieved? If you're a student, 
pick the option you are currently studying for. 
High school or less 
Undergraduate degree or equivalent 
Postgraduate degree or equivalent 
Q27: You win a lottery and as your prize, you get to choose between 100 euro today 
or 102 euro a month from now. What do you choose? 
100 euro today 
102 euro a month from now 
Q28: You are a given a choice between two options: With Option A you have a 100 
% chance of losing 100 euro, with option B a 50 % chance of losing 200 euro but 












Q30: Suppose you were given a 25 % pay increase (or grant/dole increase if you’re a 
student/unemployed) – for how long do you think this may make you happier than 
you currently are? Note: The pay increase is permanent, not temporarily.  
Less than 1 month 
1 to 3 months 
4 to 12 months 
I would be permanently happier 
PART 2 
Below you will find a number of questions regarding your physical and mental health 
as well as some questions on your personal economy. The following nine questions 
are known as the PHQ-9 test. 
PLEASE KEEP IN MIND THAT THESE ANSWERS ARE 100 % ANONYMOUS 





Over the last two weeks, how often have you been bothered by any of the following 
problems? 
Q31: Little interest or pleasure in doing things? 
Not at all 
Several days 
More than half the days 
Nearly every day 
Q29: Feeling down, depressed or helpless? 
Not at all 
Several days 
More than half the days 
Nearly every day 
Q30: Trouble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too much?  
Not at all 
Several days 
More than half the days 
Nearly every day 
Q31: Feeling tired or having little energy?  






More than half the days 
Nearly every day 
Q32: Poor appetite or overeating? 
Not at all 
Several days 
More than half the days 
Nearly every day 
Q33: Feeling bad about yourself – or that you are a failure or have let yourself or 
your family down?  
Not at all 
Several days 
More than half the days 
Nearly every day 
Q34: Trouble concentrating on things, such as reading the newspaper or watching 
television? 
Not at all 
Several days 
More than half the days 





Q35: Moving or speaking so slowly that other people could have noticed? Or the 
opposite – being so fidgety or restless that you have been moving around a lot more 
than usual? 
Not at all 
Several days 
More than half the days 
Nearly every day 
Q36: Thoughts that you would be better off dead, or of hurting yourself in some 
way?  
Not at all 
Several days 
More than half the days 
Nearly every day 
Q37: Do you smoke or use other forms of tobacco? 
Yes 
No 
Q38: How much alcohol do you consume in an average week? NOTE: One unit 
equals approximately half a pint of beer (4 %), half a glass of wine, one third of a 
glass of cider (4.5 %) or one 25 ml glass of spirits. Hence, if you drink 5 beers in a 










Over 25 units 
Q39: What is your annual income (before taxes)? Please include which currency 
you’re paid in.  
[Comment field] 
Q40: Do you suffer from obesity and/or Type II diabetes?  
Yes 
No 
Q41: Are you currently working? 
Yes 
No, I’m unemployed  
No, I’m a student 
No, I’m retired 
Q42: Do you save regularly?  
Yes, privately or both privately and through a pension plan 











Over 26 times 
Q44: Do you plan your spending ahead of time and then keep to the plan (that is, do 
you stick to a budget)? 
Yes 
No 
Q45: How much attention did you pay to this survey? 
None or very little of my attention 
Some of my attention 
My full attention 
Q46: Do you have any feedback? If so, please use this field. 
[Comment field] 
Q46: By ticking this box and submitting this survey, you are also confirming that  
o   You agree to have you responses stored, and processed in a manner compatible 









Thank you for taking part in this survey. It is recognized that some of these questions 







Appendix B: ADDITIONAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
 
TABLE 11: DEPRESSION (INCLUDING UNBIASED VARIABLE)4 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES depression nodepression 
   
unbiased 0.715* 1.110 
 (0.0841) (0.505) 
undergrad 0.600** 1.697** 
 (0.0401) (0.0161) 
postgrad 0.277*** 2.707*** 
 (9.03e-06) (9.00e-06) 
age2435 0.577** 2.365*** 
 (0.0372) (0.000773) 
age3664 0.385*** 4.613*** 
 (0.00129) (1.48e-08) 
over64 0.109*** 8.935*** 
 (0.000191) (2.67e-09) 
Anglosphere 1.361 0.706* 
 (0.251) (0.0914) 
developingcountry 1.316 0.683 
 (0.563) (0.320) 
otherlocation 1.947* 0.491** 
 (0.0982) (0.0297) 
patiencescore 0.822** 0.941 
 (0.0123) (0.323) 
Constant 1.260 0.330*** 
 (0.558) (0.00133) 
   
Observations 852 852 





4 Notes on Tables 11-15: The tables show logistic regression coefficients as odds ratios for the 
variables listed in the left column. Numbers below the odds ratios are p-values.  Each column contains 
the result for a different dependent variable, the name of which can be found at the top of the column. 
Statistically significant results are marked with asterisks with * denoting significant at 90%, ** 





TABLE 12: INCOME (INCLUDING UNBIASED VARIABLE) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES highincome abovemedianincome lowincome 
    
unbiased 2.056*** 2.062*** 0.568** 
 (0.00264) (0.000570) (0.0195) 
undergrad 3.062** 2.348*** 0.610 
 (0.0283) (0.00761) (0.129) 
postgrad 7.689*** 4.704*** 0.276*** 
 (3.52e-05) (1.08e-06) (0.000197) 
age2435 1.816e+06 5.327** 0.250** 
 (0.981) (0.0338) (0.0116) 
age3664 3.125e+06 12.50*** 0.132*** 
 (0.981) (0.00147) (0.000366) 
over64 7.902e+06 36.37*** 0.0961*** 
 (0.979) (0.000215) (0.00750) 
Anglosphere 2.015** 1.248 1.274 
 (0.0135) (0.391) (0.420) 
developingcountry 0.187 0.105*** 15.41*** 
 (0.127) (0.00655) (1.74e-05) 
otherlocation 0.389 0.234** 5.796*** 
 (0.234) (0.0186) (0.00142) 
patiencescore 1.130 1.044 0.944 
 (0.192) (0.609) (0.551) 
Constant 1.19e-08 0.0250*** 4.289** 
 (0.976) (1.92e-05) (0.0282) 
    
Observations 477 477 477 







TABLE 13: DRUG USE AND ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION (INCLUDING 
UNBIASED VARIABLE) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES druguse alcoholdanger alcoholoveruse 
    
unbiased 0.735 0.901 0.785* 
 (0.118) (0.575) (0.0948) 
undergrad 0.790 0.896 1.203 
 (0.386) (0.679) (0.381) 
postgrad 0.502** 0.899 1.019 
 (0.0218) (0.683) (0.930) 
age2435 1.246 1.604 1.524* 
 (0.405) (0.222) (0.0998) 
age3664 0.656 2.601** 2.243*** 
 (0.163) (0.0131) (0.00218) 
over64 0.198** 5.610*** 2.797*** 
 (0.0149) (8.54e-05) (0.00160) 
Anglosphere 2.573*** 1.151 0.617** 
 (0.000550) (0.585) (0.0143) 
developingcountry 1.576 0.722 0.677 
 (0.373) (0.524) (0.281) 
otherlocation 3.382*** 0.934 0.933 
 (0.00172) (0.882) (0.826) 
patiencescore 0.836** 1.063 0.982 
 (0.0239) (0.412) (0.745) 
Constant 0.348*** 0.0885*** 0.546* 
 (0.00977) (1.41e-07) (0.0664) 
    
Observations 852 852 852 







TABLE 14: SMOKING AND OBESITY/TYPE II DIABETES (INCLUDING 
UNBIASED VARIABLE) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES smoking obesity 
   
unbiased 0.792 0.700 
 (0.159) (0.114) 
undergrad 0.839 1.057 
 (0.445) (0.864) 
postgrad 0.691 0.799 
 (0.106) (0.487) 
age2435 1.751* 5.530*** 
 (0.0807) (0.00228) 
age3664 2.014** 9.582*** 
 (0.0326) (6.15e-05) 
over64 1.225 14.26*** 
 (0.610) (3.19e-05) 
Anglosphere 0.499*** 2.565*** 
 (0.00251) (0.00107) 
developingcountry 0.364** 1.130 
 (0.0444) (0.847) 
otherlocation 0.508* 0.920 
 (0.0860) (0.897) 
patiencescore 0.968 0.840* 
 (0.619) (0.0557) 
Constant 0.410** 0.0225*** 
 (0.0235) (3.46e-09) 
   
Observations 852 852 








TABLE 15: BUDGETING, SAVING AND UNEMPLOYMENT (INCLUDING 
UNBIASED VARIABLE) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES yesbudget saveprivate unemployed 
    
unbiased 0.759* 0.820 1.361 
 (0.0530) (0.188) (0.367) 
undergrad 0.994 0.985 0.599 
 (0.976) (0.945) (0.273) 
postgrad 0.944 1.333 0.648 
 (0.779) (0.192) (0.351) 
age2435 0.935 0.887 1.352 
 (0.776) (0.622) (0.661) 
age3664 0.657* 0.839 1.271 
 (0.0905) (0.494) (0.735) 
over64 0.770 0.219***  
 (0.408) (3.86e-06)  
Anglosphere 0.594*** 0.515*** 1.239 
 (0.00784) (0.00140) (0.616) 
developingcountry 0.747 0.635 1.741 
 (0.407) (0.218) (0.496) 
otherlocation 0.791 0.305*** 5.625*** 
 (0.458) (0.000239) (0.00224) 
patiencescore 1.050 1.303*** 0.897 
 (0.383) (1.10e-05) (0.407) 
Constant 2.111** 1.885* 0.0801*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0540) (0.00255) 
    
Observations 852 852 538 







TABLE 16: DEPRESSION (CONTROL VARIABLES INCLUDED)5 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES depression nodepression 
   
PresentBias 0.883 1.270 
 (0.540) (0.151) 
lossaverse 1.338 0.916 
 (0.168) (0.606) 
impactbias 0.806 1.386* 
 (0.345) (0.0721) 
gamblersfallacy 1.587* 0.833 
 (0.0548) (0.378) 
sunkcost 1.802*** 0.501*** 
 (0.00834) (0.000390) 
undergrad 0.579** 1.836*** 
 (0.0324) (0.00701) 
postgrad 0.287*** 2.742*** 
 (2.16e-05) (1.00e-05) 
age2435 0.622* 2.166*** 
 (0.0782) (0.00301) 
age3664 0.433*** 3.882*** 
 (0.00685) (9.58e-07) 
over64 0.117*** 7.613*** 
 (0.000419) (8.30e-08) 
Anglosphere 1.329 0.726 
 (0.296) (0.126) 
developingcountry 1.065 0.805 
 (0.898) (0.582) 
otherlocation 1.702 0.543* 
 (0.196) (0.0677) 
patiencescore 0.808*** 0.972 
 (0.00826) (0.668) 
Constant 0.848 0.345*** 
 (0.704) (0.00578) 
   
Observations 852 852 




5 Notes on Tables 16-20: The tables show logistic regression coefficients as odds ratios for the 
variables listed in the left column. Numbers below the odds ratios are p-values.  Each column contains 
the result for a different dependent variable, the name of which can be found at the top of the column. 
Statistically significant results are marked with asterisks with * denoting significant at 90%, ** 





TABLE 17: INCOME (CONTROL VARIABLES INCLUDED) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES highincome abovemedianincome lowincome 
    
PresentBias 0.986 1.191 0.955 
 (0.955) (0.439) (0.859) 
lossaverse 0.559** 0.687* 2.001*** 
 (0.0242) (0.0946) (0.00705) 
impactbias 1.004 0.777 0.850 
 (0.986) (0.271) (0.548) 
gamblersfallacy 0.642 0.571* 2.236** 
 (0.217) (0.0599) (0.0109) 
sunkcost 0.544* 0.420*** 1.820** 
 (0.0650) (0.00169) (0.0402) 
undergrad 3.371** 2.525*** 0.577* 
 (0.0180) (0.00439) (0.0993) 
postgrad 8.184*** 4.878*** 0.265*** 
 (2.32e-05) (8.57e-07) (0.000186) 
age2435 2.320e+06 4.991** 0.227*** 
 (0.983) (0.0442) (0.00874) 
age3664 3.945e+06 11.04*** 0.118*** 
 (0.982) (0.00289) (0.000303) 
over64 9.373e+06 29.20*** 0.0767*** 
 (0.981) (0.000615) (0.00498) 
Anglosphere 2.140*** 1.304 1.207 
 (0.00837) (0.312) (0.539) 
developingcountry 0.222 0.125** 13.77*** 
 (0.166) (0.0117) (4.31e-05) 
otherlocation 0.374 0.237** 5.601*** 
 (0.221) (0.0218) (0.00276) 
patiencescore 1.199* 1.116 0.929 
 (0.0813) (0.223) (0.464) 
Constant 1.58e-08 0.0454*** 2.577 
 (0.979) (0.000507) (0.170) 
    
Observations 477 477 477 







TABLE 18: DRUG USE AND ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION (CONTROL 
VARIABLES INCLUDED) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES druguse alcoholdanger alcoholoveruse 
    
PresentBias 1.305 1.178 1.685*** 
 (0.202) (0.417) (0.000796) 
lossaverse 0.944 0.912 1.092 
 (0.789) (0.651) (0.575) 
impactbias 1.050 1.108 1.019 
 (0.828) (0.623) (0.910) 
gamblersfallacy 1.105 0.594** 0.710* 
 (0.701) (0.0470) (0.0740) 
sunkcost 1.245 0.955 1.050 
 (0.329) (0.860) (0.797) 
undergrad 0.782 0.863 1.173 
 (0.372) (0.584) (0.457) 
postgrad 0.506** 0.854 0.967 
 (0.0250) (0.546) (0.873) 
age2435 1.234 1.512 1.403 
 (0.431) (0.288) (0.192) 
age3664 0.677 2.581** 2.210*** 
 (0.212) (0.0166) (0.00366) 
over64 0.214** 6.116*** 3.041*** 
 (0.0219) (6.71e-05) (0.00106) 
Anglosphere 2.655*** 1.189 0.636** 
 (0.000393) (0.507) (0.0238) 
developingcountry 1.567 0.791 0.763 
 (0.384) (0.649) (0.463) 
otherlocation 3.465*** 1.021 1.018 
 (0.00152) (0.965) (0.956) 
patiencescore 0.850* 1.062 1.020 
 (0.0509) (0.456) (0.751) 
Constant 0.222*** 0.0859*** 0.343*** 
 (0.000870) (1.79e-06) (0.00418) 
    
Observations 852 852 852 







TABLE 19: SMOKING AND OBESITY/TYPE II DIABETES (CONTROL 
VARIABLES INCLUDED) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES smoking obesity 
   
PresentBias 0.753 0.842 
 (0.102) (0.465) 
lossaverse 1.034 1.028 
 (0.854) (0.908) 
impactbias 1.144 0.898 
 (0.467) (0.678) 
gamblersfallacy 1.631** 1.022 
 (0.0175) (0.939) 
sunkcost 0.834 1.553 
 (0.423) (0.124) 
undergrad 0.887 0.985 
 (0.606) (0.962) 
postgrad 0.741 0.782 
 (0.195) (0.451) 
age2435 1.791* 6.030*** 
 (0.0720) (0.00151) 
age3664 1.863* 11.01*** 
 (0.0634) (3.32e-05) 
over64 1.037 16.78*** 
 (0.929) (1.84e-05) 
Anglosphere 0.502*** 2.537*** 
 (0.00288) (0.00127) 
developingcountry 0.337** 1.044 
 (0.0320) (0.946) 
otherlocation 0.488* 0.873 
 (0.0719) (0.835) 
patiencescore 0.944 0.811** 
 (0.401) (0.0231) 
Constant 0.407** 0.0193*** 
 (0.0367) (8.00e-09) 
   
Observations 852 852 








TABLE 20: BUDGETING, SAVING AND UNEMPLOYMENT (CONTROL 
VARIABLES INCLUDED) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES yesbudget saveprivate unemployed 
    
PresentBias 0.950 1.503** 0.764 
 (0.735) (0.0104) (0.445) 
lossaverse 1.208 1.119 0.671 
 (0.224) (0.494) (0.308) 
impactbias 1.248 1.074 0.618 
 (0.172) (0.680) (0.249) 
gamblersfallacy 1.555** 1.159 2.208** 
 (0.0197) (0.450) (0.0493) 
sunkcost 0.926 0.964 0.872 
 (0.675) (0.850) (0.753) 
undergrad 1.050 1.011 0.640 
 (0.813) (0.959) (0.349) 
postgrad 0.998 1.345 0.732 
 (0.994) (0.183) (0.508) 
age2435 0.922 0.837 1.304 
 (0.735) (0.472) (0.703) 
age3664 0.603** 0.788 1.079 
 (0.0489) (0.370) (0.917) 
over64 0.671 0.208***  
 (0.222) (3.90e-06)  
Anglosphere 0.590*** 0.526*** 1.290 
 (0.00752) (0.00215) (0.551) 
developingcountry 0.701 0.660 1.361 
 (0.319) (0.265) (0.715) 
otherlocation 0.765 0.312*** 5.850*** 
 (0.399) (0.000336) (0.00209) 
patiencescore 1.040 1.360*** 0.933 
 (0.516) (1.27e-06) (0.609) 
Constant 1.650 1.174 0.115** 
 (0.155) (0.660) (0.0122) 
    
Observations 852 852 538 






TABLE 21: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS6 
 patiencescore saveprivate druguse 
age1823 -0.1169*** -0.0287 0.1471*** 
 (0.0006) (0.4035) (0.0000) 
age2435  0.0199 0.1364*** 
-
0.1466*** 
 (0.5620) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
age3664 0.0199 0.1364*** 
-
0.1466*** 
 (0.5620) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
over64 0.1517*** -0.1405*** 
-
0.1518*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
patiencescore 1*** 0.1372*** 
-
0.1361*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
saveprivate 0.1372*** 1*** -0.0410 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.2319) 
druguse -0.1361*** -0.0410 1*** 
 (0.0001) (0.2319) (0.0000) 
depression -0.1426*** -0.1515*** 0.0975*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0044) 
unemployed -0.0277 -0.1011*** 0.0458 
 (0.4186) (0.0031) (0.1821) 
smoking -0.0037 0.0161 0.1454*** 
 (0.9140) (0.6390) (0.0000) 
obesity -0.0769** -0.0663* -0.0408 
 (0.0249) (0.0530) (0.2336) 
alcoholdanger 0.0545 -0.0736** 0.1008*** 
 (0.1121) (0.0317) (0.0032) 
 depression unemployed smoking 
age1823 0.2392*** -0.0479 
-
0.1132*** 
 (0.0000) (0.1623) (0.0009) 
age2435 -0.1151*** 0.0594* 0.1342*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0829) (0.0001) 
age3664 -0.1151*** 0.0594* 0.1342*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0829) (0.0001) 
over64 -0.1486*** -0.0897*** -0.0188 
 (0.0000) (0.0088) (0.5843) 
patiencescore -0.1426*** -0.0277 -0.0037 
 (0.0000) (0.4186) (0.9140) 
 
6 Notes on Table 21: Numbers below correlation coefficients are p-values. Statistically significant 
results are marked with asterisks with * denoting significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, *** 





saveprivate -0.1515*** -0.1011*** 0.0161 
 (0.0000) (0.0031) (0.6390) 
druguse 0.0975** 0.0458 0.1454*** 
 (0.0044) (0.1821) (0.0000) 
depression 1*** 0.1552*** 0.0094 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.7839) 
unemployed 0.1552*** 1*** -0.0164 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.6323) 
smoking 0.0094 -0.0164 1*** 
 (0.7839) (0.6323) (0.0000) 
obesity 0.0692** -0.0107 0.0076 
 (0.0435) (0.7541) (0.8248) 
alcoholdanger -0.0396 -0.0052 0.2296*** 
 (0.2478) (0.8800) (0.0000) 
 obesity alcoholdanger 
age1823 -0.1075*** -0.1014*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0031)  
age2435 0.0456 0.0239  
 (0.1833)  (0.4851) 
age3664 0.0456 0.0239  
 (0.1833)  (0.4851) 
over64 0.0304 0.1598*** 
 (0.3758) (0.0000)  
patiencescore -0.0769** 0.0545  
 (0.0249) (0.1121)  
saveprivate -0.0663* -0.0736** 
 (0.0530) (0.0317)  
druguse -0.0408 0.1008*** 
 (0.2336) (0.0032)  
depression 0.0692** -0.0396  
 (0.0435) (0.2478)  
unemployed -0.0107 -0.0052  
 (0.7541) (0.8800)  
smoking 0.0076 0.2296*** 
 (0.8248) (0.0000)  
obesity 1*** 0.0364  
 (0.0000) (0.2890)  
alcoholdanger 0.0364 1***  








TABLE 22: CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (INCOME VARIABLES) 
 highincome abovemedianincome lowincome 
age1823 -0.1282*** -0.1850*** 0.2411*** 
 (0.0050) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
age2435 -0.0625 -0.1616*** 0.1379*** 
 (0.1726) (0.0004) (0.0025) 
age3664 0.0616 0.1748*** 
-
0.2041*** 
 (0.1792) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
over64 0.1162** 0.1221*** -0.0628 
 (0.0111) (0.0076) (0.1707) 
Postgrad 0.2471*** 0.2286*** 
-
0.1856*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
 


















7 Table 23 displays the p-values for the Box-tidwell test of the hypothesis that the non-binary variable, 





TABLE 24: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS, BIASES/WELFARE 
MEASURES8 
 PresentBias Lossaverse impactbias gamblersfallacy sunkcost 
Depression 0.0074 0.0233 -0.0227 0.0792** 0.1965*** 
 (0.8286) (0.4966) (0.5088) (0.0209) (0.0000) 
Nodepression 0.0422 -0.0012 0.0418 -0.0265 -0.2485*** 
 (0.2189) (0.9725) (0.2232) (0.4402) (0.0000) 
Highincome -0.0251 -0.0606 -0.0160 -0.0635 -0.1030** 
 (0.5850) (0.1867) (0.7277) (0.1662) (0.0244) 
Abovemedianincome 0.0317 -0.0380 -0.0705 -0.0794* -0.2044*** 
 (0.4899) (0.4072) (0.1241) (0.0833) (0.0000) 
Lowincome -0.0192 0.0895* -0.0022 0.1119** 0.1752*** 
 (0.6754) (0.0507) (0.9611) (0.0145) (0.0001) 
Druguse 0.0703** -0.0101 0.0114 0.0025 0.1442*** 
 (0.0403)  (0.7694) (0.7401) (0.9413) (0.0000) 
AlcoholDanger 0.0094 -0.0096 0.0143 -0.0514 -0.0670* 
 (0.7848) (0.7798) (0.6777) (0.1336) (0.0506) 
Alcoholoveruse 0.1071***  0.0085 -0.0082 -0.0424 -0.0717** 
 (0.0017) (0.8041) (0.8112) (0.2166) (0.0363) 
Smoking -0.0412 0.0027 0.0279 0.0838** -0.0762** 
 (0.2296) (0.9377) (0.4156) (0.0144) (0.0261) 
Obesity 0.0027 0.0121 -0.0038 0.0199 0.0142 
 (0.9364) (0.7237) (0.9109) (0.5627) (0.6791) 
yesbudget -0.0271 0.0405 0.0422 0.0783** -0.0071 
 (0.4295) (0.2374) (0.2187) (0.0223) (0.8352) 
saveprivate 0.0511 0.0119 0.0166 -0.0150 -0.0174 
 (0.1362) (0.7279) (0.6283) (0.6620) (0.6121) 
Unemployed -0.0209 -0.0347 -0.0493 0.0907** -0.0012 




8 Numbers below correlation coefficients are p-values. Statistically significant results are marked with 






TABLE 25: DEPRESSION (EXTREME BIAS VARIABLES)9 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES depression nodepression 
   
PresentBias 0.805 1.351** 
 (0.259) (0.0473) 
lossaverseextreme 0.834 1.219 
 (0.550) (0.380) 
impactbias 0.849 1.267 
 (0.449) (0.152) 
gamblerfallacyextreme 1.179 1.292 
 (0.638) (0.392) 
sunkcostextreme 2.776*** 0.384*** 
 (0.00219) (0.00276) 
patiencescore 0.740*** 1.099 
 (4.79e-05) (0.106) 
Constant 0.446*** 1.003 
 (0.000610) (0.988) 
   
Observations 852 852 
Pseudo R2 0.0352 0.0148 
 
TABLE 26: INCOME (EXTREME BIAS VARIABLES) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES highincome abovemedianincome lowincome 
    
PresentBias 1.049 1.380 0.720 
 (0.838) (0.115) (0.155) 
lossaverseextreme 0.718 1.546 0.873 
 (0.343) (0.143) (0.698) 
impactbias 0.920 0.793 0.871 
 (0.730) (0.272) (0.576) 
gamblerfallacyextreme 0.656 0.881 1.740 
 (0.454) (0.769) (0.215) 
sunkcostextreme 0.740 0.227*** 5.440*** 
 (0.601) (0.00943) (0.000353) 
patiencescore 1.208** 1.157* 0.863* 
 (0.0384) (0.0600) (0.0904) 
Constant 0.232*** 0.670 0.526** 
 (1.09e-05) (0.147) (0.0309) 
    
Observations 477 477 477 
Pseudo R2 0.0131 0.0283 0.0361 
 
9 Notes on Tables 25-29: The tables show logistic regression coefficients as odds ratios for the 
variables listed in the left column. Numbers below the odds ratios are p-values.  Each column contains 
the result for a different dependent variable, the name of which can be found at the top of the column. 
Statistically significant results are marked with asterisks with * denoting significant at 90%, ** 






TABLE 27: DRUG USE AND ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION (EXTREME BIAS 
VARIABLES) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES druguse alcoholdanger alcoholoveruse 
    
PresentBias 1.189 1.193 1.701*** 
 (0.383) (0.370) (0.000461) 
lossaverseextreme 0.792 0.774 0.831 
 (0.465) (0.391) (0.402) 
impactbias 1.079 1.097 0.993 
 (0.721) (0.649) (0.966) 
gamblerfallacyextreme 1.013 1.124 1.286 
 (0.972) (0.749) (0.380) 
sunkcostextreme 3.198*** 0.326* 0.778 
 (0.000422) (0.0641) (0.434) 
patiencescore 0.769*** 1.147* 1.121* 
 (0.000720) (0.0773) (0.0529) 
Constant 0.292*** 0.150*** 0.459*** 
 (8.59e-07) (0) (0.000161) 
    
Observations 852 852 852 
Pseudo R2 0.0376 0.0113 0.0132 
 
TABLE 28: SMOKING AND OBESITY/TYPE II DIABETES (EXTREME 
BIAS VARIABLES) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES smoking obesity 
   
PresentBias 0.837 0.865 
 (0.293) (0.525) 
lossaverseextreme 1.091 0.788 
 (0.723) (0.521) 
impactbias 1.162 0.982 
 (0.407) (0.941) 
gamblerfallacyextreme 2.350*** 0.713 
 (0.00332) (0.489) 
sunkcostextreme 0.450* 0.165* 
 (0.0757) (0.0769) 
patiencescore 0.980 0.806** 
 (0.762) (0.0143) 
Constant 0.357*** 0.241*** 
 (4.87e-06) (4.58e-07) 
   
Observations 852 852 






TABLE 29: BUDGETING, SAVING AND UNEMPLOYMENT (EXTREME 
BIAS VARIABLES) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES yesbudget saveprivate unemployed 
    
PresentBias 0.948 1.589*** 0.801 
 (0.721) (0.00276) (0.517) 
lossaverseextreme 1.167 1.150 1.024 
 (0.479) (0.542) (0.963) 
impactbias 1.213 1.108 0.633 
 (0.227) (0.540) (0.266) 
gamblerfallacyextreme 1.027 1.155 2.027 
 (0.925) (0.630) (0.223) 
sunkcostextreme 1.072 1.188  
 (0.824) (0.604)  
patiencescore 1.044 1.324*** 0.904 
 (0.456) (2.66e-06) (0.441) 
o.sunkcostextreme   - 
    
Constant 1.081 0.670** 0.130*** 
 (0.694) (0.0492) (2.60e-06) 
    
Observations 852 852 512 









TABLE 30: DEPRESSION (SCANDINAVIA-ONLY SAMPLE)10 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES depression nodepression 
   
PresentBias 0.502** 1.911*** 
 (0.0354) (0.00539) 
lossaverse 1.142 1.116 
 (0.701) (0.656) 
impactbias 0.678 1.417 
 (0.309) (0.181) 
gamblersfallacy 0.775 1.258 
 (0.531) (0.419) 
sunkcost 2.335** 0.337*** 
 (0.0408) (0.000534) 
patiencescore 0.764** 1.088 
 (0.0288) (0.353) 
Constant 0.312*** 1.498 
 (0.00791) (0.232) 
   
Observations 456 456 
Pseudo R2 0.0348 0.0391 
 
TABLE 31: INCOME (SCANDINAVIA-ONLY SAMPLE) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES highincome abovemedianincome lowincome 
    
PresentBias 0.730 1.315 0.700 
 (0.304) (0.322) (0.334) 
lossaverse 0.590 1.098 1.307 
 (0.118) (0.746) (0.471) 
impactbias 0.664 0.676 0.758 
 (0.227) (0.176) (0.494) 
gamblersfallacy 0.793 0.608 3.014*** 
 (0.565) (0.146) (0.00654) 
sunkcost 0.355** 0.280*** 2.451** 
 (0.0418) (0.000838) (0.0364) 
patiencescore 1.097 1.019 1.181 
 (0.460) (0.868) (0.278) 
Constant 0.508 1.609 0.103*** 
 (0.152) (0.261) (0.000117) 
    
Observations 276 276 276 
Pseudo R2 0.0352 0.0466 0.0570 
 
10 Notes on Tables 30-34: The tables show logistic regression coefficients as odds ratios for the 
variables listed in the left column. Numbers below the odds ratios are p-values.  Each column contains 
the result for a different dependent variable, the name of which can be found at the top of the column. 
Statistically significant results are marked with asterisks with * denoting significant at 90%, ** 






TABLE 32: DRUG USE AND ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION (SCANDINAVIA-
ONLY SAMPLE) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES druguse alcoholdanger alcoholoveruse 
    
PresentBias 0.986 0.877 1.308 
 (0.971) (0.598) (0.189) 
lossaverse 0.868 0.848 1.130 
 (0.739) (0.536) (0.569) 
impactbias 0.756 1.128 0.902 
 (0.528) (0.647) (0.641) 
gamblersfallacy 0.824 0.630 0.790 
 (0.686) (0.152) (0.330) 
sunkcost 1.944 1.007 0.971 
 (0.168) (0.986) (0.923) 
patiencescore 0.873 1.035 0.943 
 (0.371) (0.733) (0.472) 
Constant 0.118*** 0.297*** 1.133 
 (0.000122) (0.00129) (0.685) 
    
Observations 456 456 456 
Pseudo R2 0.0127 0.00801 0.00706 
 
TABLE 33: SMOKING AND OBESITY/TYPE II DIABETES 
(SCANDINAVIA-ONLY SAMPLE) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES smoking obesity 
   
PresentBias 0.770 0.766 
 (0.230) (0.424) 
lossaverse 1.265 1.219 
 (0.297) (0.559) 
impactbias 0.886 0.908 
 (0.611) (0.793) 
gamblersfallacy 1.217 1.429 
 (0.438) (0.333) 
sunkcost 0.978 1.288 
 (0.945) (0.591) 
patiencescore 0.966 1.031 
 (0.687) (0.819) 
Constant 0.544* 0.106*** 
 (0.0608) (7.95e-06) 
   
Observations 456 456 






TABLE 34: BUDGETING, SAVING AND EMPLOYMENT (SCANDINAVIA-
ONLY SAMPLE) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES yesbudget saveprivate unemployed 
    
PresentBias 1.096 1.928*** 0.487 
 (0.659) (0.00297) (0.158) 
lossaverse 1.331 1.239 0.317 
 (0.196) (0.364) (0.138) 
impactbias 1.117 1.012 0.548 
 (0.624) (0.962) (0.366) 
gamblersfallacy 1.577* 1.288 1.935 
 (0.0719) (0.343) (0.275) 
sunkcost 0.907 2.307** 0.781 
 (0.751) (0.0313) (0.754) 
patiencescore 1.021 1.175* 0.831 
 (0.799) (0.0623) (0.364) 
Constant 1.046 0.835 0.190** 
 (0.887) (0.578) (0.0164) 
    
Observations 456 456 289 


















depression 2.00 99.29 0.6711 
NoDepression 86.05 35.12 0.6418 
highincome 0 100 0.6112 
abovemedianincome 72.95 48.50 0.6423 
lowincome 5.83 96.64 0.6589 
druguse 0 100 0.6435 
alcoholdanger 0 100 0.5727 
alcoholoveruse 28.80 80.50 0.5851 
smoking 0 100 0.5808 
obesity 0 100 0.5740 
yesbudget 86.86 19.74 0.5631 
saveprivate 94.61 11.78 0.5970 
unemployed 0 100 0.5916 
 











depression 11.33 97.86 0.7596 
NoDepression 84.88 47.62 0.7466 
highincome 17.36 94.10 0.7519 
abovemedianincome 71.72 63.95 0.7531 
lowincome 35.00 94.68 0.7713 
druguse 0.70 100 0.7495 
alcoholdanger 0 100 0.6466 
alcoholoveruse 44.80 71.91 0.6425 
smoking 2.34 98.75 0.6558 
obesity 0 100 0.6749 
yesbudget 83.05 26.58 0.5830 
saveprivate 88.48 25.80 0.6669 
unemployed 0 100 0.6407 
 
11 Notes on Tables 35-36: The cutoff score for sensitivity and specificity is 0.5. The first column 
shows a list of dependent variables, with the columns next to it displaying the sensitivity, specificity 
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The Marginal Benefit of Manipulation: Investigating 










Libertarian paternalism (LP) has gained popularity in recent years as an alternative 
way for governments to induce consumers into making “good” decisions. Many, 
however, question the ethics of such interventions, calling them a form of 
psychological manipulation, and instead argue interventions should focus on 
expanding the information set available to consumers and encouraging consumers to 
reason their way to the right decision. Such interventions are known as Autonomy-
Enhancing Paternalism. The question remains how effective such interventions are 
relative to LP interventions. In this paper I introduce the term Marginal Benefit of 
Manipulation (MBoM), the difference between the treatment effect of an LP and an 
AEP intervention. I find that the AEP intervention does not succeed in altering 
behavior, but while the LP intervention initially fares better it backfires towards the 
end of the survey and the treatment effect reverses. Neither intervention appears to 
have any greater effect on behavior beyond the immediate present, though the LP 







Libertarian paternalism (LP) is a divisive topic in behavioral economics. 12 First 
introduced by Thaler and Sunstein (2003), libertarian paternalism is a set of 
interventions intended to “nudge” consumers towards a certain action (or inaction) 
without limiting freedom of choice. This is done through “choice architecture”, a 
process through which an architect (typically a policymaker) designs the choice 
process in such a way as to push consumers towards an action that the architect 
deems would be beneficial to the consumers. Examples include setting the desirable 
action as the default option, giving consumers a “cooling off” period during which 
they can reverse their decision free of charge, and public service 
announcements/informational campaigns intended to convince consumers to take (or 
avoid) a certain course of action. 
While the idea of libertarian paternalistic interventions is appealing to some 
and anathema to others (see Mitchell 2005), two critical questions remain: Do such 
interventions work, and are they ethically justified? 
In their book “Nudge”, Thaler and Sunstein cite evidence for the efficacy of 
libertarian paternalism from areas as diverse as cafeterias to retirement saving plans. 
By designing a menu in such a manner that the healthy options are easily seen while 
the unhealthy options are less visible, consumers can be induced to choose a healthy 
option, while still having the choice of not doing so. And by allowing workers to opt 
 
12 The term is itself controversial, with some arguing that it is an oxymoron, and that no true 
libertarian could possibly support libertarian paternalism. Mitchell (2005) argues that since the cost of 
LP interventions are paid for by all consumers, but LP interventions only help those consumers who 
otherwise would have chosen “poorly”, LP effectively redistributes wealth from the rational to the 
irrational, something that runs contrary to libertarian ideology. The source of conflict stems from a 
different interpretation of “libertarian”, where critics take it to mean “in line with the libertarian 
political/economic ideology” and supporters take it to mean “relatively non-intrusive compared to 
other types of paternalism”. Mitchell is correct that no paternalism (libertarian or otherwise) can ever 





out of a retirement saving plan instead of having to opt in, under-saving can be 
reduced. Through such measures policymakers may nudge consumers into what they 
consider to be the right direction, without having to resort to outright limiting 
choices. 
While at first look this approach appears less invasive than traditional 
paternalistic measures such as sin taxes, it has not escaped criticism. Klick and 
Mitchell (2006) argue that libertarian paternalism may remove opportunities as well 
as incentives for consumers to learn how to make rational decisions, effectively 
making consumers less discerning and in need of more paternalism, potentially 
creating a vicious cycle. In a similar vein, Binder (2014) argues that nudges may put 
a consumer on a learning trajectory that he or she did not choose and that LP 
interventions may have dynamic effects that supporters have failed to investigate. 
Binder also argues that it is nearly impossible to determine what an “acceptable” 
level of rationality is and how big a deviation from the neoclassical model must be to 
justify a libertarian paternalistic intervention, creating a risk of a “slippery slope” 
situation. Additionally, one may of course question whether or not the neoclassical 
model is even the best model to begin with (Berg and Gigerenzer, 2010). Finally, 
Binder argues that any libertarian paternalistic intervention will tend to be 
conservative in nature, aimed at promoting behaviors considered correct by the 
culture and society at the time.  
Defenders of libertarian paternalism argue that since framing is inevitable – the 
items on a menu have to be ordered in some way, after all – one may as well frame in 
such a manner as to help the individual make a (from the perspective of the choice 
architect) good decision (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). This implicitly assumes that 





top of the menu (or to do it for any non-LP reason, such as standard profit 
maximization) is not the same as to do it on purpose to make people eat salad. The 
latter creates a precedent for using psychological manipulation to help individuals do 
what is “right”, a precedent that can then be used to justify further interventions.  
Proponents of libertarian paternalism often make the claim that what they are 
nudging consumers to do are the same things the consumers wished they had the 
willpower to do on their own; the nudges are, so to speak, in line with consumer 
metapreferences. Thaler and Sunstein in their aforementioned book note that the vast 
majority of smokers would like to quit, and so by imposing nudges that make it 
harder for them to smoke or to access cigarettes, policymakers would really be doing 
them a favor. 
The problem with this argument is that metapreferences are not observable. 
While it is true that most smokers who have been surveyed claim to want to quit, we 
have no way of knowing whether they actually want to quit or whether they are 
merely stating what they believe to be the most socially acceptable position. They 
may claim to want to quit because they do not want to have to explain themselves 
and/or because they think it is what the person asking them wants to hear. Basing 
nudges on metapreferences means that we may unintentionally manipulate people 
into choices that are socially acceptable but not in line with their utility functions. 
Since metapreferences are so strongly influenced by cultural norms and beliefs one 
would, in order to accept this argument from LP proponents, essentially have to 
accept that all widely held beliefs are by definition correct – a rather extreme form of 





This goes back to Binder’s criticism of libertarian paternalism that it is 
inherently conservative and promotes whatever is considered correct behavior by the 
culture in the time and place where it is being applied. If nudges are based on 
metapreferences, which is almost certain given that they play such a prominent role 
in justifying their existence in the first place, then there is a high risk that these 
nudges will serve to reinforce cultural beliefs and stigmas. 
Another key criticism against libertarian paternalism, advanced by Binder and 
Lades (2015), is that it is unethical to use psychological biases in policy 
interventions, even when this is done to benefit the consumer. They argue that 
consumers are not actually taught to act in a more rational manner by LP 
interventions – they are merely tricked into doing so. They suggest an alternative, 
restricted version of libertarian paternalism, which they call “autonomy-enhancing 
paternalism” (AEP). In order for an intervention to qualify under the criteria of AEP, 
the intervention must not rely on psychological biases and must instead work to 
strengthen the individual’s autonomy (the ability to make an actual conscious 
decision) by, for example, providing more information (through public service 
announcements, etc.) or by preventing an individual from making a hasty decision, 
by for example introducing a mandatory waiting time between the purchase decision 
and the delivery of a good/service during which the individual can cancel the 
purchase. Traditional LP interventions such as the use of default options and framing 
are then off limits as their efficacy stems from psychological biases (status quo bias 
and the framing effect, respectively).  
While it is clear that an ethical case can be made in favor of AEP over LP, the 
question remains whether or not LP treatments are more effective than AEP 





manipulation” (MBoM), the difference between the treatment effect of an LP 
treatment and an AEP treatment. This term is appropriate since LP interventions rely 
on psychological manipulation of consumers, while AEP interventions do not. The 
additional benefit offered by using an LP intervention is therefore the marginal 
benefit of using manipulation. In this paper I conduct an experiment the ostensible 
goal of which is to reduce the individual time discount rate, to measure the MBoM 
by randomly assigning participants into three groups: An AEP treatment group, an 
LP treatment group, and a control group. This random assignment allows the 
experiment to run under both the AEP and LP umbrella, allowing them to be 
compared directly. In the AEP treatment group, participants were presented with a 
list of arguments in favor of the larger-later option and a list of arguments in favor of 
the smaller-sooner option (see Appendix A), while in the LP treatment participants 
were instead given the larger-later option as the default option and had to check a 
box if they wanted to choose the smaller-sooner option. In the control treatment 
participants neither received arguments in favor of an option, nor were there any 
default options.  
While the efficacy of a treatment in the immediate term is interesting, it is 
equally interesting from a policy viewpoint to determine to what extent the effect of 
a treatment outlives the treatment itself. A treatment that causes a small but 
permanent effect may be considered preferable to a treatment that causes a bigger 
effect which disappears as soon as the treatment is discontinued. For this reason, in 
my study all participants were invited to take part in a follow-up survey which they 
could complete (at the earliest) seven days after completing the first survey. In the 
follow-up survey everyone received the same tasks and information as the control 





effect can outlast the treatment itself in a study on reducing energy consumption, 
however this treatment was a combination of AEP (they provided information on 
monthly energy usage) and LP (they used social pressure by pointing out to those 
who consumed more than their neighbors that they were doing so) and hence there is 
no way to know whether the permanency was caused by the AEP or the LP 
component, or both. There is also the problem of the transaction cost; a consumer 
who has switched to an energy-saving device after receiving a monthly report is 
unlikely to switch back (at least immediately) after the monthly reports end, but this 
does not apply in all intertemporal choice situations. In my experiment, there was no 
cost associated with choosing different options in the second survey than in the first 
survey (i.e., choosing the larger-later options in the first survey and the smaller-
sooner options in the follow-up survey), which leads to a more accurate estimate of 
the permanency of the effect of the different treatments. 
From the neoclassical model of time discounting (commonly known as the 
Discounted Utility [DU] model) introduced by Samuelson (1937) we would expect 
there to be no difference between the control group and the treatment groups as 
consumers have stable preferences (thus framing does not affect them) and full 
information (thus the AEP intervention adds nothing of value). Further we would not 
expect anyone who chooses the smaller-sooner option for the shortest delay (one 
week vs one month) to choose the larger-later reward for the longer delays as the 
implied annual interest rate on the shortest delay is higher than for any of the later 
delays, so a consumer with a constant discount rate (as per the DU model) who 
rejects the larger-later option in the tasks with the shortest delay would also reject it 
for the longer delays. Finally, the DU model implicitly assumes there to be no 





participants should choose the same course of action regardless of whether the 
reward consists of money or vouchers. Hence, no participant should, for example, 
choose to the larger-later option when asked to choose between €30 in one week and 
€50 in one month and then choose the smaller-sooner option when asked to choose 
between a €30 Amazon voucher in one week and a €50 Amazon voucher in one 
month. 
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 I develop my methodology and 
discuss its limitations, in Section 3 I present the results from both surveys and 
discuss what they mean, and finally Section 4 contains my conclusions. 
Hypotheses 
I test two hypotheses: First, that LP and AEP both increase the likelihood that a 
participant opts for the larger-later options, and that these treatments will prove 
equally effective; that is, that there will not be a positive marginal benefit of 
manipulation. 
Second, that the AEP treatment effect will still be present in the follow-up 
survey while the LP treatment effect will not. This hypothesis is based on Rogers and 
Frey (2014) who found that adding information could permanently change individual 
decision making, while to the best of my knowledge no evidence exists that default 







To test the hypotheses concerning the relative efficacy of LP and AEP I conducted 
an online experiment using the platform Surveymonkey between the 27th of April 
and the 3rd of June 2015 with the original survey conducted between the 27th of April 
and 27th of May, and the follow-up survey conducted between the 4th of May and 3rd 
of June. A total of 535 participants completed the experiment, with 263 of those 
completing the follow-up survey. Participants were recruited mainly through social 
media websites including Facebook, Reddit, Twitter and Craigslist, and through an 
email invitation sent out to all economics, finance and accounting students at 
Maynooth University. 
Following the incentive structure used by Coller and Williams (1999), this 
study used real incentives, with three randomly chosen participants being paid based 
on one pre-selected task.13 Limiting the number of paid participants to three was 
done purely due to budget limitations. The randomly selected participants were 
contacted via email and paid through PayPal. Participants were informed about the 
incentive structure before agreeing to take part in the experiment but were neither 
informed of the hypotheses nor which task would determine the payment if they were 
one of the randomly chosen participants, as this may have biased the results. The 
“real” task was task number 4. 
There is little evidence indicating that incentives matter in the context of 
intertemporal choice experiments as documented by an extensive review of the 
intemporal choice literature by Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002). 
Coller and Williams (1999) found no difference between participants who were 
 





offered real incentives and those were not, while Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and 
l’Haridon (2013) found only small differences. Bickel et al. (2009) found, through a 
neuroimaging study, that responses to intertemporal choice tasks were the same 
regardless of whether incentives were offered or not. Even if participants were to 
display different discount rates depending on the type of incentives offered, this 
would not be of great concern seeing as how the purpose of the study was not to 
determine discount rates per se, but to determine the effect of various interventions. 
That is, as long as the type of incentive offered did not affect one treatment group 
differently from another, comparisons can still be made between groups to determine 
whether or not one treatment performed better than another. There is no intuitive 
reason to believe that this is not the case. 
Participants were randomly assigned into one of three groups: the LP treatment 
group, the AEP treatment group, and the control group. Due to platform limitations 
no true randomization was possible. Instead, in the first part of the survey 
participants were asked in what part of the month they were born and based on that 
answer were assigned to one of the groups. 
The second part of the experiment differed depending on into which group 
participants fell. All participants were asked to choose between receiving €30 in one 
week or €50 in one month, €30 in one month or €50 in 6 months, and €30 in 6 
months or €50 in 12 months, and the choices were repeated with €30 and €50 
Amazon and Apple vouchers being used instead, giving a total of nine tasks 
(exchange rates for US Dollars and Pound Sterling were provided). Amazon and 
Apple vouchers were used to complement the money tasks to mitigate the issue of 
participant choices being affected by operative liquidity constraints. That is, liquidity 





inherently impatient, but because they suffer from a shortage of liquid funds. While 
some individuals may choose the smaller-sooner option for the money tasks for that 
reason, it is highly unlikely that any individual desperately needs an Apple product 
and cannot delay receiving a voucher for that reason. The tasks in this experiment 
were inspired by Green, Myerson and McFadden (1997), Hesketh (2000) and 
Madden et al. (1997). 
While choice tasks such as those used by this experiment provide less precision 
than other tasks, such as matching, they are preferable since they are the closest 
equivalent to the type of intertemporal choices faced by most consumers on a daily 
basis, that is, a choice between one fixed amount now and another fixed amount at a 
specific later point. There are very few, if any, real life situations where consumers 
are asked to “match” how much money at a later point is the equivalent of a certain 
amount in the present. Thus, as discussed by Frederick, Loewenstein and 
O’Donoghue (2002), participants in experiments tend to rely on heuristics to solve 
matching tasks, and this overuse of heuristics appears to be an experimental artifact. 
Matching tasks also require more time and effort which may reduce the number of 
participants who complete the experiment. Rating tasks were also considered but 
ultimately rejected as they too do not resemble any real-life situation and so are 
inferior in terms of generalizability, and also because they may be sensitive to 
extremeness aversion (Tversky and Simonson, 1993). The main reason for limiting 
the number of intertemporal choice tasks to nine was to ensure a high response rate 
and also because a high number of tasks may increase the risk of participants not 
paying attention. 14 Needless to say there are also very few real-life situations where 
 
14 Galesic and Bosnjak (2009) showed that there is a negative relationship between the number of 





participants are faced with dozens of intertemporal choice tasks at the same time, 
therefore had participants had to solve a large number of tasks, the generalizability of 
the experiment would have been reduced. 
The AEP treatment group, those born in the last third of the month, was 
presented with a list of arguments in favor of the larger-later and the smaller-sooner 
option. The arguments, together with the rest of the survey, can be found in 
Appendix A. Additionally, participants in this group were asked which arguments 
they found most convincing for the smaller-sooner and larger-later option 
respectively to get a better idea about how individuals make intertemporal choice 
decisions. 
The LP treatment group, those born in the second third of the month, was 
presented with the option to receive €50 (or a €50 voucher) in 1 month/6 months/12 
months, or €30 (or a €30 voucher) in 1 week/1 month/6 months. For the latter option 
to be availed of, a box had to be checked. By requiring participants to make an active 
choice to receive the smaller-sooner option, this treatment relied on the default 
option bias (also known as the status quo bias) to nudge participants toward the 
larger-later option. 
The control group, those born in the first third of the month, was neither 
provided with a default option nor presented with any arguments in favor of either 
option. 
The third part of the survey was identical for all participants and consisted of a 
set of demographic questions covering age, country of residence, marital status, 





were not required to share any identifying information). The survey also asked 
participants to rate Apple and Amazon on a scale from 1 (dislike) to 5 (strongly like).  
For participants to be included in the statistical analysis of the Apple/Amazon 
voucher tasks, they had to have indicated that they at least somewhat liked the 
company (rated 2 or higher) as time discounting for losses (Thaler, 1981) and less 
desirable rewards (Tsukayama and Duckworth, 2010) have been shown to differ 
from that of more desirable rewards. In the regressions that included control 
variables, those participants who had answered “I’d rather not say” to any of the 
relevant questions (for example, participants who had refused to state their level of 
education) were dropped. As a result, the sample size used in the statistical analysis 
varies from 411 to 501 depending on the task and depending on whether or not 
control variables were included. 
Additionally the final part of the survey included two questions to weed out 
inattentive and less serious participants. These questions were “Is water wet?” and 
“What is two plus three?” Participants who answered either of these questions 
incorrectly had their answers removed from the data analysis to strengthen the 
credibility of the results and conclusions from the study (this was inspired by de 
Haan and Linde (2011) who used a similar procedure). 
As a final question, participants were asked to provide feedback and/or ask any 
questions they may have in a comment field. The purpose was two-fold: By allowing 
participants a chance to give feedback, future experimental designs may be 
improved, and also the feedback question may reveal that some participants had no 
idea what they were doing and/or did not take the survey seriously, in which case 





the trick questions correctly. Participants were also asked to indicate if they wanted 
to find out what the experiment discovered and all participants who indicated that 
they did and who had provided their email addresses received a summary of the 
conclusions by email. 
All participants who provided their email addresses were invited to take part in 
the second survey exactly one week after they took part in the first survey. The 
second survey once again asked participants during what part of the month they were 
born, but the second part of the survey was identical regardless of what participants 
answered, as the purpose of the follow-up survey was to measure the permanence of 
the treatment effect(s) from the first survey. 
The rewards, as mentioned above, were set at €30 and €50 or the voucher 
equivalent. Thaler (1981) showed that discount rates are negatively correlated with 
the size of the reward (“the magnitude effect”); meaning very small rewards would 
cause an overwhelming number of participants to choose the smaller-sooner option. 
Large rewards solve this problem but creates an additional two: Participants may not 
be used to making decisions involving large amounts of money, and this 
inexperience may affect their decision-making, while €30 and €50 are amounts that 
most people spend quite frequently. Also, had larger rewards been used, hypothetical 
incentives would have been necessary due to the limited budget of the study. 
The purpose of conducting the experiment online was to allow for a larger, 
more diverse sample. This was achieved since the experiment had 535 participants 
from all age groups and several countries. The internet also allowed for a greater 
degree of anonymity than what can be provided by a regular lab experiment, 





experiment requires less participant effort and time expenditure, online experiments 
can attract even those who would not volunteer to take part in a lab experiment, 
reducing the self-selection problem associated with such experiments.  
Conducting an experiment online is, however, also associated with certain 
drawbacks. Wright (2005) identifies that there is a risk that participants could take 
part of the experiment multiple times, a risk that was mitigated by making it 
impossible to take the experiment more than once from the same device. While this 
is not a fool-proof measure, due to the relatively low incentives used in this 
experiment, it is unlikely that many participants found it worthwhile to take the 
experiment several times. Second, participants may be suspicious of financial 
incentives used in an online experiment (they may be afraid of being scammed), a 
risk which was mitigated by assuring participants before the experiment that they 
would not have to share any bank account details to receive payment.  
Participants taking part in an online experiment may be more easily distracted 
during the course of the experiment than they would have been during a lab 
experiment, something which may affect their decision-making. This, however, may 
not be a disadvantage, as real-life economic decisions are often taken in “noisy” 
environments (i.e. shopping centers) where participants are distracted, and so this 
actually strengthens the generalizability of the experiment. Also having participants 
take part in an experiment from the comfort of their own home with their own 
computers (or other internet-connected devices) should increase the likelihood that 
they act naturally, again strengthening the generalizability of the experiment, though 
at the same time as discussed by Grimelikhuijsen and Meijer (2014), this hurts the 





experiment and ensure that they are not, for example, getting input from their friends 
or from the internet.  
There is no way to know whether any, and, if so, how many, participants were 
under the age of 18. Although the experiment was never advertised to children and 
the instructions on the first page made it clear that children ought not to take part, 
due to the lack of ability to verify the age of participants there is no way to know for 
certain whether children did take part. Further as discussed by Duda and Nobile 
(2010), online surveys struggle with unbiasedness as there is no representative 
samples of email addresses for the general population from which to draw, and not 
the entire population is online. This problem however is shared by lab experiments 
which generally use student-only samples. 
Finally, unlike in a lab experiment, there is no way to pay participants in an 
online experiment immediately upon completion of the experiment. Hence, 
measuring very short-term discount rates is not possible in studies which use real 
incentives, such as this one. For that reason the shortest delay in this experiment was 
one week. While this means that some of the “present bias” (Laibson, 1997) is lost, 
this is not a major concern as discount rates appear to be falling for at least one year 
from the present (Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2002), and therefore 
most of the present bias is preserved even though participants cannot choose to 
receive the reward immediately. 
The dropout rate for this survey is not known. The responses of those 
participants who did not complete the survey was deleted, as was promised in the 
survey instructions. This was done for ethical reasons: Participants who did not 





changed their minds since they started the survey). Never-the-less, this lack of data is 
a shortcoming as it may have indicated how successful the survey design was at 






These results were obtained by estimating logistic regressions with the responses to 
the different choice tasks as the dependent variables. As there were nine different 
choice tasks, there are nine dependent variables. The coefficients are odds ratios 
representing the likelihood of a participant choosing the larger-later option relative to 
the control group. 
The final sample size used in the statistical analysis varies between 411-501 for 
the original survey (see Methodology for details). In the follow-up survey, the 
sample size is 263.  
Model specification and assumptions 
Logistic regression model 1: No control variables 
log Prob(Y=1)/(1 - Prob(Y=1)) = B0 + Blpdlp + Baepdaep  
Logistic regression model 2: Control variables included 
log Prob(Y=1)/(1 - Prob(Y=1)) = B0 + Blpdlp + Baepdaep + Bageover23dageover23 + 
Bmaledmale + Bnopostgraddnopostgrad 
where Y is a dependent variable based on the answers to a certain intertemporal 
choice task (see Tables 4-6). 
As with any type of regression, there are certain assumptions that must hold true in 
order for a logistic regression – the type that was used for this research – to yield 
valid, reliable results.  
First, because these are binary logistic regressions, the dependent variables 
must be binary variables. It is not hard to verify that this is indeed the case. 
Second, observations must be independent of one another. There is no reason 
to believe that the answers of one respondent would not be independent of the other 





the participants took the survey multiple times given the low incentives involved and 
given that IP tracking ensured that a participant would have to use a different device 
or a proxy/VPN to do so. 
Third, there must be little or no multicollinearity among the independent 
variables in a logistic regressions. Calculating the variance inflation factor (see 
Appendix B) confirms that this is indeed the case. 
Fourth, logistic regression requires that all continuous independent variables be 
linearly related to the log odds. Since all independent variables are binary this 
condition does not apply. 
Finally, logistic regression requires the sample size to be relatively large. 
Peduzzi et al. (1996) argued that as a guideline the sample size, N, should be at least 
equal to 10k/p, where k is the number of independent variables and p the smallest 
number of negative or positive cases in the population. Every regression that does 
not include control variables fulfills this criteria, which is why the conclusions of this 
study are mainly based on this set of regressions.  
Table 1: Description of variables  
Control 1 if participant is in the control group, 0 
otherwise 
lp 1 if participant is in the libertarian 
paternalist group, 0 otherwise 
aep 1 if participant is in the autonomy-
enhancing paternalist group, 0 
otherwise 
onemmoney 1 if participant chose €50 in one month 
over €30 in one week, 0 otherwise 
onemamazon 1 if participant chose a €50 Amazon 
voucher in one month over a €30 
Amazon voucher in one week, 0 
otherwise 
onemapple 1 if participant chose a €50 Apple 
voucher in one month over a €30 Apple 





sixmmoney 1 if participant chose €50 in six months 
over €30 in one month, 0 otherwise 
sixmamazon 1 if participant chose a €50 Amazon 
voucher in six months over a €30 
Amazon voucher in one month, 0 
otherwise 
sixmapple 1 if participant chose a €50 Apple 
voucher in six months over a €30 Apple 
voucher in one month, 0 otherwise 
twelvemmoney 1 if participant chose €50 in twelve 
months over €30 in six months, 0 
otherwise 
twelvemamazon 1 if participant chose a €50 Amazon 
voucher in twelve months over a €30 
Amazon voucher in six months, 0 
otherwise 
twelvemapple 1 if participant chose a €50 Apple 
voucher in twelve months over a €30 
Apple voucher in six months, 0 
otherwise 
age1823 1 if participant is aged 18-23, 0 
otherwise 
age2435 1 if participant is aged 24-35, 0 
otherwise 
age3664 1 if participant is aged 36-64, 0 
otherwise 
ageover64 1 if participant is over the age of 64, 0 
otherwise 
single 1 if participant is single or not 
cohabitating with partner, 0 otherwise 
married 1 if participant is married, in a civil 
union, or cohabitating with partner, 0 
otherwise 
male 1 if participant identifies as male, 0 
otherwise 
female 1 if participant identifies as female, 0 
otherwise 
highschool 1 if participant's highest achieved level 
of education is high school or less, 0 
otherwise 
undergrad 1 if participant's highest achieved level 
of education is an undergraduate 
degree, 0 otherwise 
postgrad 1 if participant's highest achieved level 
of education is a postgraduate degree, 
0 otherwise 
ireland 1 if participant resides in Ireland, 0 
otherwise 






usa 1 if participant resides in the USA, 0 
otherwise 
canada 1 if participant resides in Canada, 0 
otherwise 
uk 1 if participant resides in the UK, 0 
otherwise 
ausnz 1 if participant resides in Australia or 
New Zealand, 0 otherwise 
euro 1 if participant resides anywhere else in 
Europe, 0 otherwise 
other 1 if participant resides anywhere not 
listed above, 0 otherwise 
ageover23 1 if participant is over the age of 23, 0 
otherwise. 
nopostgrad 1 if participant does not hold a 














































As seen above, participants from vastly different backgrounds – in terms of age, 
nationality, education level, etc., – took part in the experiment. This is one relatively 
unique feature of this experiment as most experiments are only open to students (or 
only open to non-students), resulting in a homogenous sample not very 





While this sample was more representative than most experiments, it should be 
noted that very few participants came from outside the western world, which is 
unfortunate but difficult to avoid as knowledge of English and access of internet 
tends to be lower outside the west. Caution is therefore advised before extrapolating 
any conclusions from this study to non-western populations and cultures. 







Control 0 0 
LP 0 100 
AEP 100 0 
onemmoney 75,5 86,5 
onemamazon 90,6 92,3 
onemapple 86,8 94,8 
sixmmoney 50,3 62,6 
sixmamazon 65,4 71 
sixmapple 67,9 76,8 
twelvemmoney 67,3 73,5 
twelvemamazon 67,3 78,1 
twelvemapple 66 77,4 
age1823 48,4 51,6 
age2435 35,8 36,8 
age3664 12,6 11 
ageover64 1,9 0 
single 64,2 72,9 
married 34 24,5 
male 56 58,7 
female 43,4 41,3 
highschool 32,7 35,5 
undergrad 49,1 47,1 
postgrad 14,5 15,5 
ireland 18,9 23,2 
sweden 3,1 8,4 
usa 50,9 40 
canada 5,7 5,2 
uk 7,5 9,7 
ausnz 2,5 3,2 
euro 5,7 5,2 
other 3,1 2,6 
ageover23 50,3 47,7 






As can be seen in the table above, randomization was overall successful with 
demographic groups being close to equally represented in both treatment groups. The 
exception being Americans and married people, who are overrepresented by about 10 
% in the AEP group relative to the LP group. 
TABLE 4: €30 (or voucher equivalent) in one week vs €50 (or voucher 
equivalent) in one month15 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES onemmoney onemamazon onemapple 
    
lp 1.905** 1.212 2.831** 
 (0.0273) (0.626) (0.0143) 
aep 0.919 1.220 1.157 
 (0.738) (0.613) (0.662) 
Constant 3.349*** 9.765*** 5.520*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
    
Observations 501 492 429 
Pseudo R2 0.0143 0.00122 0.0233 
 
The LP treatment is clearly significant in the first task, increasing the odds of a 
participant choosing the larger-later option by approximately 90 per cent. The AEP 
treatment on the other hand is insignificant. Inclusion of control variables did not 
change which variables were and were not significant. 
Neither treatment variable turned out to be significant in the first regression 
involving Amazon vouchers. Again, inclusion of control variables did not change 
this. 
 
15 Notes on Tables 4-9: The tables show logistic regression coefficients as odds ratios for the variables 
listed in the left column. Numbers below the odds ratios are p-values.  Each column contains the result 





In the first regression involving Apple vouchers, the LP treatment is strongly 
significant, while the AEP treatment again fails to have any impact on how 
participants choose, and this remained the case when control variables were included. 
TABLE 5: €30 (or voucher equivalent) in one month vs €50 (or voucher 
equivalent) in six months 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES sixmmoney sixmamazon sixmapple 
    
lp 1.842*** 1.500* 1.630* 
 (0.00580) (0.0823) (0.0643) 
aep 1.115 1.192 0.969 
 (0.614) (0.440) (0.898) 
Constant 0.908 1.614*** 2.019*** 
 (0.511) (0.00164) (2.44e-05) 
    
Observations 501 492 429 
Pseudo R2 0.0122 0.00483 0.00877 
 
As with the previous “Money” regression (see Table 4), the LP treatment turns out to 
be significant with roughly the same positive odds ratio (1.84 vs 1.90). The AEP 
variable is still insignificant.  
Like in the first regression involving Amazon vouchers, in the second one both 
treatment variables are insignificant. However, it should be noted that the LP 
variable is significant at a 10 per cent level and inches closer to significance at a 5 
per cent level once control variables are included. In the second regression involving 
Apple vouchers, both treatments are insignificant but notably LP is significant once 






TABLE 6: €30 (or voucher equivalent)  in six months vs €50 (or voucher 
equivalent) in twelve months 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES twelvemmoney twelvemamazon twelvemapple 
    
    
lp 1.219 1.401 1.433 
 (0.295) (0.356) (0.386) 
aep 0.902 0.885 0.874 
 (0.209) (0.211) (0.221) 
Constant 2.281*** 2.519*** 2.396*** 
 (0.362) (0.413) (0.412) 
    
Observations 501 492 429 
Pseudo R2 0.00248 0.00581 0.00667 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the LP variable is no longer significant once the choice is 
between a smaller-sooner reward in six months and a larger-later reward in twelve 
months. Inclusion of control variables made no difference. 
Discussion of first survey results 
What these results indicate is that while LP has a positive treatment effect initially, 
this effect appears to wear off once applied repeatedly. While it is of course 
technically possible that LP only works on intertemporal choices involving relatively 
short time periods, there is no intuitive reason to believe this to be the case; in fact, it 
could be argued that consumers ought to pay greater attention (and thus be more 
likely to go with the default option) when payoffs are further away as there is less at 
stake in the short term.  
Instead, I believe the change may be to some extent explained by some 
relatively impatient participants at first “going along” with the default option. 
Towards the later tasks they may realize that they have picked the same (patient) 





to “diversify” their consumption bundles to be somewhat more in line with their 
fundamentally impatient preferences (though further research is necessary to confirm 
whether this is the case). This would suggest that while LP can work in modifying a 
consumer choice in one situation, making drastic changes to the overall consumption 
bundle is more difficult. Expressed differently, it may be the case that impatient 
consumers always will be impatient in the end, even if a choice architect temporarily 
tricks them into making patient choices.  
It is also possible that some participants realize towards the later tasks that they 
are being manipulated, and that this provokes a negative visceral reaction causing 
them to choose the smaller-sooner option for the later tasks. Expressed differently, 
people do not like being manipulated, and some act in the opposite way as to what 
the manipulator intended once they realize they are being manipulated.  
Defenders of libertarian paternalism may invoke that participants merely get 
bored towards the end of the survey as they are being asked almost the same question 
several times and pick another option just to “mix things up”; however, the presence 
of real incentives means that participants have good reason to stay focused and not 
pick randomly, and any participant who got bored could exit the experiment by 
clicking the upper right-hand corner as it was conducted online.  
The AEP treatment turned out to have no effect whatsoever on the choices 
made by participants. The likeliest explanation for this is that the AEP treatment 
provided participants with arguments in favor of both options. A naturally impatient 
participant may focus on the arguments in favor of the smaller-sooner option and use 
them as an “excuse” to follow his or her natural inclination, and vice versa for a 





the participants were already leaning towards. It is worth noting that providing 
arguments for both options is not necessary for a treatment to qualify as AEP; this 
treatment is therefore a very un-intrusive treatment even by AEP standards. 
A separate set of regressions was estimated using only those participants who 
stated that they reside in the United States. In this set, neither treatment was 
significant at a 5 per cent significance threshold. While this may suggest that 
Americans are more resilient to both types of interventions, caution is strongly 
advised as the sample size was very small (N=225 for the money tasks, 222 for the 
Amazon voucher tasks and 189 for the Apple voucher tasks). 
Sensitivity and specificity were estimated and specificity in particular turned 
out to be generally poor (see Appendix B; Tables 19-20). This was to be expected as 
there are many variables that influence intertemporal choice that are unaccounted for 
in this model, the purpose of which is only to determine the relative efficacy of the 
LP and AEP treatment. 
Only participants who provided their email addresses had a chance to be paid 
for their participation, on the basis of their response to one task. For those unwilling 
to provide their email addresses (see Appendix B, Table 22), the rewards in the 
experiment were in other words hypothetical. No difference was found between these 
groups, indicating that the presence of real incentives does not affect intertemporal 
choices. 
The first hypothesis stated that both treatments would have a positive equal 
effect. These results indicate that while LP has a positive treatment effect initially, it 
also has a strongly negative effect if repeated excessively. The AEP treatment did not 





effect on three of the intertemporal choice tasks, and a negative effect on two. In 
conclusion, the first hypothesis was incorrect. 
On a final note, these results contradict the Discounted Utility model: 
Participants frequently turned down the larger-later option during the tasks with the 
shortest delay but choose it when delays were longer. The LP treatment clearly 
affected the way participants chose, and many participants chose differently when 
dealing with money compared to vouchers even when the delay was the same. 
TABLE 7: €30 (or voucher equivalent) in one week vs €50 (or voucher 
equivalent) in one month (Follow-up survey) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES onemmoney onemamazon onemapple 
    
lp 1.196 1.167 2.761* 
 (0.707) (0.794) (0.0845) 
aep 0.457** 1.083 0.778 
 (0.0458) (0.887) (0.540) 
Constant 7*** 12*** 6.429*** 
 (5.28e-11) (0) (9.37e-11) 
    
Observations 263 263 263 
Pseudo R2 0.0270 0.000512 0.0290 
 
In the first task, the LP treatment is clearly insignificant, while the AEP treatment 
actually appears to have a negative effect on participants’ tendency to choose the 
larger-later option. 
In the second task of the follow-up survey both variables are clearly 
insignificant. 
In the third task, the LP variable is significant at a 10 per cent level, while the 






TABLE 8: €30 (or voucher equivalent) in one month vs €50 (or voucher 
equivalent) in six months (Follow-up survey) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES sixmmoney sixmamazon sixmapple 
    
lp 0.966 1.606 1.224 
 (0.913) (0.164) (0.560) 
aep 0.604* 1.071 0.816 
 (0.0911) (0.827) (0.526) 
Constant 1.737*** 1.971*** 2.586*** 
 (0.00671) (0.00107) (1.39e-05) 
    
Observations 263 263 263 
Pseudo R2 0.00946 0.00665 0.00418 
 
In the second of the money tasks in the follow-up survey the LP treatment variable 
makes no significant impact, while the AEP variable has a negative impact at a 10 
per cent significance level. 
Neither treatment variable reaches the threshold of significance for the two 
voucher tasks with this delay. 
TABLE 9: €30 (or voucher equivalent) in six months vs €50 (or voucher 
equivalent) in twelve months (Follow-up survey) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES twelvemmoney twelvemamazon twelvemapple 
    
lp 1.481 1.806* 1.345 
 (0.232) (0.0859) (0.391) 
aep 0.936 1.324 0.764 
 (0.826) (0.377) (0.390) 
Constant 1.737*** 1.889*** 2.355*** 
 (0.00671) (0.00203) (6.46e-05) 
    
Observations 263 263 263 
Pseudo R2 0.00623 0.00965 0.00811 
 






The LP variable is significant at a 10 per cent level in the final Amazon 
voucher task, which is interesting as this was one of the two tasks in the original 
survey in which the LP treatment failed to increase the likelihood of participants 
choosing the larger-later option. 
In the final task both treatment variables turn out to be insignificant.  
Discussion of follow-up survey results 
As we can see in the follow-up survey the LP treatment fares better than the AEP 
treatment. It is possible that participants found it easier to remember the arguments in 
favor of the smaller-sooner option as they are relatively straight-forward, and so they 
stay with them longer than the arguments for the larger-later option. However, given 
the number of tasks, it cannot be ruled out that this is merely a coincidence. One 
limitation with the follow-up survey is that participants were not asked any 
demographic questions, nor were they asked how much they liked Amazon/Apple, 
and so, unlike in the main survey, there is no way to control for demographic 
variables or remove data from participants who disliked Amazon and/or Apple. 
My second hypothesis stated that the AEP treatment effect would still be 
present in the follow-up survey while the LP treatment effect would not, but I have to 
concede that the data firmly rejects this hypothesis and, if anything, the opposite may 






These results indicate that while LP is clearly superior to AEP, the effect of an LP 
intervention may taper off when treatment is repeated frequently.  While the AEP 
treatment was inefficient, the LP treatment was outright counterproductive in the 
later stages of the experiment, largely undoing its positive effect in the early stage. 
Binder’s (2014) prediction that LP interventions may turn out to have adverse 
dynamic effects appears to be correct judging from this experiment. Neither 
treatment showed any greater degree of permanency, though, as discussed in the 
previous section LP did edge out AEP on this measure. 
Proponents of libertarian paternalism may argue that the tapering off seen in 
the later stages of the survey is an experimental artifact. There are several reasons to 
believe that this is not the case. First of all, the likelihood of experimental artifacts is 
reduced substantially by the design of the experiment which, as explained in previous 
sections, allowed participants to take part in the experiment from the comfort of their 
own homes, thereby likely inducing more natural behavior. The cost of acting 
“defiantly”, picking the smaller-sooner option instead of the larger-later option, was 
also much higher (an individual that did so lost out on hundreds of percent of 
interest) in this experiment than in most real-world situations, and so it is reasonable 
to assume it would actually be even more common in a real world setting. Finally, 
individuals face a number of intertemporal choices on an everyday basis (both 
economic and otherwise), and as such there are several situations where “nudges” 
would be used if libertarian paternalists had their way. Hence, it is not at all 
unreasonable to imagine an individual being exposed to several LP interventions 
during a single day. This experiment suggests that even if the first intervention 





basket appears to be sturdier than behavioral economists have understood it to be. In 
the real world there is no way to ensure that an individual is only exposed to one or a 
few nudges, which means there is no way to ensure that the effect of a nudge does 
not taper off.  
Proponents may also assert that they would not advocate that interventions be 
done in this manner; that the efficacy wears off because the intervention is being 
carried out without the knowledge and consent of the participants involved. Had 
participants merely been informed that one option had been set as the default option 
for their own good, they would have understood and probably been grateful for the 
favor done to them by the choice architect, they may say. However, in the real world, 
it is virtually unheard of for libertarian paternalist interventions to follow these 
standards. While it is often true that consumers are able to find out about nudges that 
they are subject to, this requires them to actively seek out information on the topic. 
As most consumers do not even know what nudges are, it follows logically that most 
of them never think of looking up information about them. Thus, most consumers are 
being nudged without them being explicitly informed about them, just like in this 
experiment. 
Finally, proponents might claim that these nudges were “obvious” and that 
such bold-faced manipulation of course would cause participants to realize that they 
were being tricked, leading some of them to react in a defiant manner by doing the 
opposite of what the manipulator clearly wanted them to do. However, in the real 
world while nudges may sometimes be more subtle, there are media outlets that 
would be more than happy to inform consumers of what they are being tricked into 





Beshears et al. (2009) reviewed the literature on the effect of a default option 
on retirement saving in the United States and conclude that the literature supports the 
idea that enrollment rates increase when the default option is to enroll. However, 
they do not discuss any literature on how many of those enrolled through automatic 
enrollment later go on to drop out of the plans they have enrolled in (assuming that is 
possible). It should be noted, however, that even if the dropout rate among those who 
had been automatically enrolled were no higher than among those who had to make 
an active choice to be enrolled, this does not in and of itself contradict the idea that 
the effect of nudging tapers off as there is technically nothing that prevents 
consumers to “compensate” by changing preferences in another domain (e.g. through 
a decrease in private saving). 
If repeated nudging does in fact reduce the efficacy of nudging – regardless of 
the reason – there are potentially severe policy implications. In the real world, unlike 
in an experiment, we do not know exactly when a nudge will stop working and 
which nudges a consumer will be exposed to first and the most, making the results 
unpredictable. If a consumer is first exposed to a nudge that is intended to change a 
minor destructive behavior (i.e. overeating), this may make similar future nudges 
intended to change severely destructive behaviors (i.e. problem drinking) ineffective. 
This would suggest nudges should be reserved for severe issues, so as to not “waste” 
the potential of nudges on behaviors that are only somewhat destructive. It is near-
impossible to say to what extent a nudge will prove to be welfare-improving without 
knowing its dynamic effect; a consumer that is nudged to save more now and as a 
result cannot be nudged to save more tomorrow will only be better off by the nudge 
today provided that saving more now and not tomorrow makes sense. An example 





tomorrow; in this case, saving today makes little sense as the marginal utility of 
consumption is likely to be high. 
Furthermore, it is conceivable that nudging, if repeated enough times, could 
have an outright negative effect. If we assume that the tapering off seen in this 
experiment is due to some consumers “lashing out” upon realizing the manipulation, 
it is conceivable that even more consumers would have acted this way had there been 
more tasks and more nudges, causing the treatment effect of the LP intervention to 
become negative. Further research is necessary to explore this possibility. 
I must, however, also conclude that this experiment does not support the idea 
that AEP would have a greater permanency than LP (which was my second 
hypothesis). It is possible that a “stronger” AEP treatment (for example, providing 
arguments only in favor of the larger-later option) may have produced better results, 
but that is a topic for future research.  
Future research will further investigate the effect of LP and AEP interventions 
on different demographic groups and will also focus on determining whether or not 
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Appendix A: Surveys  
Welcome! 
My name is John Gustavsson and I’m a research student at Maynooth University at 
the Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting. 
This survey is an experiment that is part of the research I am doing for my thesis. In 
this survey, you will be asked a number of questions about how you value future 
income relative to present income – what we economists call “inter-temporal 
choice”. 
You will be posed with a number of scenarios and asked how you would act in them 
(there will be two options in each scenario). These are not purely hypothetical 
scenarios; three of you who answer this survey will be paid in accordance with how 
you answer one of the scenarios. The three who are paid will be randomly selected; 
your answers have no bearing on your likelihood of being one of them. The final part 
of this survey contains demographic questions (age, gender, country of residence, 
education and marital status) as well as some questions on consumer behavior and 
attitudes. If you are uncomfortable with answering a demographic question, simply 
choose the option “I’d rather not say” (or write N/A in the box) which is provided for 
every demographic question. 
You will be asked to provide me with your email address at the end of the survey – 
this is so that I can contact you in case you are one of those who have been selected 
to be paid. You are not required to provide your email address, but if you don’t I 
won’t be able to pay you. You will not need to provide your bank account details to 
receive payment. The email addresses will be stored only until the selected 





purposes. You may quit the survey at any time; if you quit before finishing the 
survey, your data will be deleted. You can also withdraw your data at any time by 
emailing me at the email address provided below. 
It must be recognized that, in some circumstances, confidentiality of research data 
and records may be overridden by courts in the event of litigation or in the course of 
investigation by lawful authority. In such circumstances the University will take all 
reasonable steps within law to ensure that confidentiality is maintained to the greatest 
possible extent. 
Everyone who takes this survey will be invited back (by email) to take a shorter 
version of the survey again after 1 week. Retaking the survey is not mandatory. If 
you’re interested in taking part of the findings of this study you’re more than 
welcome to do so; simply indicate your interest when answering the final question. 
If you have any questions or you wish to contact me for any reason, you can reach 
me at john.gustavsson.2010@mumail.ie. 
You must be 18 or older to participate in this survey. This survey will take 
approximately 10-20 minutes to complete, obviously depending on how much time 
you spend thinking about your decisions. 
By proceeding, you agree to take part in this survey, and have your data stored under 
the conditions outlined above. Thank you for your participation! 
What time of the month is your birthday? 
First third of the month 
Second third of the month 





Intertemporal choice scenarios [Libertarian Paternalist treatment group] 
 
NOTE: 1 euro is the equivalent of about 1.08 USD or 0.73 Pound Sterling as of this 
writing. 
In one month, you are going to receive 50 euro. If you would rather receive 30 euro 
in one week, please tick this box. 
[] 
In one month, you are going to receive an Amazon voucher worth 50 euro. If you 
would rather prefer to receive a voucher worth 30 euro in one week, please tick this 
box. 
[] 
In one month, you are going to receive an Apple voucher worth 50 euro. If you 
would rather prefer to receive a voucher worth 30 euro in one week, please tick this 
box. 
[] 
In six months, you are going to receive 50 euro. If you would rather receive 30 euro 
in one month, please tick this box. 
[] 
In six months, you are going to receive an Amazon voucher worth 50 euro. If you 
would rather prefer to receive a voucher worth 30 euro in one month, please tick this 
box. 
[] 
In six months, you are going to receive an Apple voucher worth 50 euro. If you 







In 12 months, you are going to receive 50 euro. If you would rather receive 30 euro 
in six months, please tick this box. 
[] 
In 12 months, you are going to receive an Amazon voucher worth 50 euro. If you 
would rather prefer to receive a voucher worth 30 euro in six months, please tick this 
box. 
[] 
In 12 months, you are going to receive an Apple voucher worth 50 euro. If you 








Intertemporal choice scenarios [Autonomy-enhancing paternalist group] 
Below, you will be presented with a number of scenarios – you will be asked to 
choose between a smaller-sooner option, and a larger-later option. Before you make 
your choices, here are a few arguments that I would like you to take into account: 
1) Choosing the “later” option means you have something to look forward to. 
2) Saving money means you’ll be safe in the event of a “rainy day” 
3) Every decision that we make is influenced by the choices we’ve made in the past. 
By choosing the later option now, it’ll be easier to do the same in the future – you 
can establish a positive precedent for yourself. 
4) The annual interest rate in the first three scenarios (see below) is 742961 % (based 
on a four-week month) in the second and last third of the scenarios it is 241 % and 
178 % respectively. 
However, you should also keep in mind that: 
1)      If you choose to receive the money or voucher sooner, you’ll also be able to 
enjoy it sooner and have the freedom to choose whether you use them now or later. 
The “later” option prevents you from using the money/voucher sooner, but if you 
choose the sooner option you can always choose to use it later. Basically, the 
“sooner” option gives you more freedom. 
2)      Choosing the “later” option means taking a risk, as you could end up needing 
the money (or voucher) sooner than you thought, and choosing the “later” options 
means you won’t have it. 






You are given a choice between receiving 50 euro in one month, or 30 euro in one 
week. Which option do you choose? 
50 euro in 1 month 
30 euro in 1 week 
You are given a choice between receiving an Amazon voucher worth 50 euro that 
you can use in one month, or a voucher worth 30 euro that you can use in one week. 
Which option do you choose? 
A 50 euro voucher in 1 month 
A 30 euro voucher in 1 week 
You are given a choice between receiving an Apple voucher worth 50 euro that you 
can use in one month, or a voucher worth 30 euro that you can use in one week. 
Which option do you choose? 
A 50 euro voucher in 1 month 
A 30 euro voucher in 1 week 
You are given a choice between receiving 50 euro in six months, or 30 euro in one 
month. Which option do you choose? 
50 euro in 6 months 
30 euro in 1 month 
You are given a choice between receiving an Amazon voucher worth 50 euro that 
you can use in six months, or a voucher worth 30 euro that you can use in one month. 
Which option do you choose? 
A 50 euro voucher in 6 months 





You are given a choice between receiving an Apple voucher worth 50 euro that you 
can use in six months, or a voucher worth 30 euro that you can use in one month. 
Which option do you choose? 
A 50 euro voucher in 6 months 
A 30 euro voucher in 1 month 
You are given a choice between receiving 50 euro in twelve months, or 30 euro in six 
months. Which option do you choose? 
50 euro in 12 months 
30 euro in 6 months 
You are given a choice between receiving an Amazon voucher worth 50 euro that 
you can use in twelve months, or a voucher worth 30 euro that you can use in six 
months. Which option do you choose? 
A 50 euro voucher in 12 months 
A 30 euro voucher in 6 months 
You are given a choice between receiving an Apple voucher worth 50 euro that you 
can use in twelve months, or a voucher worth 30 euro that you can use in six months. 
Which option do you choose? 
A 50 euro voucher in 12 months 
A 30 euro voucher in 6 months 
Which argument in favour of the “later” option did you find to be the most 
convincing? 
The “something to look forward to”-argument 
The “rainy day”-argument 





The effective interest rate-argument 
No difference 





Intertemporal choice scenarios [control group] 
NOTE: 1 euro is the equivalent of about 1.08 USD or 0.73 Pound sterling as of this 
writing. 
You are given a choice between receiving 50 euro in one month, or 30 euro in one 
week. Which option do you choose? 
50 euro in 1 month 
30 euro in 1 week 
You are given a choice between receiving an Amazon voucher worth 50 euro that 
you can use in one month, or a voucher worth 30 euro that you can use in one week. 
Which option do you choose? 
A 50 euro voucher in 1 month 
A 30 euro voucher in 1 week 
You are given a choice between receiving an Apple voucher worth 50 euro that you 
can use in one month, or a voucher worth 30 euro that you can use in one week. 
Which option do you choose? 
A 50 euro voucher in 1 month 





You are given a choice between receiving 50 euro in six months, or 30 euro in one 
month. Which option do you choose? 
50 euro in 6 months 
30 euro in 1 month 
You are given a choice between receiving an Amazon voucher worth 50 euro that 
you can use in six months, or a voucher worth 30 euro that you can use in one month. 
Which option do you choose? 
A 50 euro voucher in 6 months 
A 30 euro voucher in 1 month 
You are given a choice between receiving an Apple voucher worth 50 euro that you 
can use in six months, or a voucher worth 30 euro that you can use in one month. 
Which option do you choose? 
A 50 euro voucher in 6 months 
A 30 euro voucher in 1 month 
You are given a choice between receiving 50 euro in twelve months, or 30 euro in six 
months. Which option do you choose? 
50 euro in 12 months 
30 euro in 6 months 
You are given a choice between receiving an Amazon voucher worth 50 euro that 
you can use in twelve months, or a voucher worth 30 euro that you can use in six 
months. Which option do you choose? 
A 50 euro voucher in 12 months 





You are given a choice between receiving an Apple voucher worth 50 euro that you 
can use in twelve months, or a voucher worth 30 euro that you can use in six months. 
Which option do you choose? 
A 50 euro voucher in 12 months 
A 30 euro voucher in 6 months 
Demographic questions 





I’d rather not say 
What country do you live in? If you’d rather not say, just write N/A in the box 
[Comment field] 
What is your relationship status? 
Single/not living with partner 
Married/civil union/living with partner 
I’d rather not say 
Is water wet? 
Yes 
No 









I’d rather not say 
If Yes, why don’t you? 
Not enough money 
Lack of motivation 
Forgetfulness 
I don’t want to save more 
I’d rather not say 
What gender do you identify as? 
Male 
Female 
I’d rather not say 
What is the highest level of education you have achieved?  
High-school/post-primary school or less 
Undergraduate degree 
Postgraduate degree 
I’d rather not say 
Do you currently save? 
Yes, through a pension plan 
Yes, privately/both privately and through a pension plan 
No 
















Is it currently morning or evening where you live? 
Morning 
Evening 
How do you feel about Apple on a scale from 1 (dislike) to 5 (strongly like) 
[Pull-down menu with numbers 1-5] 
How do you feel about Amazon on a scale from 1 (dislike) to 5 (strongly like) 
[Pull-down menu with numbers 1-5] 
Please provide your email address in the field below (this is voluntary but 
encouraged) 
[Comment field] 
Do you have any comments, questions or feedback in general? If you would like to 









One week ago, you participated in a survey I did on inter-temporal choice. In case 
you forgot, my name is John Gustavsson, and I’m a research student at the National 
University of Ireland, Maynooth at the Department of Economics, Finance & 
Accounting, and this research will form part of my thesis. The survey you are about 
to take is similar (but shorter as there are no demographic questions). Once again, 
your results are anonymous, and your data will be retained for research purposes. 
You may quit the survey at any time; if you quit before finishing the survey, your 
data will be deleted. You can also withdraw your data at any time by emailing me at 
the email address provided below. 
 
It must be recognized that, in some circumstances, confidentiality of research data 
and records may be overridden by courts in the event of litigation or in the course of 
investigation by lawful authority. In such circumstances the University will take all 
reasonable steps within law to ensure that confidentiality is maintained to the greatest 
possible extent. 
 
If you have any questions or you wish to contact me for any reason, you can reach 
me at john.gustavsson.2010@mumail.ie. This survey will take approximately 10 
minutes to complete, depending on how much time you spend thinking about each 
decision. 
 
By proceeding, you agree to take part in this survey, and have your data stored under 





Once again, could you please tell me if your birthday is… 
In the first third of the month 
In the second third of the month 
In the final third of the month 
You are given a choice between receiving 50 euro in one month, or 30 euro in one 
week. Which option do you choose? 
50 euro in 1 month 
30 euro in 1 week 
You are given a choice between receiving an Amazon voucher worth 50 euro that 
you can use in one month, or a voucher worth 30 euro that you can use in one week. 
Which option do you choose? 
A 50 euro voucher in 1 month 
A 30 euro voucher in 1 week 
You are given a choice between receiving an Apple voucher worth 50 euro that you 
can use in one month, or a voucher worth 30 euro that you can use in one week. 
Which option do you choose? 
A 50 euro voucher in 1 month 
A 30 euro voucher in 1 week 
You are given a choice between receiving 50 euro in six months, or 30 euro in one 
month. Which option do you choose? 
50 euro in 6 months 
30 euro in 1 month 
You are given a choice between receiving an Amazon voucher worth 50 euro that 





Which option do you choose? 
A 50 euro voucher in 6 months 
A 30 euro voucher in 1 month 
You are given a choice between receiving an Apple voucher worth 50 euro that you 
can use in six months, or a voucher worth 30 euro that you can use in one month. 
Which option do you choose? 
A 50 euro voucher in 6 months 
A 30 euro voucher in 1 month 
You are given a choice between receiving 50 euro in twelve months, or 30 euro in six 
months. Which option do you choose? 
50 euro in 12 months 
30 euro in 6 months 
You are given a choice between receiving an Amazon voucher worth 50 euro that 
you can use in twelve months, or a voucher worth 30 euro that you can use in six 
months. Which option do you choose? 
A 50 euro voucher in 12 months 
A 30 euro voucher in 6 months 
You are given a choice between receiving an Apple voucher worth 50 euro that you 
can use in twelve months, or a voucher worth 30 euro that you can use in six months. 
Which option do you choose? 
A 50 euro voucher in 12 months 






Appendix B: Additional statistical analysis 
 
 
TABLE 10: Variance inflation factors (VIF), money tasks 
Variable   VIF 
nopostgrad   2.76 
male   2.01 
aep   1.68 
lp   1.67 
ageover23   1.61 
      
Mean VIF   1.95 
 
TABLE 11: Variance inflation factors (VIF), Amazon voucher tasks 
Variable   VIF 
nopostgrad   2.79 
male   2.02 
aep   1.70 
lp   1.67 
ageover23   1.60 
      
Mean VIF   1.96 
 
TABLE 12: Variance inflation factors (VIF), Apple voucher tasks 
Variable   VIF 
nopostgrad   2.54 
male   1.88 
aep   1.62 
lp   1.62 
ageover23   1.61 
      








TABLE 13: €30 (or voucher equivalent) in one week vs €50 (or voucher 
equivalent) in one month (control variables included)16 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES onemmoney onemamazon onemapple 
    
lp 2.163** 1.361 3.225*** 
 (0.0133) (0.447) (0.00935) 
aep 0.961 1.176 1.232 
 (0.883) (0.683) (0.553) 
ageover23 2.174*** 1.751 1.514 
 (0.00276) (0.126) (0.212) 
male 1.393 1.256 1.810* 
 (0.166) (0.497) (0.0635) 
nopostgrad 1.377 1.594 0.767 
 (0.363) (0.328) (0.611) 
Constant 1.562 4.337** 4.269** 
 (0.294) (0.0117) (0.0152) 
    
Observations 481 473 411 
Pseudo R2 0.0393 0.0125 0.0473 
 
TABLE 14: €30 (or voucher equivalent) in one month vs €50 (or voucher 
equivalent) in six months (control variables included) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES sixmmoney sixmamazon sixmapple 
    
lp 1.953*** 1.559* 1.764** 
 (0.00387) (0.0659) (0.0401) 
aep 1.084 1.207 0.958 
 (0.723) (0.428) (0.870) 
ageover23 2.426*** 2.033*** 2.703*** 
 (1.08e-05) (0.000780) (3.55e-05) 
male 1.198 1.088 1.436 
 (0.350) (0.676) (0.107) 
nopostgrad 0.848 0.689 0.813 
 (0.558) (0.246) (0.561) 
Constant 0.605 1.494 1.243 
 (0.157) (0.301) (0.612) 
    
Observations 481 473 411 
Pseudo R2 0.0503 0.0337 0.0576 
 
 
16 Notes on Tables 13-18: The tables show logistic regression coefficients as odds ratios for the 
variables listed in the left column. Numbers below the odds ratios are p-values.  Each column contains 





TABLE 15: €30 (or voucher equivalent) in six months vs €50 (or voucher 
equivalent) in twelve months (control variables included) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES twelvemmoney twelvemamazon twelvemapple 
    
lp 1.321 1.413 1.559 
 (0.330) (0.365) (0.438) 
aep 0.844 0.849 0.877 
 (0.202) (0.208) (0.234) 
ageover23 1.959*** 1.810*** 2.072*** 
 (0.427) (0.407) (0.509) 
male 1.581** 1.285 2.306*** 
 (0.323) (0.272) (0.529) 
nopostgrad 1.287 1.348 1.735* 
 (0.385) (0.418) (0.570) 
Constant 1.004 1.251 0.674 
 (0.372) (0.483) (0.276) 
    
Observations 481 473 411 
Pseudo R2 0.0277 0.0201 0.0507 
 
TABLE 16: €30 (or voucher equivalent) in one week vs €50 (or voucher 
equivalent) in one month (USA-only sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES onemmoney onemamazon onemapple 
    
    
lp 1.765 1.122 2.281 
 (0.824) (0.589) (1.279) 
aep 0.798 1.286 1.232 
 (0.299) (0.647) (0.568) 
Constant 3.824*** 7.000*** 4.385*** 
 (1.042) (2.366) (1.348) 
    
Observations 225 222 189 







TABLE 17: €30 (or voucher equivalent) in one month vs €50 (or voucher 
equivalent) in six months (USA-only sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES sixmmoney sixmamazon sixmapple 
    
    
lp 1.780* 1.588 1.385 
 (0.611) (0.582) (0.569) 
aep 1.188 1.178 0.764 
 (0.373) (0.389) (0.282) 
Constant 0.952 1.667** 2.333*** 
 (0.210) (0.385) (0.609) 
    
Observations 225 222 189 
Pseudo R2 0.00943 0.00576 0.00928 
 
TABLE 18: €30 (or voucher equivalent) in six months vs €50 (or voucher 
equivalent) in twelve months (USA-only sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES twelvemmoney twelvemamazon twelvemapple 
    
    
lp 2.033* 1.834 2.034 
 (0.834) (0.818) (0.956) 
aep 0.672 0.548* 0.540 
 (0.222) (0.192) (0.202) 
Constant 2.280*** 3.211*** 2.889*** 
 (0.547) (0.843) (0.790) 
    
Observations 225 222 189 

















onemmoney 100 0 0.5720 
onemamazon 100 0 0.5236 
onemapple 100 0 0.5971 
sixmmoney 66.54 41.70 0.5654 
sixmamazon 100 0 0.5449 
sixmapple 100 0 0.5533 
twelvemmoney 100 0 0.5320 
twelvemamazon 100 0 0.5483 
twelvemapple 100 0 0.5516 
 










onemmoney 100 0 0.6474 
onemamazon 100 0 0.5843 
onemapple 100 0 0.6631 
sixmmoney 77.34 46.67 0.6495 
sixmamazon 100 0 0.6282 
sixmapple 96.50 10.40 0.6677 
twelvemmoney 99.70 0.68 0.6114 
twelvemamazon 100 0 0.5990 




17 Notes on Tables 19-20: The cutoff score when estimating sensitivity and specificity is 0.5. The first 
column shows a list of dependent variables, with the columns next to it displaying the sensitivity, 


















18 Notes on Table 21: The table shows the p-values for the correlation coefficients between the email 
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Libertarian paternalism, a term which refers to the practice of “nudging” consumers 
into making “good” decisions, has grown steadily in popularity in recent years as an 
alternative to sin taxes and other traditional forms of paternalism. Critics however 
believe that relying on psychological manipulation is inherently unethical as 
consumers are typically unaware of the nudge and the intention behind it.  While 
proponents of LP insist that they want LP interventions to be conducted in an ethical 
manner, there is so far little evidence that LP interventions, when conducted in such 
a manner, still have the desired effect. In this paper I introduce the term Marginal 
Cost of Transparency (MCoT), the difference in treatment effect of an LP and what I 
call a Transparent Libertarian Paternalism (TLP) intervention, a type of LP 
intervention where consumers are made aware of the nudge and why it is there. In 
this paper I conduct an experiment the results of which indicate that the MCoT is for 
the most part not statistically significantly different from zero and that the answer to 
the question “Do honest nudges work?” is Yes. Moreover, the results indicate that 
Autonomy-enhancing paternalism (AEP), a type of paternalist interventions that 
work to enhance the autonomy of consumers (mainly by providing information) and 
unlike LP do not rely on psychological manipulation, fares at least as well as the 







Since the term was coined (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003), libertarian paternalism has 
been a topic of debate among behavioral economists. The term refers to measures 
that intend to change consumers’ behavior for their own good, paternalism, without 
using coercive means, that is, using a “libertarian” approach. It can be thought of as 
an umbrella term, incorporating various types of so called “nudges”: Changing the 
order of items on a menu, changing the default option on a corporate pension plan 
from opt-in to opt-out and informing people in a neighborhood of their neighbors’ 
consumption patterns such as how much energy the average person in their 
neighborhood uses are just a few examples. 
Although libertarian paternalism has been embraced by policymakers in 
several countries as an easy way to “fix” consumer behaviors perceived as flawed, 
libertarian paternalism has been met with far from universal acclaim in the academic 
community with critics questioning everything from the suitability of the term itself 
to the efficacy and ethics of the methods used.  
One criticism leveled by Binder and Lades (2015), among others, is that most 
forms of libertarian paternalism use psychological manipulation and the exploitation 
of biases to achieve the goal of the “choice architect” the policymaker designing the 
nudge and usually without the consumer being aware of the nudge or why it is there. 
Thus, while workers being enrolled in an opt-out retirement saving plan will be 
informed that they are being enrolled and be provided with information regarding the 
plan, the same cannot be said for consumers visiting a restaurant whose menu has 





Binder and Lades (2015) proposed an alternative they named Autonomy-
Enhancing Paternalism (AEP). AEP is technically a subset of LP but with stricter 
criteria. In order for an intervention to qualify under the AEP umbrella, the 
intervention cannot rely on the exploitation of psychological biases; instead it must 
enhance the individual’s autonomy, the ability to make a conscious decision, by 
providing more information, such as public service announcements, nutrition labels 
on menus etc., or by preventing an individual from making a hasty decision by, for 
example, introducing a mandatory waiting period between the purchase and delivery 
of a good/service, such as a payday loan, during which the individual can cancel the 
purchase. Common forms of libertarian paternalism such as changing the default 
option to the option the choice architect wants the consumer to choose, is off limits 
under AEP, as is the use of framing as in the menu example. 
AEP relies implicitly on the assumption of classic liberalism that consumers 
will do what is best for them if given all the necessary information and enough time 
to make a decision. In contrast, LP is based on the more pessimistic view common 
among behavioral economists where consumers are seen as helpless victims that 
cannot be reliably counted on to make good decisions for themselves even if 
provided with full information. The AEP approach has been discussed in the context 
of improving the health and well-being of adolescents (Patton et al., 2016) and in 
promoting sustainable practices (Babutsidze and Chai, 2018). Wagner (2019) 
advocates for AEP as one measure to reduce opportunism on behalf of principals. 
While AEP has a clear ethical advantage over LP, it is not without 
disadvantages. It is conceivable that providing nutrition information on restaurant 
menus could cause a loss of utility for all consumers who are buying high or even 





shame. While these consumers may be aware that they are eating an unhealthy meal, 
having the nutrition information “pushed down their throats” may put a damper on 
the mood even if the meal is, for example, part of the celebration of a special 
occasion. Such an AEP intervention could also serve to worsen the conditions of 
those who suffer from eating disorders such as anorexia who are prone to obsess 
about the calories in the foods they consume. It is an open question what information 
consumers need to make good choices and who is capable of deciding that and why. 
Moreover, different sets of consumers need different information, i.e. anorexics do 
not need calorie information. There is no mechanism to assure all groups are 
accommodated. 
In their book Nudge (2008) Thaler and Sunstein assure the readers that they 
want nudging to be carried out in an ethical, transparent manner, although they do 
not describe in any further detail what they mean by this. Curiously, however, the 
vast majority of nudging case studies they present to bolster their case lack 
transparency, and there is no way to know whether the nudges would work as well or 
at all had the choice architects been transparent about their work and intentions. If it 
is in fact the case that transparency does not harm the efficacy of a nudge, then this 
provides a potential “third option”, a compromise of sorts between the LP and AEP 
approach: Honest nudging, or Transparent Libertarian Paternalism (TLP). A TLP 
intervention would be identical to an LP intervention, with the exception that 
consumers are explicitly informed, for example through a written disclaimer, that 
they are being nudged and why. This approach solves one of the major ethical issues 
with LP which is the lack of transparency and by extension lack of accountability of 





Transparency in the context of nudging has been discussed extensively, though 
few empirical studies exist on the topic. Bovens (2009) argue that nudges “work best 
in the dark”, a view that was accepted by the House of Lords in a report released in 
2011. 
Some studies, however, have challenged this assumption: Kroese, Marchiori 
and de Ridder (2016) conducted a field experiment in which two groups of 
participants were nudged towards making healthier food choices. The nudge 
consisted of a redesign of two stores to make the healthy choices more prominent. 
One store however informed customers about this through a sign near the cash 
register display, whereas the other did not. The transparent nudge did not perform 
any worse than the hidden nudge, suggesting that disclosing the existence of a nudge 
does not change how consumers react to it. However, it should be noted that the sign 
that informed customers about the nudge merely stated that “we help you make 
healthier choices”. Thus, customers were not informed explicitly that they had been 
nudged, that the store had employed a form of psychological manipulation of their 
choices, only that the store had done something to make them choose healthier 
options. Clearly, such a sign could just as easily have referred to the store slashing 
prices on fruits and vegetables or adding more healthy options without hiding the 
unhealthy ones. 
While transparency is a common theme throughout literature, and while almost 
everyone will speak highly of transparency as a concept, the meaning of the term 
transparency is not agreed upon. Does transparency only require that consumers or 
employees in the case of a workplace nudge are able to find out about the nudge? Or 
does it require that they are told that they are being nudged? If so, how clear must 





assumed that most of them actively considered the information in their decision 
making? Does transparency mean that consumers must explicitly be told that they are 
being nudged, rather than just being told that changes have been made to make them 
act in a certain way, i.e. “we help you make healthier choices” with no further 
information provided? Do you have to inform consumers what the nudge is, or 
merely that there is one? Do you have to be honest about who is behind the nudge or 
would it be acceptable to phrase a disclaimer using neutral terms? Stating that “Fruit 
and vegetables have now been more prominently displayed to promote healthy 
lifestyles” may make consumers believe that the nudge has been implemented by 
order of the government whereas “In this store we have chosen to display fruits and 
vegetables more prominently to promote healthy lifestyles” makes it clear who is 
behind the nudge and thus who consumers ought to hold accountable for it. 
In my view, in order for a nudge to be considered transparent, the disclosure 
should be made in such a way that most consumers will read it and it should be clear 
what is being done (what the nudge consists of), why, and who is behind it. I argue 
that the purpose of transparency should not merely be to avoid deception in a 
technical, legalistic sense, but to avoid consumers feeling that they have been 
deceived. Informing consumers about a nudge in a manner that most of them will 
miss, for example, by putting a disclaimer in a footnote on a website, will likely not 
stop consumers from feeling that they have been deceived if/when they find out 
about the nudge at a later point. The fact that they could have found out on their own 
will not lessen the feeling of deception. If anything, consumers may see the hiding of 
the disclosure as proof that the company or government knew that what they were 
doing was wrong or would be unpopular. Likewise, only providing partial 





that you have redesigned the store but not why, can reasonably be considered lying 
by omission; that is, another form of deception.  
Furthermore, as transparency is a necessity for accountability, transparency 
must entail informing consumers who is responsible for the nudge. Should they 
complain to the shop owner or their local elected representative if they dislike the 
nudge? 
In their report from 2011, the House of Lords made the argument that since 
private businesses do not have to disclose the exact methods they use to make 
(nudge) consumers purchase more, neither should government have to do so when 
nudging individuals towards its own goals. This, however, ignores that the 
government is far from just another actor on the market. Rather it assumes that the 
government does not have a greater ethical responsibility towards the citizens than a 
private business does and ignores the higher expectations citizens place on their 
government. It also ignores the higher risk associated with governmental nudging. If 
consumers feel like they have been deceived or lied to by their government this 
arguably has a greater negative effect on political stability and society as a whole 
than if consumers feel that they have been deceived or lied to by a private business. 
This is especially troubling today as public trust in government and its institutions 
has fallen dramatically throughout the western world since the financial crisis of 
2008. Given these circumstances it seems wise to err on the side of caution with 
regards to transparency so as not to further erode the public’s confidence. 
Bruns et al. (2018) conducted an experiment that concluded that even full 
transparency, fulfilling the criteria listed above, does not reduce the efficiency of a 





compensation. While transparency did reduce the amounts contributed, the difference 
was not statistically significant. However, their study suffers from a student-only 
sample and lack of questions to gauge engagement with the experiment. Moreover, 
students and young people are more interested in environmental issues than the 
general population, which could affect the outcome. Perhaps such an 
environmentally concerned group does not mind being nudged towards an 
environmentally friendly option, but there is no way to tell whether this is the case in 
the general population. The combination of real incentives with the lack of 
engagement identifying questions is also troubling. By offering €10 to all 
participants out of which they could keep whatever they did not donate towards 
climate compensation without having any way of weeding out unserious or 
inattentive participants, they ignored the significant risk that students signed up to 
make some money rather than to seriously engage with the experiment. 
In this paper I introduce the term the “Marginal Cost of Transparency” 
(MCoT), the difference between the treatment effect of a standard libertarian 
paternalist treatment and a transparent libertarian paternalist treatment. I conduct an 
experiment with the ostensible goal of reducing the time discount rate, and I measure 
the MCoT by assigning participants to four different groups: An LP group, a TLP 
group, an AEP group and a control group. Conducting an experiment with random 
assignment allows for the effects of the LP and TLP treatments to be compared 
directly. The reason for including an AEP treatment in the experiment is that AEP is 
another potentially viable ethically superior alternative to LP.  
In the LP treatment group the default option was set to the larger-later option, 
meaning participants had to make an active choice by checking a box in order to 





disclaimer in capital letters informing participants of the nudge, what it is meant to 
do and why. That I am the person behind the nudge should be clear to all 
participants. In the AEP treatment there was no default option but participants were 
instead provided with a list of arguments in favor of choosing the larger-later option. 
The arguments and the disclaimer message can both be found in Appendix A. In the 
control group there was neither a default option nor were participants provided with 
any arguments in favor of either option.  
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 I outline my methodology, 
how the experiment was conducted and the advantages and limitations of my 
approach. In Section 3 I present the results of the experiment and discuss what these 
results mean. Finally, Section 4 contains my conclusions from this study. 
Hypotheses 
This study tests two main hypotheses:  
1. TLP has no effect 
2. The difference between the LP and AEP treatment effects will be statistically 






In order to test the hypotheses regarding the relative efficacy of first and foremost 
TLP and LP and secondly LP and AEP I conducted an online experiment between 
the 18th of October and the 17th of November 2016. In total 1552 participants 
completed the experiment. Participants were mainly recruited through social media 
including Facebook, Reddit and Twitter, and an email invitation sent out to all 
students at the Department of Finance, Economics & Accounting at Maynooth 
University.  
The incentive structure of this experiment was similar to the one developed by 
Coller and Williams (1999). Three participants were randomly selected to be paid 
based on their stated preference for one pre-selected task (task #4). These 
participants were neither aware at the time they took part in the experiment that they 
would be paid nor were they nor any other participants aware of which task was the 
“real” task. All participants were informed of the incentive structure before agreeing 
to take part in the experiment, but they were not informed of the hypotheses as that 
may have biased the results. The three selected participants were contacted via email 
and paid through PayPal. 
There is little evidence indicating that incentives matter in the context of 
intertemporal choice experiments as documented by an extensive review of the 
intemporal choice literature by Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002). 
Coller and Williams (1999) found no difference between participants who were 
offered real incentives and those were not, while Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and 
l’Haridon (2013) found only small differences. Bickel et al. (2009) found, through a 
neuroimaging study, that responses to intertemporal choice tasks were the same 





caution this experiment used real incentives, though due to budget constraints, as 
discussed, only a few participants could be paid. It should be noted that even if 
participants were to display different discount rates depending on the type of 
incentives offered, this would not be of great concern seeing as how the purpose of 
the study was not to determine individual discount rates per se, but rather to 
determine the impact of various interventions. That is, as long as the type of 
incentive offered did not affect one treatment group differently than another, 
comparisons can still be made between groups to determine whether or not one 
treatment performed better than another, even if the discount rates recorded are 
higher or lower than they would be in real life. There is no intuitive reason to believe 
that any group would be differently affected by the real, low incentives offered in 
this study. 
Participants were randomly assigned into one of four groups: The LP treatment 
group, the TLP treatment group, the AEP treatment group, and the control group. As 
the platform did not allow for true randomization, the first question asked 
participants during what part of the month (first week, second week etc.) they were 
born, and based on their answers they were assigned to different groups.  
In the second part of the experiment, all participants were told that they had 
won the lottery and were asked to choose between a prize of €20/€50/€25019 in 1 
week/1 month/6 months and €40/€100/€500 in 1 month/6 months/12 months, which 
made for a total of nine intertemporal choice tasks. Different sized rewards were 
used as it has been shown (Thaler, 1981) that the discount rate tends to fall as the 
size of the reward goes up, hence it seems within reason to suspect that demographic 
 





and treatment variables may have different impact on different sized rewards, i.e. 
some may only affect the lowest rewards, some only the highest. 
This experiment used choice tasks that were inspired by those used by Green, 
Myerson and McFadden (1997) and Hesketh (2000). Choice tasks are tasks where 
participants are asked to choose between a smaller-sooner reward and a larger-later 
reward. Such tasks provide less precision in measuring discount rates, yet they are 
preferable since they are the closest equivalent to the type of intertemporal choices 
faced by most consumers on a daily basis which consist of a choice between one 
fixed amount now and another fixed amount at a specific latter point.  One option 
would have been to use “matching” tasks where participants are asked to match how 
much money they would need at a certain point in the future for it to be equivalent to 
a specific amount of money today. However, such matching tasks, while they do 
provide precise measurements of discount rates, are very rare outside of experiments; 
there are very few if any real life situations where consumers are asked to “match” a 
certain amount in the future with another amount today. Because of this, as discussed 
by Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002), consumers tend to rely on 
heuristics when solving matching tasks that they would not rely on outside of the 
experiment. Finally, matching tasks are relatively time consuming and may reduce 
the number of participants who actually complete the experiment and/or stay focused 
throughout its duration.  
In addition to matching tasks rating tasks were also considered, but ultimately 
deemed inferior to choice tasks as they, just like matching tasks, do not resemble any 
real life situation and additionally they may be sensitive to extremeness aversion 
(Tversky and Simonson, 1993). The number of tasks was kept at the relatively low 





shown to have a negative relationship with the number of questions (Galesic and 
Bosnjak, 2009) and second, because the generalizability of the experiment would be 
reduced by too many tasks, as there are very few real life scenarios where a 
consumer would face dozens of intertemporal choices at once and little is known 
regarding whether consumers act differently when faced with a large number of 
choices compared to a small number.    
Participants were randomly assigned into one of four groups, based on their 
answer to the first question which asked which during which part of the month they 
had been born. This was necessary as the platform did not allow for true 
randomization. The four groups were the libertarian paternalist treatment group, the 
transparent libertarian paternalist treatment group, the autonomy-enhancing 
paternalist treatment group and the control group. 
In the libertarian paternalist treatment group, the default option was set to the 
larger-later option and participants had to make an active choice by checking a box if 
they wanted the smaller-sooner option suggesting that the treatment relied on the 
status quo bias.  
In the transparent libertarian paternalist treatment group, the default option 
was, just like in the LP treatment group, set to the larger-later option. However, 
participants in this treatment group were explicitly told about the default option and 
the purpose behind it before the choice tasks there was a message written in all-caps 
conveying this information. As such, while the treatment still had a nudge, it had a 
greater degree of transparency and did not seek to unknowingly manipulate 





In the AEP treatment group, nudges were foregone entirely in favor of 
providing participants with a list of reasons why they should choose the larger-later 
option. The list, together with the rest of the survey, can be found in Appendix A. 
Participants were also asked which argument they found the most convincing, and 
those who stated that they had not read the list were not included in the regressions 
as they could not be considered part of the AEP group – one option would have been 
to include them in the control group, but this was rejected as there is no way to know 
whether they may have read and been influenced by a few of the reasons or whether 
they did not read any at all.  
Participants in the control group were neither provided with a list of arguments 
nor exposed to a default option.  
The third and final part of the survey was identical to all participants and 
consisted of demographic questions covering age, marital status, gender, education, 
in which part of the world the participant resided and whether the participant was 
currently enrolled at university. Participants were not required to provide any 
identifying information. This section also asked questions regarding saving and the 
participant’s attitude towards it. See Appendix A for complete list. Notably, this 
survey did not ask for the annual income of participants, even though it is 
conceivable that it may affect the discount rate. This is for a number of reasons. First, 
a large number of participants – likely mainly those with low incomes – would be 
reluctant to provide that information. Second, what is considered a high income in 
one location may not be a high income in another location; a person making a high 
salary in Mexico may still make less than the average American. This issue exists 
even within countries. A salary high enough to afford a very comfortable lifestyle in 





Manhattan or San Francisco. Third, income is far from a perfect predictor of 
lifestyle. Students, for example, generally have low incomes but also do not have the 
same expenses that adults out of college tend to have – students tend to save money 
by living in dorms or at home, most of them do not need a car as they live close to 
college, they receive student discounts in many shops, etc., and may therefore appear 
poorer than they really are. The same can be said of retirees.  
The final part of the survey also contained two questions designed to find out 
whether the participants had paid attention while reading the instructions of the 
survey. This was inspired by Haan and Linde (2011). These questions were “How 
many participants who take this survey will be paid?” and “How many intertemporal 
choice scenarios (questions where you were asked to choose between a smaller-
sooner and larger-later reward) were there on the previous page?” The answer to the 
first question was provided in the introduction to the survey, and to answer the 
second question the participant only needed to remember how many tasks he or she 
had just completed on the previous page.  
The second-to-last question asked participants for their email address so that 
they could be contacted and paid if they were one of the three selected participants. 
The last question was a comment field where participants could leave feedback and 
request to receive the findings from the experiment. The “feedback form” was 
included for two reasons. First, because this feedback may be used to improve the 
design of future experiments. Second, because the feedback of some participants may 
indicate that they did not understand the experiment and their role in it, and in that 






As mentioned above the rewards in this experiment varied from €20, €50 and 
€250 for the smaller-sooner option to €40, €100 and €500 for the larger-later option. 
The smaller-sooner reward was always half of the larger-later reward. Given the 
magnitude effect (Thaler, 1981) we cannot expect smaller rewards to be discounted 
at the same rate as larger rewards, and it is conceivable to think that a treatment that 
works on a smaller (larger) reward may not work on a larger (smaller) reward, which 
is why this experiment used rewards of different sizes.  
Conducting this experiment online allowed for a larger and more diverse 
sample than traditional experiments conducted on college campuses. This experiment 
has 1552 participants. The experiment was far more diverse than most experiments, 
with hundreds of participants from all age group groups, both genders, married as 
well as non-married, etc.  
The internet also provides a greater degree of anonymity than traditional lab 
experiments, potentially reducing the observer effect that otherwise may lead to 
participants acting unnaturally, which would reduce the generalizability of the 
results. Finally, participation in an online experiment requires less time and effort on 
behalf of the participant, meaning even those who would not find it worthwhile to 
participate in a lab experiment may take the time to participate in this experiment, 
which reduces the self-selection problem associated with economic experiments.  
However, as identified by Wright (2005), an online experiment is also 
associated with drawbacks not present in a lab experiment. The same participant 
could potentially take the experiment multiple times, although this risk was mitigated 
by making it impossible to take the experiment multiple times from the same 





devices. Given the relatively low incentives in this experiment, it is highly unlikely 
that more than at most a few participants found this worthwhile.  
Participants may also be suspicious of the financial incentive and may suspect 
that the experiment is a scam. However, this risk was mitigated by reassuring 
participants in the introduction to the experiment that they would not have to provide 
any banking details to receive payment.  
There is also the issue of distractions; while in a lab experiment participants 
tend to be in a quiet room with nothing else to do than completing their tasks, this is 
not the case with an online experiment where participants may be distracted by other 
web content such as popup notifications, and where the experimenter is unable to 
observe the participants to make sure that they are not, for example, asking for help 
or getting input from their friends or from the internet. While this lack of control 
does reduce internal validity (Grimelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2014), on the whole it 
does not necessarily have to be a negative feature as economic decisions are usually 
taken in “noisy” environments such as shopping centers, as such the “environment” 
provided by this experiment may be closer to the kind of environment where real life 
intertemporal choices are made. This experiment also allows participants to take part 
from the comfort of their own homes, possibly making them more relaxed and prone 
to act naturally.  
Recruiting a representative sample can be a struggle with online experiments 
which generally suffer from lack of unbiasedness for this reason (Duda and Nobile, 
2010). In particular this may be a problem for surveys like this which are open to the 





does pose a problem, lab experiments generally suffer from this to an even higher 
degree as samples tend to be student-only. 
In the specific setting of conducting an intertemporal choice experiment online 
has the disadvantage of not being able to pay participants immediately upon 
completion as could be done in a lab experiment. As such, the shortest delay in an 
online intertemporal choice task cannot be zero if real incentives are to be used, as in 
this experiment, as many participants would certainly figure out that it would be 
impossible to pay rewards immediately and that tasks that gave the option of 
receiving money immediately were hypothetical. Therefore, the shortest delay in this 
experiment was set to one week. While this may mean that the experiment may fail 
to capture some of the “present bias”, this is not a grave concern as discount rates 
appear to be falling for at least one year from the present time (Frederick, 
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2002) and so most of the present bias is likely to still 
be present even though participants cannot choose to receive the reward 
immediately. 
Finally, this survey did not record dropout rates as the data from participants 
who did not finish the survey were deleted as promised in the introductory page of 
the survey (see Appendix A). Due to this, it is impossible to say how many or what 
kind of participants dropped out (i.e. was there a higher dropout rate in one particular 






These results were obtained by estimating logistic regressions using the responses to 
the intertemporal choice tasks as the dependent variables. As there were nine tasks, 
there are also nine dependent variables, all of them binary making them suitable for 
logistic regression. For the sake of simplicity, the coefficients are expressed as odds 
ratios expressing the likelihood of a participant in the relevant group choosing the 
larger-later option for that particular task relative to the likelihood of a participant in 
the control group making the same choice.  
After estimating the regression parameters, Wald tests were used to determine 
whether or not the LP treatment significantly outperformed the TLP or AEP 
treatment, and whether the TLP treatment significantly outperformed the AEP 
treatment, or vice versa. Note that since Wald tests p-values are calculated on a two-
tailed basis, one must cut this statistic in half in order to get the appropriate one-
tailed p-value which is relevant to this paper (i.e. does LP outperform TLP?). Thus, 
in the tables in this section a p-value less than 0.1 indicates significance. 
There are two different sets of regressions below. In the first set (Tables 4-6) 
everyone who passed at least one question discerning attentiveness is included, 
giving a sample size of 1000. In the second set (Tables 7-9), only those who passed 
both attentiveness discerning questions are included, giving a sample size of 323. 
The reasoning for including the first set is pragmatic; it seems reasonable to assume 
that some of those who failed only one of these questions may still have taken the 
experiment seriously but have paid too little attention to remember the instructions 
where they could find the answer to one of the questions, and to the number of tasks 
that they solved which was the answer to the other question. In the real world many 





consumers while they are not paying full attention, and estimating and comparing 
regressions with both samples can provide insights on the whether and how different 
treatments affect fully attentive and less attentive participants differently. Finally, the 
regressions that included control variables have a sample size of 944; this is because 
those who answered “I’d rather not say” to any of the relevant demographic 
questions that made up the control variables (age, education, gender) were excluded. 
Model specification and assumptions 
Logistic regression model 1: No control variables 
log Prob(Y=1)/(1 - Prob(Y=1)) = B0 + Blpdlp + Btlpdtlp + Baepdaep 
Logistic regression model 2: Control variables included 
log Prob(Y=1)/(1 - Prob(Y=1)) = B0 + Blpdlp + Btlpdtlp + Baepdaep + Bagebelow36dagebelow36 
+ Bmaledmale + Bnopostgraddnopostgrad 
where Y is a dependent variable based on the answers to a certain intertemporal 
choice task (see Tables 4-9). 
Like with any type of regression, certain assumptions must hold true in order for a 
logistic regression to yield valid and reliable results.  
First, given that these are binary rather than multinomial logistic regressions, 
the dependent variables must be binary. It is not difficult to verify that this is indeed 
the case. 
Second, observations must be independent of one another. There is no reason 
to believe that the answers of one respondent would not be independent of the other 
respondents as the participants did not know each other and it is unlikely that any of 





low incentives and also seeing as how IP tracking ensured that a participant would 
have to use a different device or a proxy/VPN to do so.  
Third, there must be little or no multicollinearity among the independent 
variables in logistic regressions. Among the regressions that do not include control 
variables this must clearly be the case as no participant can be part of two treatment 
groups, and by calculating the variance inflation factor (see appendix 2, Table 13) I 
was able to confirm that collinearity was not an issue even for those regressions that 
did include control variables. 
Fourth, logistic regression requires that all continuous independent variables be 
linearly related to the log odds. Given that all independent variables are binary, this 
does not apply. 
Finally, a logistic regression requires a relatively large sample size. Peduzzi et 
al. (1996) argued that as a guideline the sample size, N, should be at least equal to 
10k/p, where k is the number of independent variables and p the smallest number of 
negative or positive cases in the population. The first set of regressions meet this 
criterion, while the second set, that includes control variables, does not (see 
Appendix 2, Tables 10-12 for regression output including control variables). The 
restricted sample also does not fulfill this criterion for every task which is why I 
decided to estimate a set of exact logistic regressions with the restricted sample. By 
comparing the outcomes to those of the ordinary logistic regressions I was able to 
confirm that they are very similar (see Appendix 2, Tables 14-16).  
TABLE 1: Description of variables  
Control 1 if participant is in the control 
group, 0 otherwise 
lp 1 if participant is in the libertarian 





aep 1 if participant is in the autonomy-
enhancing paternalist group, 0 
otherwise 
tlp 1 if participant is in the transparent 
libertarian paternalist group, 0 
otherwise 
onemonth40 1 if participant chose €40 in one 
month over €20 in one week, 0 
otherwise 
onemonth100 1 if participant chose €100 in on 
month over €50 in one week, 0 
otherwise 
onemonth500 1 if participant chose €500 in one 
month over €250 in one week, 0 
otherwise 
sixmonths40 1 if participant chose €40 in six 
months over €20 in one month, 0 
otherwise 
sixmonths100 1 if participant chose €100 in six 
months over €50 in one month, 0 
otherwise 
sixmonths500 1 if participant chose €500 in six 
months over €250 in one month, 0 
otherwise 
twelvemonths40 1 if participant chose €40 in twelve 
months over €20 in six months, 0 
otherwise 
twelvemonths100 1 if participant chose €100 in 
twelve months over €50 in six 
months, 0 otherwise 
twelvemonths500 1 if participant chose €500 in 
twelve months over 250 in six 
months, 0 otherwise 
age1823 1 if participant is aged 18-23, 0 
otherwise 
age2435 1 if participant is aged 24-35, 0 
otherwise 
age3664 1 if participant is aged 36-64, 0 
otherwise 
ageover64 1 if participant is over the age of 
64, 0 otherwise 
student 1 if participant is a student, 0 
otherwise 
married 1 if participant is married, in a civil 
union, or cohabitating with partner, 
0 otherwise 






highschool 1 if participant's highest achieved 
level of education is high school or 
less, 0 otherwise 
undergrad 1 if participant's highest achieved 
level of education is an 
undergraduate degree, 0 otherwise 
postgrad 1 if participant's highest achieved 
level of education is a postgraduate 
degree, 0 otherwise 
westerneurope 1 if participant resides in western 
Europe, 0 otherwise 
easterneurope 1 if participant resides in eastern 
Europe, 0 otherwise 
southerneurope 1 if participant resides in southern 
Europe, 0 otherwise 
northamerica 1 if participant resides in North 
America, 0 otherwise 
centralamerica 1 if participant resides in Central 
America, 0 otherwise 
ausnz 1 if participant resides in Australia, 
New Zealand or elsewhere in 
Oceania, 0 otherwise 
southeastasia 1 if participant resides in south east 
Asia, 0 otherwise 
middleeast 1 if participant resides in the 
Middle East, 0 otherwise. 
africa 1 if participant resides in Africa, 0 
otherwise. 
southamerica 1 if participant resides in South 
America, 0 otherwise 
agebelow36 1 if participant is below the age of 
36, 0 otherwise 
nopostgrad 1 if participant does not hold a 












lp 21.4  
tlp 22.8  
aep 28.6  
onemonth40 94  
onemonth100 94.7  
onemonth500 93.3  
sixmonths40 74.8  
sixmonths100 79.3  
sixmonths500 85.4  
twelvemonths40 86.5  
twelvemonths100 87.7  
twelvemonths500 87.8  
age1823 7.4  
age2435 17  
age3664 60.7  
over64 14.3  
student 11.7  
married 39  
male 83.2  
highschool 29.7  
undergrad 24.4  
postgrad 41  
westerneurope 86.4  
easterneurope 1.8  
southerneurope 1.1  
northamerica 6.7  
centralamerica 0.2  
ausnz 0.7  
southeastasia 0.9  
middleeast 0.2  
africa 0.6  
southamerica 0.2  
agebelow36 24.4  
nopostgrad 54.1  
 
As can be seen in Table 2, the randomization was quite successful with only a small 
surplus of AEP participants. Unlike in most experiments, students and those aged 18-





of participants have not graduated college at all. Just under 40 per cent are married, 
and over half are older than 36. 
This sample is relatively diverse compared to other experiments, though it 
should be noted that very few participants (less than 10 per cent) reside outside the 
western world. Caution is therefore advised before applying these results and 
conclusions to developing world settings. It should also be noted that men are 














Variable Share (%) Share (%) Share (%) 
lp 100  0  0  
tlp 0  100  0  
aep 0  0  100  
onemonth40 95.3  91.2  95.5  
onemonth100 96.7  94.3  93.7  
onemonth500 91.1  92.5  95.5  
sixmonths40 83.2  79.4  70.6  
sixmonths100 89.3  82.5  75.2  
sixmonths500 87.4  84.2  87.1  
twelvemonths40 91.6  90.4  79.7  
twelvemonths100 93.9  90.4  83.2  
twelvemonths500 88.8  84.6  88.8  
age1823 7.5  8.8  5.2  
age2435 16.8  14  18.5  
age3664 61.2  64.9  57.3  
over64 13.1  11.8  18.5  
student 11.2  11.8  8  
married 33.6  41.7  39.5  
male 84.1  84.2  81.8  
highschool 29.4  31.1  26.2  
undergrad 21.5  25  22.7  
postgrad 42.5  40.8  44.8  
westerneurope 89.3  85.1  84.6  
easterneurope 1.4  2.2  3.1  
southerneurope 1.9  0.4  0.7  
northamerica 4.2  7.9  8.4  
centralamerica 0  0  0  
ausnz 0  1.8  0.3  
southeastasia 1.4  0.9  0.7  
middleeast 0.9  0  0  
africa 0  0.9  0.7  
southamerica 0  0  0  
agebelow36 24.3  22.8  23.8  
nopostgrad 50.9  56.1  49  
 
As can be seen in Table 3, randomization was by and large very successful, with only 





TABLE 4: €20/€50/250 in one week vs 40/100/500 in one month20 
 (1) (2) (4) 
VARIABLES onemonth40 onemonth100 onemonth500 
    
lp 1.360 1.726 0.727 
 (0.453) (0.243) (0.352) 
tlp 0.693 0.965 0.880 
 (0.285) (0.928) (0.715) 
aep 1.400 0.869 1.488 
 (0.374) (0.697) (0.288) 
Constant 15*** 17.13*** 14.11*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
    






















In the first task, with the shortest delays and smallest rewards, no intervention 
appears to be effective. It should be noted however that there is a significant 
difference between the AEP and TLP intervention, and that the MCoT, the difference 
between the LP and TLP treatment effect, is also significant at a 10 % level though 
not at the 5 % level. 
Once again in the second task no intervention is significant. While the LP 
intervention has an odds ratio above 1, it is far from significant and additionally not 
significantly different from either the TLP or AEP interventions. 
At the final short-delay task there are, once again, no interventions with a 
significant treatment effect. Note however that the AEP intervention significantly 
 
20 Notes on Tables 4-12: The tables show logistic regression coefficients as odds ratios for the 
variables listed in the left column. Numbers below the odds ratios are p-values.  Each column contains 
the result for a different dependent variable, the name of which can be found at the top of the column. 
The bottom three rows show the p-values for the Wald test statistics testing the hypothesis that one 
coefficient is equal to the other. Statistically significant results are marked with asterisks with * 





outperforms the LP intervention at a 10 % level and is only slightly above the 5 % 
level. 
TABLE 5: €20/€50/€250 in one month vs €40/€100/€500 in six months 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES sixmonths40 sixmonths100 sixmonths500 
    
lp 2.247*** 3.046*** 1.410 
 (0.000314) (1.79e-05) (0.190) 
tlp 1.750*** 1.724** 1.086 
 (0.00754) (0.0139) (0.736) 
aep 1.093 1.111 1.370 
 (0.629) (0.587) (0.188) 
Constant 2.200*** 2.726*** 4.913*** 
 (1.67e-09) (0) (0) 
    






















For the first time not just one but two interventions – LP and TLP – turn out to be 
significant. Furthermore, both these interventions are statistically significantly 
different from AEP, although not from one another: The MCoT is insignificant.  
In the second medium-delay task the pattern continues, with LP and TLP being 
significant while AEP is not. However, it is notable that the difference between the 
LP and TLP variables – the MCoT – again reaches statistical significance. 
Furthermore, the differences between the LP and TLP effects and the AEP effect are 
again statistically significant. 
No intervention proves statistically significant on the second high-stakes task, 






TABLE 6: €20/€50/€250 in six months vs €40/€100/€500 in twelve months 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES twelvemonths40 twelvemonths100 twelvemonths500 
    
lp 1.714* 2.666*** 1.018 
 (0.0754) (0.00328) (0.950) 
tlp 1.474 1.614* 0.709 
 (0.174) (0.0896) (0.195) 
aep 0.619** 0.855 1.021 
 (0.0370) (0.501) (0.938) 
Constant 6.351*** 5.800*** 7.774*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
    






















On the first long-delay task the LP intervention turns out to be significant at a 10 per 
cent level, whereas the AEP treatment is negatively significant, meaning it reduced 
the likelihood of participants choosing the larger-later option. Both the LP and TLP 
interventions outperform the AEP by a statistically significant margin, but the 
difference between them is not statistically significant. 
Only the LP intervention reaches statistical significance at a 5 per cent level on 
the second long-delay task, although the TLP treatment is significant at a 10 per cent 
level. The MCoT is once again insignificant.  
Finally, no intervention turns out to be effective on the final task of the 
experiment.  
These results suggest that there is in fact a marginal cost of transparency, with 
the LP intervention outperforming the TLP intervention on 8/9 tasks. It should be 





Still, the pattern of LP more or less consistently outperforming TLP cannot not be 
ignored. 
Nonetheless, the TLP intervention is significant at a 5 per cent level for two 
tasks and significant at a 10 per cent level for another, and thus the answer to the 
question “Do honest nudges work?” appears to be Yes – though they are not as 
effective as hidden nudges. 
However, as will become clear when looking at the regression output that used 
the restricted sample, the picture is more complicated. 
TABLE 7: €20/€50/€250 in one week vs €40/€100/€500 in one month (Restricted 
sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES onemonth40 onemonth100 onemonth500 
    
lp 2.406 2.281 0.905 
 (0.148) (0.236) (0.847) 
tlp 2.008 2.410 1.602 
 (0.216) (0.206) (0.417) 
aep 5.362** 1.831 8.671** 
 (0.0324) (0.339) (0.0427) 
Constant 7.273*** 10.37*** 9.111*** 
 (6.83e-10) (2.63e-10) (3.13e-10) 
    






















Immediately there is a clear difference in treatment effect compared to the regression 
that used the less restrictive sample inclusion criteria: While LP and TLP are still 





notable that no intervention has a significantly different effect compared to any other 
intervention as measured by the Wald test scores. 
The results for the second short-delay task in the restricted sample are very 
similar to the unrestricted sample, with no intervention proving successful and no 
treatment effect substantially different from any other. Notable is that the MCoT is 
actually negative, with the TLP intervention ever so slightly outperforming the LP 
intervention. 
In the final short delay task what stands out the most is once again the AEP 
treatment effect, which is statistically significant and also significantly different from 
the LP treatment effect as per the Wald score, which was also the case in the 
equivalent regression that used the larger sample. The MCoT is negative, but again 
insignificant. 
TABLE 8: €20/€50/€250 in one month vs €40/€100/€500 in six months 
(Restricted sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES sixmonths40 sixmonths100 sixmonths500 
    
lp 2.032* 2.700** 1.511 
 (0.0514) (0.0155) (0.321) 
tlp 2.842*** 3.691*** 1.607 
 (0.00652) (0.00287) (0.253) 
aep 1.137 1.354 2.375* 
 (0.695) (0.384) (0.0563) 
Constant 1.935*** 2.370*** 3.789*** 
 (0.00283) (0.000169) (2.40e-07) 
    


























Results here are similar to the same regression with the less restrictive sample. TLP 
is clearly significant while the p-value for the LP variable is 0.001 away from the 
significance threshold. AEP is clearly insignificant, as is the MCoT which once again 
is negative. 
The pattern continues with the LP and TLP interventions being significant for 
the medium-delay tasks, while the AEP remains insignificant. The MCoT is negative 
and insignificant. 
The LP and TLP interventions are insignificant just as was the case with the 
larger sample, but the AEP intervention is now significant. The MCoT is once again 
negative and insignificant. 
TABLE 9: €20/€50/€250 in six months vs €40/€100/€500 in twelve months 
(Restricted sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES twelvemonths40 twelvemonths100 twelvemonths500 
    
lp 0.905 2.096 1.253 
 (0.847) (0.184) (0.642) 
tlp 1.602 3.797** 1.165 
 (0.417) (0.0449) (0.746) 
aep 0.439* 0.783 1.873 
 (0.0666) (0.572) (0.232) 
Constant 9.111*** 6.583*** 6.583*** 
 (3.13e-10) (1.18e-09) (1.18e-09) 
    






















No intervention is significant for the first of the long-delay tasks, although notably 





choosing the larger-later option. Once again, the TLP intervention outperforms the 
LP intervention meaning the MCoT is negative, though it is also once again 
insignificant. 
In the second long-delay task, only the TLP intervention is significant and the 
MCoT is again negative, although as usual insignificant.  
On the final task no intervention turns out to be significant, and there is a 
positive but clearly insignificant MCoT. 
Discussion of results 
What stands out is that the TLP treatment outperforms the LP treatment in the 
regression sets where all participants who failed either attentiveness discerning 
question have been dropped, with a negative MCoT on seven of nine tasks. Although 
the Wald scores suggests these are not significant differences, in my view this is a 
pattern that should not be ignored, though of course one should also caution against 
drawing too strong conclusions based on this, especially considering the relatively 
small sample. 
What these results suggest is that TLP works better when participants pay more 
attention, which at first seems counterintuitive, though it is in line with previous 
experimental studies as discussed in the introduction, as those who are not paying 
attention ought to be more likely to miss the disclaimer revealing the existence and 
purpose of the default option nudge. In other words, it appears the disclaimer has if 
anything a positive impact on the efficacy of the nudge.  
This brings us to the question of how consumers can be nudged even when 
they know that they are being nudged. The likeliest explanation in my view is that 





and “lash out” against the choice architect by actively doing the opposite of what the 
architect wants. In this case, once a participant realizes that the choice architect is 
trying to manipulate him/her to choose the larger-later option, and out of resentment 
over this manipulation, he/she then chooses the smaller-sooner option. Gustavsson 
(2016) showed that the effect of an LP treatment may taper off if repeated often 
enough, presumably as more and more participants figure out what the choice 
architect is doing and lash out against it. Evidence of this type of backlash against 
nudges has also been documented by Arad and Rubenstein (2018) in a series of 
experiments. In this experiment we do not see the same strong pattern of a treatment 
effect tapering off, but it should also be noted that the Gustavsson (2016) study had a 
significantly younger sample and the Arad and Rubenstein experiments had student-
only samples. It may be the case that younger people are more prone both to at first 
go along with a nudge, and then to ‘act out’ if they discover its presence and feel that 
they are being manipulated, which in this case they would do by doing the opposite 
of what the choice architect wants them to.  
Why would this kind of backlash not occur with the TLP intervention? Quite 
simply nudging appears to be a case where honesty pays. By informing the 
participants that there is a nudge and why, participants no longer feel the need to 
“lash out” against the choice architect once they found out, as they do not experience 
the same feeling of having been deceived and manipulated. 
Additionally, it cannot be ruled out that participants are still affected by the 
default option on a psychological level even though they know why it is there, 
similar to how humans can experience a placebo effect even when they know that 





However, the question remains as to why the TLP underperforms the LP 
intervention in the larger sample group. Suppose that many of those who are not 
paying full attention are not reading the TLP disclaimer; should they not logically act 
the same as those in the LP group? Instead, they seem to be less prone to choose the 
larger-later option than they would have been if, like for the LP group, the disclaimer 
had not been there at all.  
One possible explanation could be that those who were not paying full 
attention may in fact have hastily read the disclaimer and picked up the point that 
someone was trying to make them choose something, but not further reflected on 
why or whether this was done in their best interest. This would then trigger some of 
them to reject the option they were being pushed towards because they dislike the 
idea of someone trying to manipulate their choices. Unlike in the LP group, where 
some participants may not realize that they are being pushed towards a certain 
option, in the TLP group everyone who had paid any attention to the disclaimer 
would have known what was going on. Those who read but did not reflect on the 
disclaimer may therefore have been more prone to backlash than those in the LP 
group. 
There is also another possible interpretation of the difference between the two 
samples; rather than attention, it may be the case that those who only managed to 
answer one attentiveness discerning question correctly have a poorer short-term 
memory compared to those who got both of them right. This would provide an 
alternative explanation as to why there is a large difference in AEP treatment effect 
between the full and the restricted sample; participants who cannot remember the list 
of reasons provided for the larger-later option obviously cannot be affected by them. 





LP intervention, as it seems intuitively unlikely these participants could forget what 
the disclaimer said as it was rather short. 
It is worth keeping in mind that a large proportion of the participants in this 
survey are Swedish21. While English proficiency in Sweden is very high it cannot be 
ruled out that some participants in the TLP group did not understand the meaning of 
the disclaimer informing them about the nudge. It is however unlikely that this had 
any greater effect on the results as it is unlikely that many participants 
simultaneously had a such a poor grasp of English that they could not understand the 
disclaimer while simultaneously a good enough grasp of English to pass at least one 
attentiveness discerning question.  
Turning attention to the AEP treatment, there is a great difference between the 
two sets where participants needed only to have passed one attentiveness discerning 
question and those where they needed to have passed both. AEP has a great effect in 
the latter case, likely because, as discussed, these participants were paying more 
attention to the experiment, which likely translated to paying more attention to the 
list of arguments provided in the AEP treatment. It should not come as a surprise to 
anyone that in order for a list of arguments to be effective in convincing a consumer 
to pursue a certain course of action, the consumer has to pay attention to the 
arguments.  
The AEP treatment also appears to work better when rewards are large. This 
may be because participants are more likely to stop and consider their actions 
carefully when large amounts are at stake. This may have made the list of arguments 
more persuasive than with the smaller rewards participants may have simply not 
 





bothered to think too hard about the decision and instead just used their intuition. The 
exception is the first task where, in the restricted sample, the AEP intervention is in 
fact significant. This is likely due to participants having just read the arguments and 
thus having them fresh in mind. 
A separate set of regressions was estimated using only those participants who 
stated that they reside in western Europe (Tables 17-19). Differences in treatment 
effects were small, suggesting western Europeans are not reacting substantially 
differently to the interventions.  
Another separate set used only those participants whose highest educational 
achievement was a high school diploma or less, and who were not currently studying. 
All treatments proved far less effective, suggesting that changing preferences among 
less educated individuals may require other measures. This is a notable finding that 
would not have been possible if not for the use of a mixed sample (as opposed to the 
more common student-only samples). Most notably the TLP intervention turned out 
not to be significant in any intertemporal choice task, while with the full sample, the 
TLP intervention turned out to be significant twice at a 5 % significance level, and 
once at a 10 % significance level. This suggests that lower educated individuals may 
take offense at the idea of an authority trying to guide their choices, even if the 
authority in question is being transparent. It should be noted that the sample size is 
relatively small (N=244), and further research is necessary to confirm whether or not 
this is in fact the case. 
Estimates of sensitivity and specificity were in general poor, in particular 
specificity (see Appendix B, Tables 20-22). This, however, is to be expected as there 





the purpose of this study is not to identify all these variables but rather to determine 
the impact of the treatment variables. 
My first hypothesis stated that the TLP intervention would be ineffective. This 
is clearly not the case. 
My second hypothesis stated that the LP intervention would be just as effective 
as the AEP intervention. This is true in the restricted sample (Tables 7-9), while LP 
easily outperforms AEP among the larger sample (Tables 4-6). 
In summary these results suggest that honest nudges do work reasonably well 
and may even be preferable to hidden nudges provided that participants can be 
assumed to be paying attention during the decision-making process. If stakes are 







These results indicate that nudging can work even if conducted in an open, 
transparent manner, at least in the context of intertemporal choice. While that may be 
seen as a victory for libertarian paternalism, if we accept these results it also means 
that the way that nudges are commonly being used today – without transparency – is 
not just an ethically questionable way of changing consumer behavior, but an 
ethically questionable way that carries little or no gain as the same results can be 
achieved through transparent means, though, as discussed, this depends on 
circumstances. 
Furthermore, these findings also suggest that AEP under the right 
circumstances may be even better than LP/TLP, and it can be argued that if the same 
or similar results can be obtained using an AEP treatment, then an AEP treatment 
should be used as it relies on informing consumers. TLP, while more ethical than LP, 
still will not teach a consumer anything he or she did not already know. When the 
TLP nudge is gone, the consumer’s behavior is likely to revert back to what it was 
before the consumer was nudged. 
Judging from the results of this experiment, the problem with AEP and quite 
possibly also TLP interventions is that they require consumers to pay attention for 
them to be effective, while LP interventions seem to work regardless, which makes 
sense as AEP still requires an active choice. From a policy standpoint, this means 
that AEP/TLP interventions should mainly be used when one can be reasonably 
assured that consumers will be paying attention, and they should be designed in such 
a way as to grab attention. Finally, it is important to note that some AEP 
interventions may be less reliant on consumers paying attention to them, such as 





Future research will investigate whether there may be a marginal cost of 
transparency in contexts other than intertemporal choice and for LP interventions 
other than default options, and future experiments will also be provided in several 
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Appendix A: Survey 
Welcome! 
My name is John Gustavsson and I’m a PhD student at Maynooth University at the 
Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting.  
This survey is an experiment that is part of the research I am doing for my doctoral 
thesis. In this survey, you will be asked a number of questions about how you value 
future income relative to present income – what we economists call “inter-temporal 
choice”.  
You will be posed with a number of scenarios and asked how you would act in them 
(there will be two options in each scenario). These are not purely hypothetical 
scenarios; three (3) of you who answer this survey will be paid in accordance with 
how you answer one (1) of the scenarios. The three who are paid will be randomly 
selected; your answers have no bearing whatsoever on your likelihood of being one 
of them.  
The final part of this survey contains demographic questions (age, gender, what part 
of the world you live in, education level, whether you are currently a student and 
marital status) as well as some questions on consumer behavior and attitudes. If you 
are uncomfortable with answering a demographic question, simply choose the option 
“I’d rather not say” (or write N/A in the box) which is provided for every 
demographic question. All data will be stored in a password-protected folder stored 
in the university system, and there will be no further use of the data beyond this 
study. 
You will be asked to provide me with your email address at the end of the survey – 





to be paid. You are not required to provide your email address, but if you don’t I 
won’t be able to pay you. You will not need to provide your bank account details to 
receive payment. The email addresses will be stored (in a separate password-
protected folder) only until the selected participants have been paid, while the rest of 
the data will be retained for research purposes. You may quit the survey at any time; 
if you quit before finishing the survey, your data will be deleted. You can also 
withdraw your data at any time by emailing me at the email address provided below.  
It must be recognized that, in some circumstances, confidentiality of research data 
and records may be overridden by courts in the event of litigation or in the course of 
investigation by lawful authority. In such circumstances the University will take all 
reasonable steps within law to ensure that confidentiality is maintained to the greatest 
possible extent. 
If you’re interested in learning the findings of this study you’re more than welcome 
to do so; simply indicate your interest when answering the final question.  
If you have any questions or you wish to contact me for any reason, you can reach 
me at john.gustavsson.2010@mumail.ie.  
You must be 18 or older to participate in this survey. This survey will take 
approximately 15 minutes to complete, obviously depending on how much time you 
spend thinking about your decisions. Please read the descriptions on the next page 
carefully. 
By proceeding, you agree to take part in this survey, and have your data stored under 
the conditions outlined above. Thank you for your participation! 
Q1: What time of the month is your birthday? 





Between the 8th and 14th of the month 
Between the 15th and 21st of the month 
After the 22nd of the month 
CONTROL GROUP 
NOTE: 20 euro equals approximately 22 USD, 195 SEK or 18 Pound sterling.  40 
euro equals approximately 88 USD, 390 SEK or 36 Pound Sterling. 
Q2: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 40 euro in one month, or 
20 euro in one week. What do you choose? 
20 euro in one week 
40 euro in one month 
Q3: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 100 euro in one month, or 
50 euro in one week. What do you choose? 
50 euro in one week 
100 euro in one month 
Q4: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 500 euro in one month, or 
250 euro in one week. What do you choose? 
250 euro in one month 
500 euro in one month 
Q5: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 40 euro in six months, or 
20 euro in one month. What do you choose? 
20 euro in one month 





Q6: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 100 euro in six months, or 
50 euro in one month. What do you choose? 
50 euro in one month 
100 euro in six months 
Q7: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 500 euro in six months, or 
250 euro in one month. What do you choose? 
250 euro in one month 
500 euro in six months 
Q8: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 40 euro in twelve months, 
or 20 euro in six months. What do you choose? 
20 euro in six months 
40 euro in twelve months 
Q9: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 100 euro in twelve 
months, or 50 euro in six months. What do you choose? 
50 euro in six months 
100 euro in twelve months 
Q10: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 500 euro in twelve 
months, or 250 euro in six months. What do you choose? 
250 euro in six months 
500 euro in twelve months 
AEP TREATMENT GROUP 
Below, you will be presented with a number of scenarios – you will be asked to 





Before you make your choices, here are a few things that I would like you to take 
into account: 
1) Choosing the “later” option means you have something to look forward to. 
2) Saving means you’ll be better off in the event of a “rainy day” 
3) Every decision that we make is influenced by the choices we’ve made in the past. 
By choosing the larger-later option now, it’ll be easier to do the same in the future – 
you can establish (or strengthen an already existing) good habit. 
4) The interest rate is 100 %, or to put it another way on an annual basis in the first 
three scenarios (one week vs one month, see below) the interest rate is 170 681%, 
while in the second (one month vs six months) and last third (six months vs twelve 
months) of the scenarios it is 428 % and 300 % respectively. 
NOTE: 20 euro equals approximately 22 USD, 195 SEK or 18 Pound sterling.  40 
euro equals approximately 88 USD, 390 SEK or 36 Pound Sterling. 
Q11: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 40 euro in one month, or 
20 euro in one week. What do you choose? 
20 euro in one week 
40 euro in one month 
Q12: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 100 euro in one month, 
or 50 euro in one week. What do you choose? 
50 euro in one week 
100 euro in one month 
Q13: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 500 euro in one month, 





250 euro in one month 
500 euro in one month 
Q14: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 40 euro in six months, or 
20 euro in one month. What do you choose? 
20 euro in one month 
40 euro in six months 
Q15: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 100 euro in six months, 
or 50 euro in one month. What do you choose? 
50 euro in one month 
100 euro in six months 
Q16: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 500 euro in six months, 
or 250 euro in one month. What do you choose? 
250 euro in one month 
500 euro in six months 
Q17: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 40 euro in twelve 
months, or 20 euro in six months. What do you choose? 
20 euro in six months 
40 euro in twelve months 
Q18: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 100 euro in twelve 
months, or 50 euro in six months. What do you choose? 
50 euro in six months 
100 euro in twelve months 
Q19: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 500 euro in twelve 





250 euro in six months 
500 euro in twelve months 
 
Q20: Which argument in favor of choosing the larger-later option did you find the 
most convincing?  
The “Something to look forward to”-argument 
The “Rainy day”-argument 
The “good habit”-argument 
The interest rate-argument 
No difference 
I didn’t find any argument convincing 
I didn’t read them 
LP TREATMENT GROUP 
NOTE: 20 euro equals approximately 22 USD, 195 SEK or 18 Pound sterling.  40 
euro equals approximately 88 USD, 390 SEK or 36 Pound Sterling. 
Q21: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 40 euro in one month, or 20 
euro in one week. If you would prefer to receive 20 euro in one week, please tick this 
box. 
[] 
Q22: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 100 euro in one month, or 







Q23: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 500 euro in one month, or 
250 euro in one week. If you would prefer to receive 20 euro in one week, please tick 
this box. 
[] 
Q24: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 40 euro in six months, or 20 
euro in one month. If you would prefer to receive 20 euro in one month, please tick 
this box. 
[] 
Q25: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 100 euro in six months, or 
50 euro in one month. If you would prefer to receive 50 euro in one month, please 
tick this box. 
[] 
Q26: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 500 euro in six months, or 
250 euro in one month. If you would prefer to receive 250 euro in one month, please 
tick this box. 
[] 
Q27: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 40 euro in twelve months, 
or 20 euro in six months. If you would prefer to receive 20 euro in six months, please 
tick this box. 
[] 
Q28: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 100 euro in twelve months, 
or 50 euro in six months. If you would prefer to receive 50 euro in six months, please 






Q29: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 500 euro in twelve months, 
or 250 euro in six months. If you would prefer to receive 250 euro in six months, 
please tick this box. 
[] 
TLP TREATMENT GROUP 
BEFORE YOU PROCEED, BE AWARE THAT THE DEFAULT OPTION FOR 
THIS SECTION IS THE LARGER-LATER OPTION (RECEIVING 40/100/500 
EURO AFTER A LONGER DELAY RATHER THAN 20/50/250 AFTER A 
SHORTER). DEFAULT OPTIONS ARE KNOWN TO AFFECT THE DECISIONS 
MADE BY CONSUMERS AND THE DEFAULT OPTION HAS BEEN SET THIS 
WAY TO HELP YOU MAKE GOOD, FORWARD-LOOKING CHOICES. 
NOTE: 20 euro equals approximately 22 USD, 195 SEK or 18 Pound sterling. 40 
euro equals approximately 44 USD, 390 SEK or 36 Pound Sterling. 
Q30: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 40 euro in one month, or 20 
euro in one week. If you would prefer to receive 20 euro in one week, please tick this 
box. 
[] 
Q31: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 100 euro in one month, or 
50 euro in one week. If you would prefer to receive 20 euro in one week, please tick 
this box. 
[] 
Q32: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 500 euro in one month, or 







Q33: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 40 euro in six months, or 20 
euro in one month. If you would prefer to receive 20 euro in one month, please tick 
this box. 
[] 
Q34: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 100 euro in six months, or 
50 euro in one month. If you would prefer to receive 50 euro in one month, please 
tick this box. 
[] 
Q35: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 500 euro in six months, or 
250 euro in one month. If you would prefer to receive 250 euro in one month, please 
tick this box. 
[] 
Q36: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 40 euro in twelve months, 
or 20 euro in six months. If you would prefer to receive 20 euro in six months, please 
tick this box. 
[] 
Q37: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 100 euro in twelve months, 
or 50 euro in six months. If you would prefer to receive 50 euro in six months, please 
tick this box. 
[] 
Q38: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 500 euro in twelve months, 





please tick this box. 
[] 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS 





I’d rather not say 











I’d rather not say 







I’d rather not say 
Q42: Are you a full-time student (or a graduate of the class of 2016)? 
Yes 
No 
I’d rather not say 







Q44: Thinking about your personal finances, do you think you should save more than 




I’d rather not say 
Q45: If Yes, why don’t you? 
I don’t feel like I can afford it 
Lack of motivation 
Forgetfulness 





Q46: What gender do you identify as? 
Male 
Female 
I’d rather not say 
Q47: Do you think you are prone to be affected by psychologically manipulative 




I don’t know 
Q48: What is the highest level of education that you have achieved? 
High school/Post-primary school or less 
Undergraduate degree 
Postgraduate degree/Postgraduate diploma 
I’d rather not say 
Q49: Do you currently save regularly? 
Yes, through a pension plan 
Yes, privately/both privately and through a pension plan 
No 
I’d rather not say 
Q50: How many intertemporal choice scenarios (questions where you were asked to 











Q51: Do you think that your consumer choices are affected by the order that the 
options (such as, items in a shop) are presented in? 
Yes 
No 
I don’t know 






Q53: Do you think that saving is a moral obligation for those who are able to save? 
Yes 
No 
Q54: Do you usually plan your consumption ahead of time (budgeting)? 
Yes 
No 
I’d rather not say 
Q55: Thinking back, do you think your attitude towards saving and whether it’s 





Yes, I’m more positive to saving today than when I was younger 
Yes, I’m more negative to saving today than when I was younger 
No 
I’d rather not say 
Q56: Please provide your email address in the field below (this is voluntary but it’s 
necessary for you to have a chance to be paid as I need to be able to get in touch with 
you). 
Q57: Do you have any comments, questions or feedback in general? If you would 






Appendix B: Additional statistical analysis 
TABLE 10: €20/€50/€250 in one week vs €40/€100/€500 in one month (control 
variables included) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES onemonth40 onemonth100 onemonth500 
    
lp 1.789 1.861 0.792 
 (0.210) (0.213) (0.521) 
tlp 0.648 0.909 0.838 
 (0.214) (0.810) (0.621) 
aep 1.510 0.903 1.576 
 (0.307) (0.787) (0.254) 
agebelow36 0.766 0.834 1.416 
 (0.423) (0.609) (0.316) 
male 1.148 0.988 0.738 
 (0.711) (0.975) (0.469) 
nopostgrad 1.005 1.243 0.745 
 (0.988) (0.482) (0.296) 
Constant 14.65*** 16.34*** 20.63*** 
 (2.79e-09) (6.80e-09) (4.94e-10) 
    




























TABLE 11: €20/€50/€250 in one month vs €40/€100/€500 in six months (control 
variables included) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES sixmonths40 sixmonths100 sixmonths500 
    
lp 2.082*** 2.803*** 1.297 
 (0.00185) (9.63e-05) (0.335) 
tlp 1.591** 1.618** 0.996 
 (0.0331) (0.0332) (0.987) 
aep 1.074 1.135 1.404 
 (0.718) (0.534) (0.180) 
agebelow36 0.392*** 0.551*** 0.868 
 (8.22e-08) (0.00141) (0.520) 
male 1.407* 1.165 0.859 
 (0.0882) (0.477) (0.568) 
nopostgrad 0.840 0.896 0.797 
 (0.295) (0.529) (0.253) 
Constant 2.510*** 3.056*** 6.916*** 
 (0.000180) (1.71e-05) (9.83e-10) 
    



























TABLE 12: €20/€50/€250 in six months vs €40/€100/€500 in twelve months 
(control variables included) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES twelvemonths40 twelvemonths100 twelvemonths500 
    
lp 1.607 2.933*** 0.963 
 (0.132) (0.00256) (0.898) 
tlp 1.374 1.562 0.678 
 (0.276) (0.118) (0.148) 
aep 0.591** 0.845 1.073 
 (0.0289) (0.484) (0.801) 
agebelow36 0.849 0.923 1.232 
 (0.469) (0.734) (0.398) 
male 2.276*** 1.731** 1.434 
 (0.000331) (0.0255) (0.165) 
nopostgrad 0.760 0.765 0.665* 
 (0.191) (0.216) (0.0582) 
Constant 4.195*** 4.418*** 7.057*** 
 (9.88e-07) (9.03e-07) (1.62e-09) 
    























TABLE 13: Variance inflation factor (VIF) 
Variable   VIF 
Male   3.11 
nopostgrad   2.26 
aep   1.63 
tlp   1.55 
lp   1.51 
agebelow36   1.41 
      







TABLE 14: €20/€50/€250 in one week vs €40/€100/€500 in one month (exact 
logistic regression)22 
 (1) (2) (3)  
VARIABLES onemonth40 onemonth100 onemonth500  
     
lp 2.394339 2.270539 .9060348  
 (0.2230) (0.3706) (1.0000)  
tlp 5.318547** 1.825082 8.589063**  
 (0.0329) (0.5078) (0.0307)  
aep 1.999577 2.397974 1.598086  
 (0.3209) (0.3247) (0.5950)  
     
Observations 323 323 323  
     
 
TABLE 15: €20/€50/€250 in one month vs €40/€100/€500 in six months (exact 
logistic regression) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES sixmonths40 sixmonths100 sixmonths500 
    
lp 2.02359* 2.684273** 1.507643 
 (0.0717) (0.0205) (0.4290) 
tlp 1.135816 1.352048 2.363414* 
 (0.8205) (0.4858) (0.0800) 
aep 2.824378*** 3.664153*** 1.602881 
 (0.0084) (0.0029) (0.3438) 
    
Observations 323 323 323 




22 Notes on Tables 14-16: The tables show logistic regression coefficients as odds ratios for the 
variables listed in the left column. Numbers below the odds ratios are p-values.  Each column contains 
the result for a different dependent variable, the name of which can be found at the top of the column. 
Statistically significant results are marked with asterisks with * denoting significant at 90%, ** 





TABLE 16: €20/€50/€250 in six months vs €40/€100/€500 in twelve months 
(exact logistic regression) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES twelvemonths40 twelvemonths100 twelvemonths500 
    
lp .9060348 2.087289 1.251469 
 (1.0000) (0.2732) (0.8271) 
tlp .4411514* .7839891 1.86676 
 (0.0987) (0.7256) (0.3379) 
aep 1.598086 3.770943* 1.163513 
 (0.5950) (0.0580) (0.9322) 
    
Observations 323 323 323 
    
 
TABLE 17: €20/€50/€250 in one week vs €40/€100/€500 in one month (Western 
Europe-only sample)23 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES onemonth40 onemonth100 onemonth500 
    
lp 1.546 1.984 0.739 
 (0.332) (0.206) (0.418) 
tlp 0.661 0.887 0.752 
 (0.255) (0.780) (0.444) 
aep 1.419 0.807 1.190 
 (0.391) (0.591) (0.656) 
Constant 14.80*** 18.75*** 14.80*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
    
























23 Notes on Tables 17-19: The tables show logistic regression coefficients as odds ratios for the 
variables listed in the left column. Numbers below the odds ratios are p-values.  Each column contains 
the result for a different dependent variable, the name of which can be found at the top of the column. 
The bottom three rows show the p-values for the Wald test statistics testing the hypothesis that one 
coefficient is equal to the other. Statistically significant results are marked with asterisks with * 





TABLE 18: €20/€50/€250 in one month vs €40/€100/€500 in six months (Western 
Europe-only sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES sixmonths40 sixmonths100 sixmonths500 
    
lp 2.758*** 3.626*** 1.573 
 (5.16e-05) (1.18e-05) (0.106) 
tlp 1.864*** 1.863** 1.133 
 (0.00652) (0.0113) (0.632) 
aep 1.162 1.075 1.466 
 (0.454) (0.731) (0.136) 
Constant 2.203*** 2.823*** 4.643*** 
 (1.76e-08) (0) (0) 
    






















TABLE 19: €20/€50/€250 in six months vs €40/€100/€500 in twelve months 
(Western Europe-only sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES twelvemonths40 twelvemonths100 twelvemonths500 
    
lp 2.462** 4.097*** 1.393 
 (0.0137) (0.000482) (0.293) 
tlp 1.386 1.650* 0.734 
 (0.291) (0.0972) (0.260) 
aep 0.593** 0.853 1.064 
 (0.0367) (0.521) (0.822) 
Constant 6.645*** 5.583*** 6.900*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
    





































Onemonth40 100 0 0.5766 
Onemonth100 100 0 0.5543 
Onemonth500 100 0 0.5695 
Sixmonths40 100 0 0.5841 
Sixmonths100 100 0 0.6017 
Sixmonths500 100 0 0.5397 
Twelvemonths40 100 0 0.6090 
Twelvemonths100 100 0 0.6053 
Twelvemonths500 100 0 0.5349 
 










Onemonth40 100 0 0.6225 
Onemonth100 100 0 0.5780 
Onemonth500 100 0 0.5994 
Sixmonths40 97.73% 6.72% 0.6593 
Sixmonths100 100 0 0.6269 
Sixmonths500 100 0 0.5669 
Twelvemonths40 100 0 0.6578 
Twelvemonths100 100 0 0.6348 




24 Notes on Tables 20-22: The cutoff score when estimating sensitivity and specificity is 0.5. The first 
column shows a list of dependent variables, with the columns next to it displaying the sensitivity, 















Onemonth40 100 0 0.6529 
Onemonth100 100 0 0.5989 
Onemonth500 100 0 0.6507 
Sixmonths40 100 0 0.6100 
Sixmonths100 100 0 0.6367 
Sixmonths500 100 0 0.5844 
Twelvemonths40 100 0 0.6242 
Twelvemonths100 100 0 0.6475 
Twelvemonths500 100 0 0.5586 
 
TABLE 23: €20/€50/€250 in one week vs €40/€100/€500 in one month (Including 
only participants below Age 36)25 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES onemonth40 onemonth100 onemonth500 
    
lp 1.485 1.219 0.409 
 (0.589) (0.793) (0.236) 
tlp 0.855 1.219 0.710 
 (0.804) (0.793) (0.683) 
aep 3.000 2.463 2.913 
 (0.188) (0.292) (0.360) 
    
Constant 11.00*** 13.40*** 23.00*** 
 (4.690) (6.212) (13.56) 
    
























25 Notes on Tables 23-28: The tables show logistic regression coefficients as odds ratios for the 
variables listed in the left column. Numbers below the odds ratios are p-values.  Each column contains 
the result for a different dependent variable, the name of which can be found at the top of the column. 
The bottom three rows show the p-values for the Wald test statistics testing the hypothesis that one 
coefficient is equal to the other. Statistically significant results are marked with asterisks with * 





TABLE 24: €20/€50/€250 in one months vs €40/€100/€500 in six months 
(Including only participants below Age 36) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES sixmonths40 sixmonths100 sixmonths500 
    
lp 2.111** 2.662** 1.328 
 (0.046) (0.018) (0.560) 
tlp 1.788 1.762 1.153 
 (0.116) (0.145) (0.763) 
aep 2.049** 2.524** 1.810 
 (0.038) (0.014) (0.216) 
    
Constant 0.895 1.400 4.143*** 
 (0.211) (0.335) (1.234) 
    






















TABLE 25: €20/€50/€250 in six months vs €40/€100/€500 in twelve months 
(Including only participants below Age 36) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES twelvemonths40 twelvemonths100 twelvemonths500 
    
lp 0.484 0.992 0.597 
 (0.121) (0.987) (0.326) 
tlp 1.516 1.383 0.804 
 (0.474) (0.551) (0.692) 
aep 0.622 1.182 2.000 
 (0.296) (0.730) (0.277) 
    
Constant 6.200*** 5.545*** 8.000*** 
 (2.113) (1.817) (3.000) 
    



























TABLE 26: €20/€50/€250 in one week vs €40/€100/€500 in one month (Including 
only participants whose highest educational qualification is a high school 
diploma or less) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES onemonth40 onemonth100 onemonth500 
    
lp 4.052 3.186 1.158 
 (0.209) (0.307) (0.828) 
tlp 1.121 1.831 1.368 
 (0.870) (0.495) (0.641) 
aep 2.586 1.333 2.070 
 (0.267) (0.714) (0.320) 
Constant 11.60*** 14.75*** 9.500*** 
 (1.45e-07) (1.90e-07) (1.56e-07) 
    






















TABLE 27: €20/€50/€250 in one month vs €40/€100/€500 in six months 
(Including only participants whose highest educational qualification is a high 
school diploma or less) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES sixmonths40 sixmonths100 sixmonths500 
    
lp 1.848 3.178** 1.105 
 (0.201) (0.0359) (0.852) 
tlp 1.355 1.930 0.985 
 (0.482) (0.154) (0.976) 
aep 1.063 1.393 1.274 
 (0.881) (0.432) (0.637) 
Constant 2.706*** 2.706*** 5.300*** 
 (0.000453) (0.000453) (1.32e-06) 
    



























TABLE 28: €20/€50/€250 in one month vs €40/€100/€500 in six months 
(Including only participants whose highest educational qualification is a high 
school diploma or less) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES twelvemonths40 twelvemonths100 twelvemonths500 
    
lp 1.600 4.865** 1.239 
 (0.466) (0.0466) (0.684) 
tlp 1.212 2.750 1.269 
 (0.738) (0.101) (0.637) 
aep 0.756 1.428 1.974 
 (0.586) (0.479) (0.210) 
Constant 6.875*** 4.727*** 4.727*** 
 (3.49e-07) (2.86e-06) (2.86e-06) 
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This thesis studied critical issues in behavioral economics.  Its key findings are that 
so-called “irrational” biases generally do not reduce and may enhance individual 
welfare and that nudging can both be ethical and effective, at least in the short run.  
Issues with survey methods and research design that were encountered in this 
research must be acknowledged and addressed and new research questions that arose 
can be pursued in future research. 
Chapter 1 concluded that most biases that were tested have no impact on 
mental health, income, or most socially desirable/destructive behaviors. To the extent 
there is an impact, it appears to be small. Future research should investigate whether 
other biases and fallacies than those studied may affect the dependent variables, and 
whether there is in fact a causal link between the biases on the one hand and the 
dependent variables on the other. This could best be accomplished through a 
longitudinal study, which would track a number of participants over a number of 
years to understand how their biases, income, mental health and habits change over 
time. 
Chapter 2 found that while nudges (Libertarian paternalism; LP) can be 
temporarily effective at altering time preferences, the effect of a nudge tapers off if 
repeated. An autonomy-enhancing paternalist (AEP) intervention tested in the same 
experiment was found to be ineffective, and neither intervention proved to have a 
lasting effect among subjects who took the same experiment again one week later 
without the intervention present. The possibility that nudges taper off, and that 
nudging thus may be a less effective policymaking tool than previously believed, is 





Chapter 3 found that transparent nudges can be just as effective as traditional, 
hidden nudges, provided that participants are paying full attention. Additionally, a 
different, stronger AEP intervention was also found to be effective, in particular 
among those participants who were paying full attention where it proved to be more 
effective than either the LP or TLP intervention. Further research is, however, 
necessary to determine whether this holds true in contexts other than intertemporal 
choice, and whether or not nudges other than the “default option” nudge also retain 
their efficiency when made transparent. 
A key decision that all survey-based research must answer is which platform to 
use to host the surveys. The platform required for this research had to allow the 
inclusion of question skip logic, meaning participants could face a different set of 
questions depending on their answer to one question. This was vital to ensure that 
participants could be divided into treatment and control groups. Without question 
skip logic, all participants would have faced all the same tasks, making an 
experiment impossible. In addition, the platform had to be able to collect a large 
number of responses and to export all individual responses to Microsoft Excel, and 
ideally the platform would be able to do so at a reasonable cost. Finally, to avoid 
platform associated “teething” issues, the platform had to be well established. 
SurveyMonkey fulfilled all of these criteria, and was used for the first two 
experiments, which were the foundations for Chapters 2 and 3. The third experiment 
was instead hosted on the QuestionPro platform. The change was motivated mainly 
by budgetary reasons, as QuestionPro was able to perform the necessary functions at 





not charge per response no matter the number of respondents26. Since one of the big 
advantages of online surveys is the ability to have a large sample size, it is important 
that having a large sample size not be cost-prohibitive. 
Each experiment in the end did have a large sample size compared to typical 
lab experiments, in particular the latter two, but while the samples were large, very 
few participants came from outside the western world. In no experiment did enough 
participants reside in any country outside the OECD to be able to isolate and estimate 
regressions using only those participants, in the way that was done with participants 
from the USA (Chapter 2) and the western world (Chapter 3).  
Two factors appear to have contributed to this. First, the surveys were 
advertised in English and Swedish, on sites and social media groups whose audience 
were mainly in the Anglosphere and Scandinavia. While anyone could, in theory, 
have seen or shared the posts advertising the surveys on social media, there is no 
doubt that this advertisement strategy was a contributing factor.  
Secondly, the surveys were only available in English. While using translation 
software to make the surveys available in other languages, such as Spanish and 
French, was considered, a good enough translation for surveys in an academic 
research context could not be guaranteed. Thus, it was not pursued. If one question 
had been mistranslated and the meaning of the question changed or become unclear 
to the participant, the data would have become polluted. 
Hiring a professional translator was also considered, but unfortunately this 
option was too expensive given the available research budget. 
 
26 SurveyMonkey offers a number of membership plans. I used the “Standard Monthly” plan which 






Despite conducting the surveys in English, it was clear that some participants 
struggled with understanding some of the questions. This was mainly an issue in the 
Chapter 1 experiment, where participants were asked a number of sensitive, personal 
questions regarding, among other things, their annual income. A number of 
participants misunderstood the question and put down their monthly income or put 
down their income in a different currency than the currency they were being paid in. 
Data also showed that the frequency of obesity in the sample was far below that 
recorded in most countries in the western world, which is likely due to a combination 
of participants not wanting to admit to being obese and/or participants not knowing 
that they are obese.  
In retrospect, conducting a pilot study as part of the first chapter may have at 
least partially resolved these issues as it may have indicated their presence and 
allowed the questions to be rephrased before beginning the final survey. 
One important difference between the second and third chapters was the 
inclusion of a follow-up survey in the second chapter designed to test the 
permanency of the LP and AEP interventions. After having found that neither had 
any permanent effect on intertemporal choices, a follow-up survey was not included 
in the research design. In retrospect, this was a mistake, since the third chapter 
introduced a new intervention (TLP) which the second chapter did not test for and 
because the AEP intervention in the third chapter experiment was significantly 
stronger than the version used in the second chapter. It is conceivable that either of 
these interventions may have a long-term effect on behavior even after they are 






Despite these issues, this thesis represents a step towards a greater 
understanding of nudging and its alternatives, as well as an understanding of how 
biases and fallacies impact consumers not just in specific situations, but in terms of 
mental health, income and commitment to socially desirable and destructive 
behaviors. 
 
